Dissertation

Reason might be a place.

Critical regionalism and architectural autonomy as examples of architectural theory building on political philosophy

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REASON MIGHT BE A PLACE

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- A city comes into being because it so happens that each of us is not self-sufficient, but we are in need of many things; or do you think that any other principle establishes the city?

- Not at all.

- Thus when someone takes on one person for one service and another for another, since we are in need of many things, many people gather together in one place to live as partners and helpers. . . . When one person shares with another, if he shares, or takes from the other, he believes it to be better for himself.¹
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ABSTRAKT DEUTSCH


Beiden theoretischen Teilen sind jeweils zwei Appendixes nachgestellt, die sich den realen Orten widmen die Arendt und Habermas als archetypisch für ihre Theorien ausgewählt haben. Für Hannah Arendt war es die griechische polis, während Jürgen Habermas das britische Kaffeehaus des 17 Jahrhunderts gewählt hat. Es ist naheliegend, dass in einer architekturtheoretischen Dissertation diesen beiden Plätzen außerordentliche Bedeutung beigemessen wird.

In der Diskussion des kritischen Regionalismus sind die Schwerpunkte der Begriff der Kultur und die Rolle, die Architekten in der Gesellschaft beigemessen wird. In beiden Fällen wird die starke Bindung an Arendts Schriften deutlich. Es ist ihr Unbehagen gegenüber den gesellschaftlichen Veränderungen der Moderne, das Frampton übernimmt. In der Schlussfolgerung zum ersten Teil, wird eine weitergefasste Verwendung des Begriffes Kultur vorgeschlagen, die gleichzeitig die Position des Architekten neu setzt. Auch im zweiten Teil steht wieder die Rolle der Architekten im Fokus, diesmal um deren relative Autonomie gegenüber der Gesellschaft.
The subject of the present text is two architectural theories that are based on writings from political theory. The text is structured in two parts. The first part is on Frampton’s critical regionalism that is to a great degree shaped by Hannah Arendt’s thoughts on politics. The second part is on autonomous architecture, not as explicitly given as the critical regionalism, but descending from Kant’s thoughts on the Enlightenment public. Jürgen Habermas propagated the most extreme version of an Enlightenment public. Consequently, the present study approaches the debate from Habermas’ writings.

Both theoretical parts are followed by two appendices on the places both Arendt and Habermas have singled out as archetype of their theories. In the case of Arendt it was the ancient Greek polis. For Jürgen Habermas was the British coffeehouse of the 17th century. Writing in architectural theory, these places will have a prominent place throughout the text.

Regarding Frampton’s critical regionalism the preoccupation will be the notion of culture and the role of the architect in society, both concepts thoroughly connected to the work of Hannah Arendt. It is her anxiety toward modernity that Frampton assigns to. I will conclude by formulating an alternative notion of culture and question the role of the critical regionalist architect within society. In the second part, the role of architects and their autonomy from the public will be the main issue. However, Jürgen Habermas’ notion of the bourgeois public sphere provides a chance for reviewing some basic biases that come from the concept of an autonomous art and architecture. Criticality in architecture is predominantly understood as being against the public at large, an assumption that I will try to challenge. Starting from political theory, that is the public as cooperative community, this stance popular in architecture seems inappropriate. Finally, Kant’s original concept of criticality is revised to propose a reformulation of a critical architectural praxis.
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In the history of architectural theory various inspirations have been used to formulate positive individual theories. For the most part, authorities from the past – with Vitruvius overshadowing all others – were re-read and modified by the contributions of others. Likewise, anthropological speculations and technical novelties were employed for theoretical efforts. Additionally, philosophical texts and writings from literary and art criticism were transformed to suit our field. Finally and only recently, the world of informal building was recognized and employed for theoretical speculation. The present study discusses political theory, a subject inspired by philosophy. In other words, our subject is that part of practical philosophy that is concerned with and addresses the public, or the city, as a political problem. More specifically, two references to theories and historical places are at the conceptual and argumentative center: Hannah Arendt and her views on the ancient Greek *polis* and Jürgen Habermas and his account of the early modern British coffeehouse.

Hannah Arendt’s most influential philosophical work, *The Human Condition*, was the model used by Kenneth Frampton to formulate an alternative located between Modernism and Postmodernism. Disappointed by the former and unsettled by the latter, Arendt’s thoughts on labor, work and action became the springboard for Frampton's critical regionalism which he from the early 1970s. Critical regionalism is still of great importance in debates about site-specific planning and building culture. Even Rem Koolhaas, who used to be critical of Frampton's views, now seems to gravitate towards what Frampton promoted in declaring that local architecture is falling prey to modernity. Moreover, the seminal influence Arendt had on Kenneth Frampton is apparent in all his historical studies.

