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The War against the Female Soldier? The Effects of Masculine Culture on Workplace Aggression

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Abstract

This study intends to analyze the relationship between military culture, masculine norms, attitude toward women, and workplace aggression. By using a paper-pencil survey in the Austrian Armed Forces, we show that overall 6.5 percent of all soldiers in the sample suffer from severe, long-term collective aggression (bullying). The detailed analysis suggests that systematic workplace aggression is associated with a culture with high power orientation and adherence to traditional (masculine) military norms. It occurs most often within socialization processes in training centers as well as in combat units. Conversely, culture in support units has high levels of task orientation with a comparably positive attitude toward female soldiers and less reported workplace aggression. The data reveal the gender dimension of workplace aggression in the Austrian Armed Forces: women are significantly more vulnerable to bullying. Almost every second soldier declares to have observed and every tenth soldier admits to have conducted aggressive acts against women.

Keywords

hypermasculinity, culture, workplace aggression, integration, military

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Introduction

In 2007, an officer in the Austrian Armed Forces approached the authors with a request to scientifically analyze incidences of workplace bullying which had occurred a few years prior during his early years of officer training. It had since then bothered him. In an interview, he confessed that he was taking part in collective aggression against women in the Austrian Armed Forces: “. . . The only two women soldiers who have made it to the academy were fully isolated and humiliated by all of us (. . .) we purposefully did not share important information or material with them. In class, when the two girls would start to speak, we all grunted like pigs (. . .) nobody wanted to join the girls-platoon because this meant to be made fun of by the rest of the comrades. I wasn’t fully aware what was happening, but, (.) yes, I also took part in harassing. The commander tolerated and even promoted aggression against the women (. . .) One of them left service in the course of the year, and by the end of the first year the last female soldier of our year also had finally thrown in the towel (. . .)” (Josef Pichlhuber, 32 years, Officer in the Austrian Armed Forces).¹

This anecdote was the starting point for our interest in systematic workplace aggression in male-dominated work environments. In 2009–2011, we conducted an empirical study in the Austrian Armed forces which is presented in this article.

The Austrian Armed Forces is an army with conscription for males and voluntary access for women since 1998. Austria is a full member of the European Union and the United Nations. Due to its neutral status, Austria is not a full North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member but has signed a “partnership for peace.” The main three responsibilities of the Austrian army are national defense, emergency aid, and peacekeeping missions abroad. Peacekeeping missions include trouble spots like the Golan Heights, Bosnia, the Lebanon as well as the Kosovo, where Austria sent a mechanized company and support units to the NATO-led Kosovo-Force (KFOR) troops and took command of KFOR’s Multinational Task Force South (MNTF-S) in early 2008.²

In 1998, the army opened all career paths, including combat units, to women. The number of females in the Austrian Armed Forces remains minimal: As of today, there are 363 women serving in the Austrian Armed Forces, representing approximately 1.8 percent of all professional soldiers.³ A drop-out rate of more than 58 percent suggests severe problems with the integration of women. Factors like conscription service, the political environment in the country, societal values, and division of labor, are considered to influence the rate of female participation in armies.⁴ Apart from that, internal cultural processes and resistance may account for the low number of female soldiers.⁵

Qualitative studies on many national armies reveal frequent aggression toward female soldiers like misogynic jokes, denigrating glances, and sexual harassment.⁶ If this form of aggression is perceived repetitively and over a significant period of time by a targeted individual, it is classified as “bullying.”⁷ Bullying is assumed to flourish in highly competitive cultures and in cultures with an extreme degree of conformity and group pressure, in cultures with norms that legitimate the

existence of domineering and punishment rituals and the instrumental use of aggression for workers' motivation.⁸

Hence, it stands to reason that military cultures are prone to bullying through the potential abuse of formal authority by supervisors and the high value of group cohesion. In such a situation, expulsion from the in-group is the worst punishment and is applied to "deviant" soldiers.⁹ Moreover, the gendered division of labor can impact the level of exhibited aggression: various scholars suggest that in particular elite combat troops of armed forces have a "hypermasculine" culture. This includes a high level of aggression and a strong differentiation and denigration of everyone who does not comply with (hegemonial) masculine standards, be it women or "insufficient" males.¹⁰

To the best of our knowledge, the specific relationship between (gendered) cultural norms and systematic bullying has rarely been empirically analyzed. Apart from the analysis of sexual harassment of women, only a few notable (qualitative) studies for military institutions exist which have investigated severe organizational misconduct in subunits of national armies.¹¹ Studies report severe institutionalized hazing against freshmen by superiors and peers.¹² A study within a paramilitary organization in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland revealed that bullying actions are endemic, especially in "masculine" operative units as part of the socialization process to separate in-group members from out-group members. Aggression was applied instrumentally to protect the white male organizational culture from minorities, namely black people and women.¹³

In this study, we analyze how military norms and workplace aggression are systematically interrelated across subunits of the military. In the second section, a review of literature shows that the internal social organization of military institutions fosters (low-level) aggression and denigration of out-group members in training centers and combat units. Furthermore, it is explained why women soldiers per se do not conform to gendered military norms and are hence vulnerable to out-group member status and systematic aggression. The section concludes with hypotheses to be tested empirically. In particular, we are interested in whether members of different military units display different cultural and gender norms associated with organizational misconduct in the form of bullying. The third section presents the method, sample and instruments, and the results are presented in the fourth section. We conclude the analysis with a discussion of results and limitations in the fifth section.

Theoretical Background

The Social Organization of Military Institutions

According to Max Weber, military organizations can be described as ideal bureaucracies, having a well-designed system of roles organized in hierarchical structures as well as predefined procedures and control mechanisms; all of these factors are ensuring high performance.¹⁴ Even then Weber discerned a certain contradiction

between the effective disciplining of the community of soldiers through bureaucratic mechanisms and the wish of single individuals to dominate and “fight out the line” in order to stand out as war heroes in combat.¹⁵ Translating these ideas to the typology of Harrison and Stokes,¹⁶ military organizations are deemed primarily role oriented with aspects of power orientation, where members tend to struggle for dominance and abuse their power for personal advantage. Archer argues that the hybrid existence of power and role orientations is deficient in nonoperational activities. In these instances frustration, that is, lack of opportunity for dominance or unease with role assignments, predominates.¹⁷