The demand for critique, opposition and resistance is also raised by those influenced by the second theory discussed here. *Autonomous architecture*, as postulated by Emil Kaufmann and promoted by European and North
American architects and theorists, is intimately tied to Immanuel Kant’s practical philosophy and the rise of the enlightened public sphere. Kaufmann connected the architecture of Ledoux and Le Corbusier to Kant’s call for an autonomous individual as the basis for civil society. Inasmuch as the principle of autonomy is historically and conceptually the founding principle of the bourgeois public sphere, the discussion here is led by the work of Jürgen Habermas, who provided a most drastic contribution to this verbose subject. Habermas claimed that in the bourgeois public sphere, autonomous individuals united by the ideal discourse, free from external pressures, would ultimately arrive at the truth about the object of discussion. This very controversial position remains influential in architecture, including the recent appeal by Patrick Schumacher.

The two theories of Arendt and Habermas have in common that these philosophers each singled out one particular historical place, where their demands for the public prevailed. Methodologically starting from these places, the Greek *polis* and the coffeehouse of Restoration Britain the attempted of the present study is to provide a comprehensive reconstruction of the original arguments and the derived architectural theories. A particular objective of the present study is to discuss the position toward culture and technology on which the projects of critical regionalism and autonomous architecture are based. This is definitely important if we want to advance the architectural theory descending from the public, that is to see the city as a political problem. Every theory developed vis-à-vis the cooperative community must pay close attention to the material world of things and its role in and for the public. We can discover the fundamental ties between architecture and technology by looking at the second part of the Greek compound noun, archi-tékton. This makes the pessimism shared by both theories obtrusive. The present study argues for a revision of both arguments in order to exploit the critical potential deriving from the initial question. Drawing from Kant’s critique, I argue that we may expect to favor a perspective for public critique in architecture. It can be show, that it is possible to argue for a distinct field of
architecture drawn from the city and under public scrutiny. Such an understanding of architecture, being responsible for such an important part of the material environment, should take its important public role seriously. And for the city, we can never have too much care.
PART I CRITICAL REGIONALISM
1. THE IDEAL CITY

Aristotle’s answer to the question why we should care about politics is still admirable for its clarity. He begins by stating a fundamental problem faced by humanity. The political animal, the *zoon politicon*, prefers "living together" (*suzēn*) over living in solitude. We humans have the innate tendency to accept rules and conventions necessary for communal life, but we constantly struggle because the most trivial affairs make it often difficult for us to get along with others.\(^2\) This is where politics begins. At the same time, this definition makes all human beings who feel acquainted with the philosopher's description of communal life. Hence, Aristotle concludes that those who shy away from life in the city (*polis*) and from mutual dependence, have ceased to be of our species. "[W]hile a man who is incapable of entering into partnership, or who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part of a *polis*, so that he must be either a lower animal or a god."\(^3\) Everybody else is left with the initial problem of the *polis*, the site of human cooperative life.

Aristotle’s account sharpens the focus and specifies the term politics as it will be used in this study. Talking about political qualities, we are not looking at occasions of mass public display recently under passionate scholarly scrutiny - at the Maidan, on Tahir or Taksim Square and in Zuccotti Park. Politics, as understood in the sense used throughout the text, is not about promoting any agenda, camp or interest. Thus, we can dispense all attempts to associate certain styles of art and architecture with political ideology – one style for Marxism, one for Fascism and yet another for democratic societies –, or to examine the problems of such an association.\(^4\) Instead, the problems of the *polis* are natural to and inseparable from human beings. Joining Aristotle’s authority, the cooperative association of the *polis* is held to be “prior in nature to the household [*oikos*] and each of us individually.” Because the “whole must necessarily be prior to the part; since when the whole body is destroyed, foot or hand will not exist except in an
equivocal sense, like the sense in which one speaks of a hand.” It is only within the context of the cooperating city that individuals and their actions make sense. And it is only within this realm where we can hope to live well, that is, reach for something more than mere survival.

At issue is the place for architecture in the public and its dependence on it, something that turned conspicuous only in the pre-modern era. Only when one unifying proportional relation, abstracted as the mos geometricus, was abandoned in science and architecture, did architecture's systemic relationship with its own history and with society at large lose its immanence. Soon, “[m]an has no proportion and o relation with the heavenly bodies [which are] infinitely distant from us,” as Charles Perrault remarked, indicating that architecture had lost its undoubted position in a unifying whole. Similarly, the new scientist architects, beginning in the seventeenth century, were probing for the proper articulation of buildings and parts inside them, rendering the external world increasingly alien. This historically and methodologically much commented revolution or crisis also stands out as a radical detachment from the public realm. Certainly not a singular development of the discipline, the perceived educational responsibility architects later felt, is in many regards idiosyncratic. Not only did architecture lose its position within society, but it was also hoped or feared that it would become an instrument of public edification.

1.1 Living well

Returning to Aristotle and his treatise on ethics and politics, the subject is the complex society, one that delegates things to specialists and produces things that are the result of cooperation. So important was Aristotle’s Politics to his successors, whom we will discuss below, that we must take time to look at this treatise in greater detail. Significantly, politics is a biological problem for Aristotle. The city allows humans to live and at the same time grants them the freedom to go beyond mere survival and strive toward “living well”
in eudemonia. Hence, in order to do so, to live well, which Aristotle calls the intrinsic good of politics, two instrumental goods must be met. To live, the biological needs of consumption must be satisfied; one must have food and drink to survive. Also, security must be guaranteed. Politics is concerned with these two instrumental goods which in turn will secure the freedom to deal with the intrinsic good, human virtue, flourishing or eudaimonia. The polis is the place where the intrinsic goods are communally provided, and as a community its aim is eudaimonia for its members. Therefore, when Aristotle talks about the fundamental status of the polis, he is considering the city-state as a political entity, including the walls, the conventions, myths and people. It is fundamentally based on the division of labor, and this division makes interaction both desirable and necessary. Aristotle maintains that a polis is by necessity directed toward virtue and flourishing, it has to be political in order to be a community and not a mere alliance in war or commerce. Its inhabitants live within some proximity to make mutual dealings possible. A polis is the dependent community, having a shared view toward virtue and how to get there.

The polis, which is the etymological root of “politics”, is a community of oikoi, “houses, households” and not one of people. Summarizing this influential dichotomy, he states that “[t]he state [polis] is a partnership of families and clans [oikoi] in living well, and its object is a full and independent life.” The oikos is not only the house, but - like the polis - it extends beyond the material things it is made of and which it includes. It is a located group of shared interests, an institutional entity. The same is true for the polis - only with the important prefix “free.” In contrast to the city, a master of the house is commanding all other members, women, children and slaves. In the Aristotelian city, only the master of the oikos is granted full civic status, only he will be a member of the polis. For Aristotle, the oikos, etymologically connected to oikonomia “economy,” is also a natural unity. It is the institution that furnishes autonomy and freedom for its master. Aristotle’s inquiry about slaves makes this clear. Whereas in the polis the members
enjoy equal status, the *oikos* is about superiority of one over others. Consequently, to engage in politics is a privilege that only few can obtain. Prior to Aristotle, Hesiod reminds readers in *Works and Days* of the deficient state of human beings. Contrary to Gods, humans must toil all their lives to make a living and survive.\(^{10}\) While the master of the house is pursuing politics (or philosophy), someone else will have to toil to provide food and drink. Hence, the philosopher concludes, keeping slaves will be a necessity, until one day a successor of Daedalus will invent machines that will finally take their place.\(^{11}\)

However, since the cooperation of the *oikos* is different to cooperation found in the *polis*, everybody who obtains the service of others in order to have the distance necessary for politics or philosophy, will risk to act unjust toward others of his own kind.\(^{12}\) In Aristotle’s *Politics* the division of labor is what make *oikos* and the *polis* different, but, at the same time, makes inequality a precondition for both politics and philosophy. In the *polis*, equals are trading and interacting. But the economy of the *oikos* works differently. In contrast to his teacher Plato, Aristotle concludes that the house is not only quantitatively different from the city, but is also a different thing qualitatively.\(^{13}\)