Western military systems have undergone profound changes within the last decades. Among them are the introduction of volunteer armies, rationalization processes in alignment with the changes in civil organizations, and stronger involvement in military missions other than war. New technologies in warfare have lowered the proportion of combatants but have increased the relevance of nonmilitary expertise. This has increased administrative and support functions and the number of civilian personnel (in noncombat positions).¹⁸ All these changes cited above are believed to have shifted the vocational/institutional character of the profession—with a high level of intrinsic motivation, normative values, role commitment, and bureaucracy—to a more “occupational” one. These institutions now resemble civilian organizations, characterized by expertise orientation and task orientation as well as meritocratic and economic aspects in selection and promotion.¹⁹ Yet, empirical studies have shown that institutional values in military systems are persistent due to the distinct and institutional character of the profession (having the monopoly on organized violence and dealing with life-threatening situations).²⁰ Carreiras suggests that postmodern military will be pluralized and segmented and that cultural norms are likely to differ across subunits: the support units, which now closely interact with civilian society, will become more occupational, whereas units, which operate in life-threatening situations and hence remain clearly distinct from civil society, will remain institutional.²¹

Military training in national armies, including peacekeeping armies, focuses essentially on the preparation for a combat emergency, that is, high-intensity war fighting.²² Combat morale and task and social cohesion are believed to lie at the heart of the operational effectiveness of (small) combat units.²³ Empirical studies suggest, however, that social cohesion is not a prerequisite for effectiveness, but rather a result of the stern socialization process during basic training, where combat morale and separation from old civilian values is trained.²⁴ Bureaucracy overload like excessive rules and regulations “depersonalizes” the responsibility for violence, which enables new members to distance themselves from the moral dimension of their behavior and old “civilian” values.²⁵ Moreover, soldiers are depersonalized with severe psychological and physical stress tests including constant monitoring and punishment to indoctrinate “new” combat values of obedience and endurance. This struggle, consequently, fosters bonding between cadets.²⁶ The “exclusivity” culture with distinctive uniforms, values, and rites promotes cohesion and separation

from outside-military life. Punishment rites against new members, who are still out-group members and have to prove their attachment to military values, is considered functional and serves as preparation for dehumanizing the enemy. Denigration and punishment increases the desire to belong to the exclusive in-group and results in high group loyalty after the test is passed.²⁷ In her study on hazing within the naval academy, Pershing found that peer loyalty might even outweigh persistent organizational norms. An informal “code of silence” forbids midshipmen, who share a common struggle through excessive monitoring and regulation, to report severe abusive behavior of their peers (it is official duty for “honorable” navy men to report misconduct of “honor”),²⁸ a process which institutionalizes aggression.

Gendered Norms

Institutionalized aggression cannot be understood without a gendered approach, as images of masculinity and femininity are central for their social organization and the inherence of aggression: Violence and warfare have been constructed as essentially male, whereas femininity is equaled with weakness and peace.²⁹ Scholars link institutionalized gender norms in the military to the construction of masculine hegemony, the legitimization of (heterosexual) male dominance over females, and the normative embodiment of the ideal man with physical strength as precondition.³⁰ As only few of men reach the ideal, hegemonial masculinity creates competition among men and the need to differentiate from allegedly subordinate, “insufficient” or “deviant” males and, of course, females. According to Connell, violence is not a prerequisite but can be supportive in the creation of hegemonial masculinities,³¹ as it is considered a legitimate means to achieve distinction and sustain supremacy of masculine values.³²

Empirical studies reveal that in formal and informal tests on masculine values like assertiveness and coolness, where failure is equaled with femininity, soldiers have to prove that they are not women.³³ Symbolic manifestations like punishment rituals, e.g., the assignment of lowly “feminine” jobs (kitchen duties and sweeping) or frequent use of curse words, like “faggot” or “girls,” to subordinate recruits demonstrate the informal gender order in military institutions.³⁴ Expressions of exaggerated masculinity concomitant with dehumanization and sexual objectification of women, known as hypermasculine behavior, assure that no “real” man is labeled gay. Hypermasculine behavior has been found in highly cohesive male-only groups, where male peer support has proven beneficial for violence against women.³⁵ Rosen et al. demonstrate in an empirical survey of more than 1,400 soldiers in Alaska that male-only troops tend to exhibit hypermasculine cultures associated with high cohesion and a strong denigration of women.³⁶ Even with the inclusion of women, Rosen et al. found persistent gender norms do not necessarily change.³⁷

Institutionalized gender norms also affect affiliation and promotion criteria. Male-based physical performance standards serve as norm for inclusion or exclusion to

service and determine informal hierarchies: the autonomous, strong, and risk-taking combat soldiers who execute the mandate of violence spearhead the internal hierarchy, and opportunities for promotion and career advancement relate to the (physical) performance in combat units. Supply officers and clerks, engaged in “administrative” feminine tasks, hold the lowest informal status.³⁸

The Situation of Women in Western Armed Forces

(Subtle) resistance against women is illustrated in the gendered division of labor in national armies. As Carreiras shows in her analysis of female participation in armies of NATO countries in 2000, the average proportion of women was 70.4 percent in support and medical functions and 28 percent in technical functions. Only 7 percent of females are in combat functions, whereas 22.2 percent of all males are in combat functions.³⁹ Albeit women have played a factual role as combatants in western armies in the past, official access to (distinctive) combat units is restricted in many national armies.⁴⁰ Arguments against the full integration of women display widely held “cultural” norms and persistent beliefs. Arguments include a weaker physical and psychological condition of women and specific female conditions like pregnancy and menstruation, which allegedly weaken combat effectiveness.⁴¹ Opponents argue that lowering the affiliation criteria or introducing gendered physical affiliation tests, as many armies have undergone, would make the whole organization less competitive. Apelt et al. contend that with binary, gender-specific fitness criteria, which have been introduced in many national armies, the binary gender order is fostered, and physical fitness appears even more important than it might actually be in modern warfare.⁴² The fear of losing group cohesion and military effectiveness is an argument cited against the inclusion of women or homosexuals to combat, despite the fact that the effect of diversity on task cohesion and performance is widely challenged.⁴³ The inclusion of women is thought to spark sexual arousal which could endanger social cohesion.⁴⁴ The rationale behind this argument is the ascription of sexuality to females who then allegedly distract organizational collective interests.⁴⁵ Another reason for resistance against the integration of women is the fear of a potential loss of professional prestige of masculinity.⁴⁶

Women hold a token status in national armies worldwide (e.g., United States 14 percent, Russia 14.4 percent, Germany 9.7 percent).⁴⁷ Tokenism refers to performance and assimilation pressures and stereotyped views for women in minority positions (less than 15 percent) due to numerical imbalance, lower social gender status, occupational inappropriateness, and intrusiveness.⁴⁸ In token situations, the female minority frequently suffers from boundary drawing activities of the majority, which can include isolation and misogynic behavior. Indeed, studies of national armies reveal strong role pressure for women and boundary heightening like misogynic jokes, denigrating glances, sexual harassment, and so on.⁴⁹ Numerous studies illustrate how women react by applying typical token coping strategies, that is,

distancing from traditional femininity, assimilation to majority norms, and trivialization of discrimination, which leave the existing masculine culture unchallenged.⁵⁰