1.2 The body politic

On Aristotle's categorical level, the house is a different thing, but he did not mean to question its position in a unifying hole. Æsop, in his fable, “The Belly and the Members”, elaborated a corporeal analogy that connected even the individual human being to house and city, right down to the anatomical details. In the fable, the members of the body come to believe that they are doing all the work while the belly is quietly consuming their produce. When they stop, the entire body becomes weak, and they themselves are incapable to move, their understanding of the belly’s duties comes too late for all.\(^{14}\) Plato also makes use of this corporeal analogy. He
maintains that both city (polis) and soul (psyche) are built of three parts. The polis comprises the classes of ruling guardians, protective auxiliaries and working citizens. The corresponding parts in the psyche are reason (noos), spirit (thymos) and appetite (epithumia). The equivalent of the productive part of the city, the workers, are the belly where appetite and desire reside. The protective part, the auxiliaries, are placed at the chest or midriff. It is the site of courage and reaction to the spirit of the soul. Finally, rulers - as might be expected - are analogous to the skull, the seat of rationality, self-control, love and wisdom. They correspond to the reasoning part of the soul. Only if the three parts are balanced by reason, the guardians, the soul and the city may flourish.

In holographic equivalence the human body, the house, the city and finally the entire cosmos are worlds distinct, yet akin. As a proportional correlation, this allowed architects until the Renaissance to use man as the measure of all things, but instead of assigning to Protagoras’ relativism, they could set up columns, buildings and cities in unified relation. Thus, Filarete declared: “the building is truly a living man… [I]t must eat in order to live.” Like the human body, “it sickens or dies or sometimes is cured of its sickness by a good doctor … [I]t needs to be nourished and governed and through lack it sickens and dies like man.” And Francesco di Giorgio Martini could plan a city with the fortress of the ruler at the noblest part of the body, the head, the church at the heart, secondary squares and temples at the palms and feet, and the place of consumption, the central piazza, at the belly.

1.3 City and soul / Community and individual

The position of architecture and its products within society is only in doubt when this universal relation is questioned, as did Perrault in the quote cited above. Let us take a bit more time to consider this analogy. Plato provides another, more detailed account in the Republic. Considering justice, and justice being an incredible difficult concept, Plato’s Socrates proposes to
pursue the dialogue by talking about the just city and not the just individual. Looking at the just city would be more promising, because enquiring into the just individual is like trying to “read small letters at distance.”

This is connected to Plato’s hierarchy of beliefs. In the famous allegory of the cave, the prisoners are chained tightly so they cannot move at all. With their backs against a fire, they stare at the wall of the cave. Behind their backs and between them and the fire, there is a parapet, then a bridge. There are people walking across the bridge, carrying statues of animals and everyday things. Seeing only the shadows cast by the objects, the prisoners mistake the shadows for reality, as they have been deprived of any acquaintance of the external world since birth. Staring at the shadows, the prisoners have beliefs without proper visible evidence, based on immaterial representations like shadows, reflections or images. Called *eikasia*, these beliefs are at the lowest level in Plato’s scale. When the prisoners finally break their chains, and look at the statues, the visible evidence elevates their beliefs to the next level of *pistis*. There are two more levels until finally their beliefs would qualify for knowledge, grounded by mathematical precision and philosophical reflection. There are two important consequences for the analogy of city and individual. First, while we can look at visible actions in the city and see if they are just or not, the insides of a person don’t allow such scrutiny. As a result, the beliefs we form by looking at the city are higher, at the level of *pistis*, than those gained by trying to make sense of an individual’s actions. From this follows the second consequence, that all theories will be at the same – the lowest – level as the believes without visible evidence. A theory may be discussed and elaborated, but it will never be as complex and telling as an encountering at the *polis*. Only by looking at the city, the complexities become apparent as we witness the infinite actions, interactions and their created effects.
1.4 Materialization of meaning

As cultural achievement, the *polis* is specifically tied to its dwellers. For Plato, the *polis* is the capitalized individual. Via the city we are able to deduce the categorical and functional interdependences humans use to appropriate their environment. We can understand what human beings are because we are able to look at what they do.\(^{22}\) This is the perspective that makes the arguments of Arendt and Habermas a distinguished point to enter architectural theories seeking the public as foundation. Following Plato’s argument, Ernst Cassirer has maintained that it is not only the city where we would find the individual writ large, but the entity of things he described as embodied meaning (*Sinn*).\(^{23}\) Through *symbolization*, production of cultural goods, humans create a common world. For Cassirer, culture is the human achievement of making the world distinctively our kind. But this connection is lost, at least both Arendt and Habermas and their architectural followers agree, with modernity. The public lost its unifying power and turned it into a place harmful for the individual. This conviction is evident in *critical regionalism* and the *autonomous architecture*, both looking for ease outside the public.
2. Framing a distant past

As an introductory citation to his omnipresent *Modern Architecture: A critical history*, Kenneth Frampton placed a rather gruesome trope, conceived by Walter Benjamin, to elucidate historical progress. Looking at Klee’s “*Angelus Novus,*” Benjamin is convinced that it witnesses the past as “one single catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage.” The angel longs to put back in order what had been smashed, but instead, the angel himself is suffering the torture of historical progress. The storm of history forces apart his wings and tears open his eyes, so he must watch the tragedy, but he is constantly blown away by the fury of the tempest.

To Frampton and his understanding of history, this seems to be an important image. He also uses it in “*The industrialization and the Crisis of Architecture,*” and accordingly he turns the history of modernity into a succession of crises. Throughout his writings and criticism, Frampton finds nothing good in our current cultural state, contingent upon this destructive chain of events. It is a “dystopia” caused by the “apocalyptic thrust of modernization”, and Frampton employs Adorno’s statement that the only way one could act in a corrupted world is by “redemption”. He argues for an “architecture of resistance” against “mass conformity” and seeks critique against the “universal” and “mediocre civilization.”

2.1 The crisis of modernity and the rise of the social

With regard to Kenneth Frampton’s view on the history of Modernity and its consequence, the elimination of the once-unified public, it will become apparent how much Hannah Arendt’s thoughts are constitutive for Frampton’s writing and especially for his proposed design practice, critical regionalism. A detailed look at the shared account of Arendt and Frampton will show how extensively they assess the impact of the fall of modernity and all that is now unattainable for us to aspire.
Both agree that at the dawn of modern science - to be precise, with Descartes – the place once occupied by truth was taken over by doubt. Since then, and at accelerating speed, humans have distanced themselves from nature and from each other, through the transformation resulting from discovery and development.\textsuperscript{26} This doubt was the “loss of confidence in appearances,” as scientists (and architects, too) began to ask for the “how” in things and not the “what.”\textsuperscript{27} As the appearances lost their unifying power, so did architecture and the public realm which hitherto “not only [served] to house the public realm, but also to represent its reality.”\textsuperscript{28} We stopped living in a world populated by things that were \textit{in essence} meaningful to all. Now, those objects divide us: they have grown meaningless and ephemeral.

Arendt elaborates that by turning from questions about the “what” of things to the “how,” the \textit{telos}, the essential “whatness” of objects, has become inaccessible and was substituted by an infinite search, doomed to never reach anything meaningful to all.\textsuperscript{29} Instead, private utilitarian ends, always inaccessible to other individuals or groups, have substituted \textit{teleological truth}. This has led to a “loss of the world,” the loss of a meaningful and uniting domain for all.\textsuperscript{30}

One precondition for the meaningful context establishing the \textit{polis} is Arendt’s version of Aristotle’s dichotomy of private and public. The private side of human life, housed by the \textit{oikos} and its counterpart of public appearance in the \textit{polis}, gave way the new all-encompassing “social.” In a long citation of Frampton she argues: “mass society not only destroys the public realm but the private as well, deprives men not only of their place in the world, but of the private home, where they once felt sheltered against the world where, at any rate, even those excluded from the world could find a substitute in the warmth of the hearth and the limited reality of family life.”\textsuperscript{31}

Frampton uses this paragraph to argue that human life has become much too public. The ubiquitous technologies of TV, radio and telephone invade people’s privacy, increasing the demand for a enclosed refuge. He connects Arendt’s argument of the fall of the public and the rise of the social
to a quote from Luis Barragán who maintains that “[a]rchitects are forgetting the need of human beings for half-light,“ in fact “half of the glass” would suffice in most contemporary architecture.\textsuperscript{32} Furthermore Frampton argues that the fragmentation of society comes from the “proliferation of urban sprawl.” The passage from Arendt he employs is taken from her argument on the origin of power: “The only indispensible material factor in the generation of power is the living together of people. Only where men live so close together that the potentials of action are always present can power remain with them, and the foundation of cities, which as city-states have remained paradigmatic for all Western political organization, is therefore indeed the most important material prerequisite for power.”\textsuperscript{33}

Both citations, about the social and the original meaning of power, are addressing pivotal concepts in Arendt’s theory, and there is much more to both of them. Action is the greatest human deed, power its precondition. And the exposure of the private realm and making it a public concern is equivalent to the loss of our human status. To understand the importance of these citations and the problems that have long been pointed out by Arendt’s readers, it is necessary to reconstruct Arendt’s account on polis and oikos in detail.
3. ARENDT’S *POLIS* IN DETAIL

The Attic *polis*, the social space of appearance, is the place on which Arendt has established her theory of action. Her rendering of the *polis* is based on two dichotomies: the *Vita Activa* stands opposite the *Vita Contemplativa* and makes both *polis* and *oikos* a necessity of human life.