In conclusion, multiple aspects reveal that (low-level) aggression is conforming to military norms and is applied instrumentally during socialization processes in training centers to provide for conformity to organizational values and to prepare soldiers for (potential) combat. Severe organizational misconduct in the form of bullying may be provoked through high pressure on members to comply with military core values: the high value of “exclusivity” is achieved through denigration of out-group members as preparation for dehumanizing the enemy. Masculine norms and rites that place value on domineering behavior provide distinction to members and legitimize the application of violence against deviants, especially women. Moreover, loyalty to (male) peers as “companions of fate” and punishment of out-group members increase in-group pressure and condone aggression against deviants. During nonoperative periods, opportunities for “male dominance” and factual power are scarce; role assignments, constant monitoring and masculinity pressures, including punishment, may cause frustration, which can be a thriving ground for aggression against weaker members, as proposed by Barrett.⁵¹ His suggestion is in line with research on bullying, where much of the etiology rests upon the frustration–aggression hypothesis: it explains how feelings of frustration and fear lead to tensions which are often relieved through bullying actions.⁵²

Hypotheses

As suggested by several authors, the hybrid existences of power and role culture elements in military culture can be dysfunctional in noncombat times. Hence, in the case of the peacekeeping Austrian Armed Forces, the abuse of roles und bureaucratic regulations for individual domineering behavior, severe punishment, and excessive monitoring can likely be perceived as not effective, but rather as arbitrary and “redundant” aggression against organizational members. Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Perceptions of power culture and reported aggression exposure are positively correlated.

In order to verify the relationship between workplace aggression and perceived culture, we have to take into account that military culture is persistent, yet not homogenous. In accordance with the theoretical contributions on the presence of institutional values and compartmentalization from “civil life,” we expect training centers and combat units, which also take part in NATO-Task forces, to remain clearly distinct from civilian professions and to display role orientation with aspects of power orientation in the Weberian sense. A high level of role orientation is considered a prerequisite for military training and combat effectiveness, but cultural values and socialization processes like punishment rites and domineering behavior also include aspects of power orientation. Support units, which exhibit

civilian “values” at a higher degree, will—besides a considerable degree of role orientation—exhibit elements of a task-oriented culture, which is considered the ideal orientation for private organizations. Hence, we formulate our second hypothesis as follows:

Hypothesis 2: Soldiers in combat units and training centers perceive a considerable level of power orientation, whereas soldiers in support units perceive a considerable level of task orientation.

As explained in the last section of the theoretical discussion, military training and the instrumental use of low-level aggression are intertwined. Moreover, as military culture is prone to condone systematic aggression against new or weaker members through the abuse of formal and informal rites, we expect to find more aggression in training centers. In combat units, we also expect a high level of aggression due to the existence of “hypermasculine” norms, cohesion, and legitimization of the application of violence, which likely provokes systematic aggression against allegedly weaker members. Hence, we formulate our third hypothesis as follows:

Hypothesis 3: Exposure to systematic workplace aggression in the form of bullying is reported more often in training centers and combat units than in support units.

Institutional values and division of labor are linked to gender norms of hegemonial masculinity. The high horizontal gender segregation in all national armies reveal (subtle) resistance against female as soldiers in combat positions, because institutionalized gender norms do not value femininity and provoke resistance to female soldiers in elite positions. We, therefore, expect cultural gender norms to be prevalent in those subunits, where “masculine” norms like physical strength are considered most crucial for effectiveness and serve as performance criteria. Hence we expect a negative attitude toward female soldiers mainly in training centers and combat units. In “feminine” support units, we expect women to be well accepted. Hence, we formulate our fourth hypothesis as follows:

Hypothesis 4: Attitudes toward female soldiers will be more positive in support units compared to training centers and combat units.

Beginning in basic training, performance criteria adhere to male norms, and denigration of femininity is institutionalized in rituals and rites. Moreover, male peer support condones severe violence against women. As we understand systematic aggression in the form of bullying to serve as a valve for resistance against the integration of women, we expect that women in training centers and combat units will be exposed to more aggressive acts compared to men. In these units “hypermasculine” values concomitant with resistance against the integration of women and (sexual) harassment have already been demonstrated in many qualitative studies on national armies (see discussion above).

Hypothesis 5: Reported exposure to systematic workplace aggression in the form of bullying against women will be higher in training centers and combat units compared to support units.

Previous studies on bullying suggest a so-called scapegoat phenomenon,⁵³ which denotes that targets of workplace aggression are more prone to act aggressively against organizational members in weaker positions (e.g. lower status, out-group, less prestigious, etc.). As explained before, military culture is prone to these dynamics. Hence, we hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 6: Targets of aggression and bullying victims will report more often to have conducted aggressive acts against female soldiers than nontargets.

Method

To test the working hypotheses, we conducted a paper-pencil survey in the Austrian Armed Forces using the following standardized quantitative instruments: bullying incidence was measured with the “Leymann Inventory of Psychological Terror” (LIPT).⁵⁴ According to Leymann’s definition a person is a bullying victim, when he or she is exposed to at least one out of forty-five actions (e.g., spreading rumors, ignoring and excluding from communication to physical aggression) at least once a week for at least six months.⁵⁵ We expanded LIPT with items that also measured whether members committed or observed aggressive acts against women. The Diagnosing Organizational Culture Instrument gauges the type of organizational culture (power, role, task, or person culture) that the member presently ascribes to the organization as well as the most favorable culture type.⁵⁶ The existing individual culture index was assessed through calculation of the relative frequency for each culture type stated by each respondent.

Additionally, we added 17 items to assess the general attitude toward women in the military on a 4-point Likert-type scale. Participants were given items regarding their attitude toward the image of a female soldiers and traditional military values like bonding (detailed results on Factor analysis see Appendix A).

Finally, we included a control question to find out whether respondents are frequently working with female soldiers; 96.84 percent of all respondents reported contact with women within the military, 71.11 percent of those have worked repeatedly or regularly with women, and all respondents indicate sufficient personal experience with female soldiers.

Description of the Sample

For strategic reasons, the Austrian Armed Forces do not reveal the relative frequencies of female soldiers in their troops and suborganizations. Therefore, we could not sample our survey according to the relative proportion of women in the subunits.