When Arendt talks about the *polis*, she is not so much talking about the stones of Athens, somewhat disappointing for the architect, but places the main emphasis on the immaterial discursive space of free and equal human interaction. It is not the *urbs*, the stones and houses, that make the *polis*, but the *civitas*, the people who live in them. The *polis* is “not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be.”

The term Arendt coined for the public realm is the "space of appearance", created by people “acting … sharing words and deeds.” Arendt uses Thucydides and the *History of the Peloponnesian War* to illustrate. Nicias, general of the Attic fleet, urges his soldiers to leave Athens behind, but without grief. "[T]he Athenians may re-erect the great power of their city, how low soever fallen. For the men, not the walls nor the empty galleys, are the city.”

The *civitas* can be re-established anywhere; all it needs is the Athenians to make Athens. This is connected to the idea of the *agora*, the empty meeting place in all Attic cities. As *transcendental void*, it became a standard principle of post-functionalist urbanism. "The *urbs* or the *polis* starts by being an empty space, the *forum*, the *agora*, and all the rest are just means of fixing that empty space, of limiting its outlines. The *polis* is not primarily a collection of habitable dwellings, but a meeting place for citizens, a space set apart from public functions."

The active life or *Vita Activa* is spatial, but does not seem to need a specific location. As social space, it encompasses everything the Greeks called *askholia* – all that is not quiet. Accordingly, the contemplative life, the
Vita Contemplativa, is the world of introspection, inside the human mind and in the Cartesian sense devoid of materiality or spatiality. As the latter will forever remain private to each of us individually, it is the active life, or *praxis*, Arendt builds on this to emphasize the importance of the community. Her focus is on how individuals come to agree on a common goal and act or reason accordingly, and on the political, ethical and epistemological qualities attached to it.

3.1 *zoon logon ekhon*

The capability of speech is central to all who form a *polis*. The human being is the language animal, *zoon logon ekhon*. At the same time, this is the singular quality that makes us *zoon politikon*, political creatures. Arendt attributes to Aristotle that due to the performative power of words, the members of the *polis* preferred “a way of life in which speech and only speech made sense.” Speaking is not the mere uttering of phonemes. It needs the presence and acceptance of others. The *polis* is the social space where people meet and interact without any obligation deriving from necessity. It is the place for *action*, the highest human deed to Arendt. We readily see that Arendt’s basic argument on the *polis* is her reading of Aristotle’s *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Free people are able to act in accordance and yield power. Without the presence of others, acting would mean nothing. The presence of others makes any action potentially endless. Acting is appearing in public, in “the presence of others who have seen and heard and will remember”. Acting is made possible by plurality, the multiplicity of views in a community or “the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world”. Acting can be realized only by appearing in public, by participating in a community and being part of a potentially endless chain of actions. Arendt maintains that the legitimacy of power is derived from the initial getting together of people, that is, from the original pact of association.
that establishes a political community. Power is reaffirmed, whenever individuals act in concert through the medium of speech and persuasion.\textsuperscript{43} It is also communal support that “lends power to the institutions of a country, and this support is but the continuation of the consent that brought the laws into existence to begin with … All political institutions are manifestations and materializations of power; they petrify and decay as soon as the living power of the people ceases to uphold them.”\textsuperscript{44}