Nevertheless, we composed a sample including a variety of suborganizations in order to test our hypotheses: combat arms, combat support arms, agencies and combat service support (medical support), center for operations preparation and special operating forces and, finally, academies and schools. Of these seven suborganizations of the Austrian Armed Forces, forty-three suborganizational departments participated in the study.

Data were collected from June to August 2009 by an officer of the Armed Forces who was allowed access to the different subunits and who ensured that the questionnaires were filled in anonymously. The questionnaires were filled in by paper-pencil. The return rate of the questionnaires was 76.5 percent, which can be regarded as extremely high in comparison to other studies on bullying prevalence.⁵⁷ The sample of 443 people contains 20 females accounting for 4.51 percent of the sample (8 people did not disclose their gender), which can be regarded as sufficient for the purpose of this study.

Of these 443 people, 115 (approximately 26 percent) are members of combat arms, 107 in combat support units (24.2 percent), 106 in academies and schools (23.9 percent), and 55 (12.4 percent) belong to combat service support (medical support). Another 25 (5.6 percent) soldiers are serving in the center for operations preparation, 20 respondents (4.5 percent) are serving in special operating forces, and 13 respondents (2.9 percent) are in agencies. Two people did not specify their subunit membership. With regard to organizational rank, 110 officers (24.8 percent), 190 noncommissioned officers (42.9 percent), 120 junior ranks (27.1 percent), and 12 privates (2.7 percent) participated in the study. Eleven people did not specify their rank within the Armed Forces. The number of privates was kept to a minimum, as their assessment of the organizational culture could be challenged due to their short job tenure within the military.

Results

According to the definition of the LIPT, 29 respondents (6.5 percent) are classified as bullying victims. We also observe a relatively high proportion of respondents ($n = 38$), who are vulnerable to bullying but would not fall into Leymann's rigorously defined category of bullying victims. They were exposed to aggression for a substantial time frame (see Figure 1). All other respondents who report (low-level) exposure to aggression have been classified as "aggression experienced."

All 29 bullying victims were bullied by more than one person. Ten victims were bullied by peers, superiors, and/or subordinates, 10 victims by peers only, 7 victims by superiors only and one victim by subordinates only. One victim did not specify the opponent/opponents. Chi square tests reveal that the age group from 21 to 30 years is most affected by aggressive behavior ($p < .001$, $\chi^2 = 40.7$, $df = 12$). Officers feel harassed significantly more often by subordinates ($p < .01$, $\chi^2 = 14.85$, $df = 3$) and junior ranks significantly more often by peers, while noncommissioned officers less often from peers ($p < .01$, $\chi^2 = 12.62$, $df = 3$). Of all the respondents who have




Figure 1. Subcultural perceptions of soldiers in different organizational subunits.

been exposed to at least one aggressive act ($n = 234$), 36.12 percent of all actions can be found under the supercategory “attacks on social reputation” (e.g., spreading rumors, plotting), followed by 34.22 percent found under the supercategory “attacks on the possibility of communication” (e.g., interrupting, shouting, ignoring). The least cited acts were from the “violent threats and violence” (3.10 percent). As for the specific negative acts, “innuendos without direct communication” are most prevalent (8.46 percent) followed by “Constant assignment of meaningless tasks” (6.69 percent), and “your supervisor constrains your possibilities to communicate” (6.41 percent). Surprisingly, only one man reports a sexual assault with two to four male opponents, but no women reported sexual assaults. 22 of the 29 victims suffer from long-term exposure (at least two years), and all but one bullying victim suffer from multiple negative acts, indicating an escalation mode of aggression.⁵⁸

Hypothesis 1 tests whether perceived power culture orientation is related to aggression exposure. Culture perceptions of subjects were weighted according to the frequency of chosen items for each culture types (individual perception index of each culture type). A Kruskal–Wallis test reveals that the power culture and experienced aggression have a highly significant relationship. Power culture mean ranks of bullied people, people vulnerable to bullying and people with aggression experience are, respectively, 215.96, 220.19, and 198.63, while mean ranks of people with no aggression experience are only 138.1 ($\chi^2 = 40.184$, $df = 3$, $p < .001$). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported by the data: perceptions of power culture and reported aggression are positively correlated.

Hypothesis 2 tests whether members of different subunits differ in perceptions of culture. We grouped the investigated suborganizations into three supercategories: combat units (combat units and special operating forces are full battleground units and have only combat tasks); academies and schools as training units (in these subunits all ranks are instructed and trained in foreign languages, constitutional law, etc., and drilled with regard to battleground instructions during their formation from private to general staff officers); and support units (agencies and combat service support have purely administrative functions and deal with information service and supply). Respondents of the other suborganizational units (combat support unit and the center for operations preparation) can have supporting, educational, and combat

Table 1. Aggression within Different Subunits.

Kruskal–Wallis test (culture type indexed)	Subunits	N	Mean ranks
Power culture*** ($p < .001$, $\chi^2 = 21.25$, $df = 2$)	Combat units	106	101.99
	Academies and schools	92	144.64
	Support units	39	104.76
Role culture ($p > .05$)	Combat units	106	117.01
	Academies and schools	92	121.01
	Support units	39	119.67
Task culture*** ($p < .001$, $\chi^2 = 21.52$, $df = 2$)	Combat units	106	134.27
	Academies and schools	92	93.46
	Support units	39	137.74
Person culture** ($p < .01$, $\chi^2 = 10.5$, $df = 2$)	Combat units	106	133.17
	Academies and schools	92	102.59
	Support units	39	119.21

tasks and are therefore not included here. In combat units, role culture elements are most frequently cited (36.2 percent) followed by power culture elements (30.2 percent), task culture (21.3 percent), and person culture (12.3 percent). Support units show almost an identical distribution (role 37.0 percent, power 31.0 percent, task 22.0 percent, and person 10.0 percent). In contrast, in academies and schools, respondents predominantly perceive power culture elements (43.1 percent) followed by role culture (37.5 percent), task culture (12.2 percent), and person culture elements (7.2 percent). A Kruskal–Wallis test reveals highly significant differences with regard to culture perceptions across the specific subunits (see Table 1).

These results are confirmed with Post Hoc Mann–Whitney tests.⁵⁹ Academies and schools differ significantly (1) from combat units with regard to the perception of each culture type except for the role culture⁶⁰ (e.g., power culture: high mean ranks of 118.76 in academies and schools vs. mean ranks of 82.78 in combat units) and (2) from the support functions with regard to the perception of the power culture and the task culture.⁶¹ Hence, Hypothesis 2 is partially supported: academies and schools, as well as support units display cultural perceptions as expected. Yet, cultural perceptions in combat units differ substantially from academies and display a significantly lower level of power orientation and higher levels of task orientation than expected.

Hypothesis 3 tests whether subunits differ in their application of aggression against soldiers. As Table 2 indicates, the incidences of aggression differ significantly across the units. Academies and schools displayed the highest number of aggressive acts. Especially within academies and schools, low-level aggression (“aggression experienced”) is more than 35 percent higher than expected. Only in academies and schools is rank a decisive factor for exposure to aggression. In this suborganizational unit, junior ranks are significantly more often exposed to persistent aggressive behavior (“vulnerable to bullying” and “bullying victim”) than

Table 2. Aggression toward Female Soldiers in Different Subunits.

χ^2 Test** ($p < .01$, $\chi^2 = 22.92$, $df = 6$)	No aggression experienced (%)	Aggression experienced (%)	Vulnerable to bullying (%)	Bullying victim (%)
Combat units ($n = 135$)	48.9	32.6	10.4	8.1
Academies and schools ($n = 106$)	30.2	50.0	11.3	8.5
Support units ($n = 67$)	65.7	25.4	4.5	4.5

Table 3. Attitude toward Female Soldiers in Different Subunits.

	Women perform equally		Women are detrimental to culture	
	χ^2 Test*** ($p < .001$, $\chi^2 = 28.22$, $df = 2$)		χ^2 Test*** ($p < .001$, $\chi^2 = 23.77$, $df = 2$)	
	Low agreement (%)	High agreement (%)	Low agreement (%)	High agreement (%)
Combat units ($n = 122$)	59.3	40.7	48.0	52.0
Academies and schools ($n = 96$)	54.6	45.4	36.1	63.9
Support units ($n = 54$)	17.9	82.1	76.8	23.2

other ranks. Noncommissioned officers are least often exposed to any form aggression ($p < .01$, $\chi^2 = 25.11$, $df = 9$). Hence, Hypothesis 3 is supported. Systematic workplace aggression in the form of bullying is more often found in training centers and combat units compared to support units.

Hypothesis 4 tests the relationship between the subunit and the attitudes toward women and traditional military values. A χ^2 test (see table 3) reveals significant differences in the perception of women between subunits for two factors of factor analysis, and it supports Hypothesis 4 (see Appendix A for detailed results of the factor analysis).

The results show that only in support units the majority of respondents regard women as capable of meeting male performance standards and fitting into military norms. In academies and schools, a high majority of respondents considers women as detrimental

Table 4. Aggression toward Female Soldiers by Male Targets of Aggression.

χ^2 Test*** ($p < .001$, $\chi^2 = 35.92$, $df = 6$)	Frequently aggressive against women (%)	Rarely aggressive against women (%)	Never aggressive against women (%)
No aggression experienced ($n = 194$)	0.0	2.6	97.4
Aggression experienced ($n = 154$)	1.3	14.3	84.4
Vulnerable to bullying ($n = 36$)	2.8	8.3	88.9
Bullying victim ($n = 25$)	8.0	24.0	68.0

to military culture and traditional norms. Testing on gender differences, we find men to have a more negative attitude than women with regard to all three factors.⁶²

Hypothesis 5 tests whether men and women are exposed to aggression to the same extent. Mann-Whitney tests reveal no gender differences with regard to aggression in diverse subunits. For persistent aggression in the form of bullying, the Fisher exact test shows that women are significantly more often victims of bullying than men ($p < .05$).⁶³ *Hypothesis 5* is therefore partially confirmed: mean ranks of low-level aggression do not differ significantly, yet females are significantly more often exposed to bullying than men.

Hypothesis 6 tests whether targets of aggression will apply more aggressive acts against female soldiers. We expanded the original LIPT with the self-reporting question, "How often have you applied one or more of the above cited actions against a woman in the Austrian Armed Forces?" Of the 436 respondents, 179 claim to have observed aggressive acts against female soldiers. Forty-nine persons admit to having conducted aggressive acts against female soldiers. Age, rank, sub-organization, and culture perception play no significant role in terms of aggressive behavior toward women. A Fisher exact test reveals that women perform significantly more aggressive acts against other women than men do ($p < .05$): 30 percent of women have at least once conducted an aggressive act against another woman as opposed to 10 percent of men. Furthermore, a highly significant scapegoat phenomenon can be observed: individuals who have been victim of aggression conduct significantly more aggressive acts against women than individuals with no aggression experience (see table 4).

In this context, it is important to note that persons who have conducted at least one aggressive act against women also have a significantly more negative attitude toward female soldiers in all three dimensions.⁶⁴

Discussion and Outlook

The aim of the study was to verify the relationship between (masculine) cultural values in the Austrian Armed Forces and systematic workplace aggression.

In general, the overall bullying rate of 6.5 percent in the Austrian Armed Forces with the restrictive Leymann criterion can be regarded as high.⁶⁵ The fact that all bullying victims were facing more than one aggressor indicates that bullying in the Austrian Armed Forces is more of a predatory phenomenon than an act of individual retaliation and dispute.⁶⁶

Overall, four of the six hypotheses of the study have been fully and the remaining two hypotheses have been partially supported. In alignment with Weber's notion of an ideal bureaucracy, members across all units perceive the culture of the Austrian Armed Forces to a considerable extent to be role oriented. However, in detailed analyses, different subcultures emerge. Members of training centers exhibit the highest adherence levels to traditional masculine and gendered military norms and perceive culture to be predominantly power oriented. This power orientation is strongly related to experienced workplace aggression. In particular, we find a high rate of overall reported aggression in training centers. Two of the three members of academies and schools report to have been a target of aggression at least once. Moreover, in this subunit low-ranked members are especially prone to persistent aggression in form of bullying. These findings are supporting our theoretical argument that masculinity pressures, high-power orientation linked with (low-level) aggression are fostering severe organizational misconduct in form of bullying against weaker members. On the contrary, members of support units perceive culture predominantly as task oriented, and they report significantly less incidences of workplace aggression and bullying. Additionally, in support units, members much more often perceive women to perform equally to men. Contrary to our expectations, combat units also perceive the culture to be highly task oriented and not power oriented. A possible explanation is that combat units, which engage primarily in peacekeeping missions, may also have a higher "civil" occupational character due to their "civilian" engagement and noncombat tasks.⁶⁷ This could result in a higher level of task orientation similar to police forces. Fitting into this picture, members of combat units report less exposure to workplace aggression compared to training centers but more incidences of aggression compared to support units. Overall, the data also strongly support the existence of a scapegoat phenomenon in the Austrian Armed Forces: self-reported aggression against females was significantly higher for men with their own aggression experience and for women in general. It is interesting to understand this "lack of solidarity" among women. Female soldiers are, as a minority, not perceived as individuals but rather as a representative of the whole group (i.e., "the women in the army"). In this token status, nonexceptional performance by a female peer might threaten one's own position and therefore cause the aggression.