When Frampton uses Arendt to argue that a seminal requirement for people is to live within a certain proximity to each other, he employs an argument that touches upon much more then spatial separations. At issue are more subtle boundaries pervading not only motopia. The decisive point is, that in establishing her categories and dichotomies, Arendt simultaneously assesses who is and is not part of the community. The static system she establishes based on Aristotle’s biological logic is one where "all men are capable of deed and word" but at the same time, "most of them - like the slave, the foreigner, and the barbarian in antiquity [and women], like the laborer or craftsman prior to the modern age, the jobholder or businessman in our world - do not live in it [the \textit{polis}]." This is not only an account on ancient Athens and a sketch of its historical consequences, but, as we shall see below, an account on the essence of politics. Arendt is confirming the requirements stated by Fustel de Coulanges and makes it part of an essentialist understanding of politics: to be considered a citizen, part of the \textit{polis}, one had to be a free male, worshiping the Gods of the City and owning a Megaron inside the city walls. Hence, arguing against the urban sprawl, Frampton earns one of the most criticized forms of reasoning in Arendt’s philosophical thought. Linking privacy with "idiocy", she maintains that to be private meant “literally a state of being deprived of something, and even of the highest and most human of man's capacities.”\textsuperscript{45} For this, she earned the label of a "nostalgic antimodernist", dealing with "remote, abstract, Grecophile concepts", especially from those interested in gender issues.\textsuperscript{46}
This makes the private realm the seat of necessities, nothing more. It is the site of force and suppression of the paterfamilias, the dominus versus slaves and family. Its separation from polis, the realm of freedom and speech, is complete. In her attempt to recover the original meaning of political notions, freedom is the capacity to start something new, tied to the polis and inborn via natality. Arendt equates the isonomia with (political) freedom as “a form of political organization in which the citizens lived together under conditions of no-rule, without a division between rulers and ruled.” She calls everybody and all occupations outside the polis private. Again relying on Fustel des Coulanges, she argues, "The sacredness of this privacy was like the sacredness of the hidden, namely, of birth and death" and "the whole of this religion was enclosed within the walls of each house." It was women, slaves and barbarians "who lived only a private life, who [were] not permitted to enter the public realm." Only a citizen is an end to himself, while all others are reduced to being means to this end. Their labor is necessary to secure somebody else’s leisure to engage in politics. In a summary of her argument it becomes most irritating: "the irrelevant becomes automatically a private matter," and the ultimate consequence is that all those not permitted to the public realm, then and now, lost their status of being human.

3.2 A comment on Arendt’s Aristotle

Both Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics were arguments delivered in lectures and did not survive as elaborated arguments in books. Being lectures, they were directed to a particular audience, in this case “young Athenian men with political ambitions.” Aristotle was not reporting of polis and oikos of the day, because his audience was well informed about goings-on in Athens. Instead, he was delivering a critique. Like his teacher Plato, Aristotle wanted to challenge the existing views these young men brought to his lectures at the Lykeion - on the nature of politics, the polis and the oikoi. His argument then
was not reflecting the *doxa*, the established views, of what politics was about, or how society was structured. Instead he was establishing a counter-argument.\(^{53}\) This will be of great importance below, because Arendt read Aristotle’s *Politics* like an historical account, basing her understanding of the original meaning of politics on that premise.

Generally speaking, the origins of Western political philosophy are to be found in political problems of the day. If we trust Cicero, "Socrates first called philosophy down from heaven, and gave it a place in cities, and introduced it even into men's homes, and forced it to make inquiry into life and morals, and things good and evil. His manifold method of discussion, the variety of his subjects, and the greatness of his genius, consecrated by the memory and the writings of Plato".\(^ {54}\) It was the trail and verdict against Socrates that fueled the interest in political philosophy. This is true for Aristotle and even more so for his teachers.\(^ {55}\)

**3.3 A nostalgic antimodernist**

Aristotle argued that the political life requires both juridical and material equality.\(^ {56}\) Detailing the public/private dichotomy, Arendt provides her answer to the resulting seminal question: Who are the equals? The answer to it, or rather the constant revisiting of it, was certainly one of the predominant theoretical concerns of the Attic *polis*. Would the good regime be constituted of “the many” *hoi polloi* [hoi homonoi] as in Sparta, or only "the few", *hoi oligoi* like in Attic *poleis*? Would the favored view be selected by wealth, descent or, as Plato proposed, by a group of experts, the philosopher kings? Both Aristotle and Plato avoid to give a final answer, agreeing that any such answer would be wrong, or at least valid only temporarily. Since we can endlessly construct the Other, economically, geographically, historically, via gender, birth or religion or other features, politics is essentially an endless struggle. Society is constantly changing, and it is very hard to find the correct moment for any decision. That is why even the best
will at some point fail. In their volumes on politics, both Aristotle and Plato establish a similar epistemic setting like Arendt does in *The Human Condition* and *Between Past and Future*, and like we will witness below in Habermas’ account of the British coffeehouse. Aristotle discussed three existing *poleis*, Sparta, Crete and Carthage, while Plato discussed two theoretical *poleis*, Phaleas and Hippodamus, in Book II of his *Politics*. He added his own fictional *polis* in Book III. However, neither of these was meant to represent a perfect city. They were all employed to illustrate what shortcomings and complexities are involved in politics. The account of Hannah Arendt is similar, yet with one crucial difference: her argument includes a perfect public that existed in the past and was dissolved.