In this context, we see the importance of a gendered analysis: persistent aggressive behavior (bullying) is conducted more often against women. Furthermore, targets of aggression have a more negative attitude toward the performance of female soldiers and their integration into the Armed Forces. Albeit women are significantly more exposed to persistent workplace aggression, perceptions of bullying acts are gender-specific; women tend to declare exposure to bullying actions more than men.⁶⁸ Yet, the fact that almost every second soldier claims to have observed aggression against women and that every tenth soldier admits to have conducted aggressive acts against women indicates a case of severe organizational misconduct. More so, since we only have access to self-reported aggressive acts, it can be assumed that the dark figures of perpetrators are very likely to be much higher.

All quantitative results of this study strongly suggest that the anecdote portrayed in the introduction is not the only incident of collective and legitimized bullying in the Austrian Armed Forces, and moreover has a gender dimension. Evidently, in the Austrian Armed Forces, where women only recently have gained full access, stereotypes are still persistent. Future (longitudinal) studies on the acceptance of women across subunits including token ratios as well as strategies against organizational misconduct should be carefully considered by policy makers and persons in authority to gain a full picture. In this context, it is important to note the limitations of this study. First of all, recent cultural research suggests that culture analysis should rely on a pluralistic approach where quantitative surveys build only one cornerstone.⁶⁹ Therefore, follow-up qualitative studies including narrative interviews with male and female bullying victims and dropouts in different units, ranks, and age groups would help gain deeper insight into the dynamics of gender, military norms and values, and systematic workplace aggression. Second, this study was restricted to one national army, predominantly involved in peacekeeping activities as well as humanitarian aid and civil services. It would be interesting to compare the findings of this study with surveys in both, peacekeeping and peace-enforcing armies in order to derive more generalizable conclusions. In particular, such a comparative analysis with additional qualitative material could shed more light on the finding that almost no sexual assaults have been reported in this study.

Appendix A

In order to reduce items for further analyses, we applied an R-Type Principal Axis Factor Analysis after removing 4 items due to low partial correlation coefficients. Direct Oblimin Rotation was chosen because theoretically factors correlate with each other. We saved factor values with regression method and saved factors using a median split for further analysis. We named the first factor “Women perform equally,” as items like “Women should serve in the combat units” and “A woman is as good a comrade as a man” loaded high on this factor, which

clearly indicates the perception of women as equal soldiers. On the second factor items like “Women destroy male bonding between men” and “Women destroy the traditions of the Austrian Armed Forces” loaded high. Therefore, we named this factor “Women are detrimental to culture.” The second factor is called Gendered role attribution because high agreement to both high-loading items suggests that women should pursue stereotypically “feminine” tasks like supporting and teaching.

Results from Factor Analysis on Attitude toward Women.

Principal axis factor analysis; Dir. Oblimin Rotation; Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Criterion = .909; 53.9 % of total variance explained; Bartlett test ^{***} ($p < .001$)	Women $\alpha = .894$ (standardized = .896)	Women are detrimental to culture $\alpha = .784$ (standardized = .784)	Gendered role attributions $\rho = .442$
Factor scores regression; loadings under 0.1 suppressed; $n = 395$			
Women perform equally in battle training	0.919		
Women perform equally in missions	0.841		
Women should serve in combat units	0.708		0.111
Women can fulfill tasks as good as men	0.609		-0.121
More women should join Austrian Armed Forces	0.571	-0.121	-0.124
Women are as good superiors as men	0.505	-0.18	-0.149
A women is as good a comrade as a men	0.453	-0.209	-0.288
Same male bonding between men and women in department	0.435	-0.21	
Women destroy male bonding		0.923	
Women cause sexual frictions which are bad for male bonding		0.691	0.152
Women destroy traditions of Austrian Armed Forces		0.55	-0.754
Women should serve in supporting units	-0.129		-0.572
Women should serve in teaching units			

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Notes

1. Name of officer changed.
2. Retrieved March 28, 2012, from the website of the Austrian Ministry of Defense www.bmlv.gv.at/ausle/zahlen.shtml, www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=794 (Austrian Security doctrine 2011) and http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48901.htm (NATO-Website).
3. 1.8 percent based on intended troop strength of 20,000 soldiers; retrieved January 05, 2012, from the website of the Austrian Armed Forces (see www.bundesheer.at) and from the Department of Human Resources of the Austrian Armed Forces, Division D.
4. M. Segal, "Women's Military Roles Cross-Nationally; Past, Present and Future," *Gender & Society* 9, 6 (1995): 757-75.
5. See H. Carreiras, *Gender and the Military; Women in the Armed Forces of Western Democracies* (London, UK: Taylor & Francis Group, 2006).
6. See research on national armies in the United States, Germany, and Israel: for example, H. K. Williams, *Jung, weiblich, in der Army. Ich war Soldatin im Krieg* (München: Dt. Verl.-Anst. 2006); G. Kümmel, "Backlash am Horizont? Die Bundeswehr und die Integration von Frauen im Praxistest," in *Frauen im Militär. Empirische Befunde und Perspektiven zur Integration von Frauen in die Streitkräfte*, ed. J.-R. Ahrens (Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), 62-78; and U. Klein, "Wehrpflicht von Frauen: Erfahrungen mit Militär und Geschlecht in Israel," in *Frauen im Militär. Empirische Befunde und Perspektiven zur Integration von Frauen in die Streifkräfte*, ed. J.-R. Ahrens (Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), 194-212.
7. H. Leymann, "The Content and Development of Mobbing at Work," *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology* 5, 2 (1996): 165-84; in this article we mainly use "workplace aggression" as a unifying term for any direct or indirect and overt or covert aggressive behavior at the workplace, i.e. including direct and overt forms like violence but also indirect and covert aggression like social exclusion; note that "aggression" and "bullying" carry slightly different meanings: the intent to harm is seen a constitutive feature for "aggression" in aggression theory, which focuses on perpetrator characteristics and behavior; European-dominated emphasizes the target's perspective: The target's perception of being unable to defend against persistent (!) exposure to aggressive acts is considered essential for labeling aggression "bullying", even if the actual intent of the perpetrator(s) to harm the target might be ambiguous; see for example J. H. Neuman and R.A. Baron, "Social Antecedents of Bullying: A Social Interactionist Perspective", in

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8. See D. Salin and H. Hoel, "Organisational Causes of Workplace Bullying," in *Bullying and Harassment in the Workplace; Developments in Theory, Research, and Practice*, ed. S. Einarsen, H. Hoel, D. Zapf, and C. L. Cooper (London, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2011), 227-44; M. Vartia, "The Sources of Bullying—Psychological Work Environment and Organizational Climate," *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology* 5, 2 (1996): 203-14; J. Hearn and W. Parkin, *Gender, Sexuality and Violence in Organizations; The Unspoken Forces of Organization Violations* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001), 61; and K. Aquino and K. Lamertz, "A Relational Model of Workplace Victimization: Social Roles and Pattern of Victimization in Dyadic Relationships," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 89, 6 (2004): 1023-34.
 9. J. L. Pershing, "Men and Women's Experiences with Hazing in a Male-Dominated Elite Military Institution," *Men and Masculinities* 8, 4 (2006): 470-92; D. Archer, "Exploring "Bullying" Culture in the Para-Military Organization," *International Journal of Manpower* 20, ½ (1999): 94-105.
 10. See for example, L. Rosen, K. Knudson, and P. Fancher, "Cohesion and the Culture of Hypermasculinity in U.S. Army Units," *Armed Forces & Society* 29, 3 (2003): 325-52; and M. Morris, "By Forces of Arms: Rape, War and Military Culture," *Duke Law Journal* 45, 4, (1996): 651-781; and F. J. Barrett, "The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity: The Case of the US Navy," *Gender, Work & Organization* 3, 3 (1996): 129-42.
 11. See for example, US Army: A 2010 survey reveals victimization rates of 4.4 percent for women and 0.9 percent for men. Accessed March 29, 2012, <http://servicewomen.org/blog/2011/03/18/pentagon-releases-2011-report-on-military-sexual-assault/>; for studies on sexual harassment, see for example, J. L. Pershing, "Why Women Don't Report Sexual Harassment: A Case Study of an Elite Military Institution," *Gender Issues* 21, 4 (2003): 3-30; J. M. Firestone and R. J. Harris, "Perceptions of Effectiveness of Responses to Sexual Harassment in the US Military, 1988 and 1995," *Gender, Work & Organization* 10, 1 (2003): 42-64; and J. M. Firestone and R. J. Harris, "Sexual Harassment in the U.S. Military Reserve Component: A Preliminary Analysis," *Armed Forces & Society* 36, 1 (2009): 86-102.
 12. Pershing, "Men and Women's Experiences with Hazing in a Male-Dominated Elite Military Institution"; see also J. L. Pershing, "Whom to betray? Self-regulation of occupational misconduct at the United States Naval Academy," *Deviant Behavior* 23, 2 (2002): 149-75; and D. Winslow, "Rite of Passage and Group Bonding in the Canadian Airborne," *Armed Forces & Society* 25, 3 (1999): 429-57.
 13. D. Archer, "Exploring "Bullying" Culture in the Para-Military Organization."
 14. Regina Titunik provides an in-depth theoretical analysis of military culture: R. Titunik, "The First Wave: Gender Integration in Military Culture," *Armed Forces & Society* 26, 2 (2000): 229-57.
 15. Ibid.
 16. R. Harrison and H. Stokes, *Diagnosing Organisational Culture* (San Francisco, CA: Pfeiffer, 1992).

17. Archer, "Exploring Bullying in the Para-Military Organisation."
18. See H. Carreiras, *Gender and the Military; Women in the Armed Forces of Western Democracies*, 78; and C. Moskos, "The American Soldier after the Cold War: Towards a Post-Modern Military?" *ARI Research Note*; U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (1998).
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22. C. Dandeker and J. Gow, "Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 10, 2 (1999): 58-79.
23. See Morris, "By Forces of Arms: Rape, War and Military Culture, 708; R. Woodward and P. Winter, "Discourses of Gender in the Contemporary British Army," *Armed Forces & Society* 32, 2 (2004): 279-301; G. L. Siebold, "Military Group Cohesion," in *Military Life; The Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat*, ed. T. W. Britt, C. A. Castro, and A. B. Adler (Westport, CO: Praeger Security International, 2006), 199; D. Harrison, "Violence in the Military Community" in *Military Masculinities; Identity and the State*, ed. P. R. Higate (London, UK: Praeger, 2003), 71-90.
24. See also A. King, "The Word of Command: Communication and Cohesion in the Military," *Armed Forces & Society* 32, 4 (2006): 493-512; and E. Kier, "Homosexuals in the U.S. Military: Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness," *International Security* 23, 22 (1998): 5-39.
25. D. Harrison, "Violence in the Military Community," in *Military Masculinities; Identity and the State*, ed. P. R. Higate (Westport and London: Praeger, 2003), 71-90; and Hearn and Parkin, *Gender, Sexuality and Violence in Organizations*, 75-119.
26. See Morris, "By Forces of Arms: Rape, War and Military Culture, 691-693; Barrett, "The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity: The Case of the US Navy"; Pershing, "Men and Women's Experiences with Hazing in a Male-Dominated

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 28. Pershing, “Men and Women’s Experiences with Hazing in a Male-Dominated Elite Military Institution”; see also J. L. Pershing, “Whom to Betray? Self-regulation of occupational misconduct at the United States Naval Academy.”
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 30. R. W. Connell and J. W. Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity. Rethinking the Concept,” *Gender & Society* 19, 6 (2005): 829-59; R. W. Connell, “The Social Organization of Masculinity,” in *The Masculinities Reader*, ed. S. M. Whitehead and F. J. Barrett (Malden, Cambridge & Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001), 30-51; H. Carreiras, *Gender and the Military*; p. 43; Barrett, “The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity: The Case of the US Navy”; and C. Cohn, “Wars, Wimps and Women: Talking Gender and Thinking War,” in *Gendering War Talk*, ed. M. Cooke and A. Woollacotte (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 225-46.
 31. Depending on culture and conditions, men construct different versions of hegemonic masculinity; for further information, see for example Barrett, “The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity: The Case of the US Navy.”
 32. Connell and Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity. Rethinking the Concept”; and Connell, “The Social Organization of Masculinity.”
 33. Barrett, “The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity: The Case of the US Navy”; and Harrison, “Violence in the Military Community.”
 34. H. Carreiras, *Gender and the Military*, 43; Barrett, “The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity: The Case of the US Navy”; and Cohn, “Wars, Wimps and Women: Talking Gender and Thinking War.”
 35. See also Harrison, “Violence in the Military Community” and Morris, “By Forces of Arms: Rape, War and Military Culture.”
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38. See Gabbert, *Gleichstellung—zu Befehl!* P. R. Higate, ““Soft Clerks” and “Hard Civvies”: Pluralizing Military Masculinities,” in *Military Masculinities: Identity and the State*, ed. P. R. Higate (Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 2003), 27-43; Barrett, “The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity: The Case of the US Navy”; and R. Woodward and P. Winter, “Discourses of Gender in the Contemporary British Army.”
39. 5.2 percent of women were listed in the category “others”; see Carreiras, *Gender and the Military*, 105-6.
40. M. W. Segal, “Women in the Armed Forces. Women and the Use of Military Force,” in *Women and the Use of Military Force*, ed. R. H. Howes and M. R. Stevenson (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 81-94; for example, in 2012, the US army has opened six military occupational specialties to women, yet are still excluded from 240,000 positions due to the so-called direct ground combat rule, which forbids women to interfere in ground combat (accessed February 20, 2012, from the official website of the US Army: <http://www.army.mil/article/73515/>).
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43. See E. Kier, “Homosexuals in the U.S. Military: Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness,” *International Security* 23, 22 (1998): 5-39.
44. See for example, C. Cohn ““How Can She Claim Equal Rights When She Doesn’t Have to Do as Many Push-Ups as I Do?” The Framing of Men’s Opposition to Women’s Equality in the Military.”
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46. See B. A. Gutek and A. Groff Cohen, “Sex Ratios, Sex Role Spillover and Sex at Work—A Comparison of Men’s and Women’s Experiences,” in *Gendering Organizational Analysis*, ed. A. J. Mills and P. Tancred (Oxford: Sage Publications, 1997), 133-50.
47. Accessed March 28, 2012, from the Websites of national armies: <http://www.army.mil/women/> and www.bundeswehr.de; and C. Eifler, “Weil man nun mit ihnen rechnen muss . . . : Frauen in den Streitkräften Russlands,” 104.
48. For more information on tokenism, see for example, R. M. Kanter, *Men and Women of the Corporation* (New York, Basic Books, 1997); and J. Yoder, “Rethinking Tokenism: Looking beyond Numbers,” *Gender and Society* 5, 2 (1991): 178-92.

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50. See for example, H. Carreiras, *Gender and the Military*; Firestone and Harris, "Perceptions of Effectiveness of Responses to Sexual Harassment in the U.S. Military"; Pershing, "Why Women Don't Report Sexual Harassment: A Case Study of an Elite Military Institution"; Eifler, "Weil man nun mit ihnen rechnen muss . . . : Frauen in den Streitkräften Russlands"; and Sasson-Levy, "Frauen als Grenzgängerinnen im israelischen Militär—Identitätstrategien und -praktiken weiblicher Soldaten in 'männlichen Rollen'."
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55. Leymann, "The Content and Development of Mobbing at Work."
56. Harrison and H. Stokes, *Diagnosing Organisational Culture*.
57. See for example, D. Salin, "The Significance of Gender in the Prevalence, Forms and Perceptions of Workplace Bullying," *Nordiske Organisationsstudier* 5, 3 (1993): 30-50.
58. An exposure to multiple acts in the course of bullying is typical, see for example P. Lutgen-Sandvik, S. J. Tracy, and J. K. Alberts, "Burned by Bullying in the American Workplace: Prevalence, Perception, Degree and Impact," *Journal of Management Studies* 44, 6 (2007): 837-62.
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61. Power culture: $p < .01$, $U = 1207.5$, $Z = -2.96$, $r = -.26$, $d = .58$; task culture: $p < .01$, $U = 1120.5$, $Z = -3.46$, $r = -.30$, $d = .69$.

62. For example, mean ranks of Mann-Whitney tests reveal that male soldiers assess women's abilities to perform equally significantly worse ($p < .001$, $U = 1332.5$, $z = -4.04$) than female soldiers (mean rank of women's performance index is 190.1 for men and 302.6 for women). Similarly, men significantly agree more than women that women are detrimental to culture ($p < .01$, $U = 2111.5$, $Z = -2.32$) and that they should serve in "feminine" units ($p < .01$, $U = 2170.5$, $Z = -2.19$).
63. We apply Fisher exact tests in case of very small sample sizes (e.g., gender differences of bullying victims), as this test is also robust in small samples.
64. Mann-Whitney tests: performance $p < .01$, $U = 5968.5$, $Z = -2.76$, detrimental to culture: $p < .05$, $U = 6456.5$, $Z = -2.08$; gendered role attributions: $p < .01$, $U = 5455.5$, $Z = -3.47$.
65. A bullying rate between 3 percent and 4 percent according to the definition of Leymann can be regarded as average. See D. Zapf, J. Escartin, S. Einarsen, H. Hoel, and M. Vartia, "Empirical Findings on Prevalence and Risk Groups of Bullying in the Workplace," in *Bullying and Harassment in the Workplace: Developments in Theory, Research, and Practice*, ed. S. Einarsen, H. Hoel, D. Zapf, and C. L. Cooper (Boca Raton, London and New York: Taylor & Francis, 2011), 75-106.
66. For different forms of bullying, see S. Einarsen, H. Hoel, D. Zapf and C. L. Cooper, "The Concept of Bullying and Harassment at Work: The European Tradition," in *Bullying and Harassment in the Workplace*, ed. S. Einarsen, H. Hoel, D. Zapf and C. L. Cooper (Boca Raton, London and New York; Taylor & Francis, 2011); 3-40.
67. Dandeker and Gow, "Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping; Moskos, "The American Soldier after the Cold War: Towards a Post-Modern Military?"
68. Salin, "The Significance of Gender in the Prevalence, Forms and Perceptions of Workplace Bullying"; and Zapf, "Mobbing in Organisationen—Überblick zum Stand der Forschung."
69. S. Sackmann, *Assessment, Evaluation, Improvement: Success through Corporate Culture* (Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007), 23-24.

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Sabine T. Koeszegi is full professor at the Institute of Management Science at the Vienna University of Technology. In 2000 she received her PhD in economics and social sciences at the University of Vienna. She had several international visiting positions and has published more than 60 peer-reviewed papers in journals and collective volumes. Her current research focuses on female careers in male-dominated environments and the management of conflict and diversity in organizations.

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René Hudribusch was chief instructor in the Austrian Armed Forces International Centre of the Austrian Armed Forces until 2011. He is currently working as auditor at the Austrian Court of Audit. René Hudribusch studied military leadership at the Military Academy of the Austrian Armed Forces and business and administration at the University of Vienna. He received his master's degree of military leadership in 2004 and his doctor's degree in business and administration in 2010. Since 2008 he studies gender studies at the University of Vienna. His interests concern organizational culture, workplace aggression, gender, liaison and negotiation and combating trafficking in human beings.