The problems of such an idea are extensive. First, determining that there was *one* social space as a perfect public realm, we are inclined to conclude the need to rebuild such a perfect public sphere. Second, we might be able to test the qualities of any social space, e.g. our globalized presence, against the famous mold, a belief apparent in notions like the “digital agora.” If we follow Arendt, we find the present almost the opposite of the ideal city. The rise of the all-encompassing social is leveling everything, but this process now appears to be a matter of perspective. The *polis* was saved for *free men*, and this raises the question: Who has lost something? - Was it a downscaling? Only in total alignment with Arendt’s reasoning and ignoring its problematic implications, Frampton could praise the *medieval city* for its shared publicness.
4. CRITICAL REGIONALISM

As an architectural practice, critical regionalism belongs to a dissolved public. It is different from any vernacular style that was "spontaneously produced by the combined interaction of climate, culture, myth and craft." We cannot hope to connect to any traditional way of building, because "no living tradition remains available to modern man." Instead of an inauthentic encounter with a lost past, critical regionalism is a guideline how, despite the fall of modernity, architectural practice remains possible. Frampton sums it up like this: "[T]he practice of Critical Regionalism is contingent upon a process of double mediation. In the first place, it has to ‘deconstruct’ the overall spectrum of world culture which it inevitably inherits; in the second place, it has to achieve, through synthetic contradiction a manifest critique of universal civilization."

To see more clearly what critical regionalism requires from the practitioner, we should look for more detail in the parts to explicate the whole. To begin with, to deconstruct is to "remove oneself from the eclecticism of the fin de siècle which appropriated alien, exotic forms in order to revitalize the expressivity of an enervated society." Thus, Frampton wants architects to take a position against the foreign-interests which Art Nouveau and Postmodern architects allowed. Also, architects should take an arrière garde position, distancing themselves from the Enlightenment myth of progress and the "unrealistic impulse to return to architectonic forms of the … past." Instead of taking from the lost history of architecture, we should strengthen regional schools. This final addition clarifies the obscure remark on Art Nouveau and marks one of the most important conclusions Frampton draws inspired by Arendt’s theory. It can be summarized like this: For architects at the present state and within this global society there is no possibility for authentic encounter with other cultures and our own past, including the entire history of architecture.
Secondly, the process of mediation denotes the “imposing limits on the optimization of industrial and post-industrial technology” and requires a “high level of critical self-consciousness.” Frampton cites two examples to explain what this could be about. Proposing a negative heuristic, architects should avoid synthetic light and cherish the quality of natural, local light. If they don’t, the building will be placeless and, in the case of a museum, all artifacts on display would loose their "aura" and seem mechanically reproduced. The same applies to the climatic conditions of the site. A building should face them, instead of creating the generic and optimized situation of the universal civilization by the use of air-conditioning. Making his point against the international desires of modernity, he argues for a site-specific architectural language based on "place-form", detached from a global history of architecture. Thus, this second taboo continues Frampton’s technological pessimism, adding artificial lighting and air conditioning to the list led by radio, telephone, TV and car.

On the positive side of the heuristics of critical regionalism, architects should cultivate the site. They should maintain the relevant topography, "in-laying the building into the site" and the "urban fabric." Once these requirements are met, "critical regionalism is the bridge over which any humanistic architecture of the future must pass." Finally and entering the debate that we will join in the second part of this study, "architectural autonomy" is "embodied in the revealed ligaments of the construction and in the way in which the syntactical form of structure explicitly resists the action of gravity." Frampton is thus demanding that structural components appear honest and not masked. In line with Karl Bötticher’s concept of Kernform versus Kunstform, Frampton’s autonomy aims for a universal addition to an architectural language based on place-form that allows the reader to decipher the structural function of a building part, falling back on Abbé Laugiers' functionalism, explained by her through the art of tectonics.
It is obvious that a process as complex as that postulated by Frampton is not a matter of course. Instead, it calls on architects to take a specific position regarding their works and society. This too is based on one of Arendt’s concepts, namely the role of *homo faber*, the working human. As the first and foremost requirement, *modern homo faber* needs distance from all influences in order to achieve something magnificent. If so, the works of *modern homo faber* will not only be magnificent, but also help to guide the public he had first needed to leave behind.

4.1 Distance

Hannah Arendt’s teacher Martin Heidegger takes scholarly distrust in modern society to the extreme. "Distantiality, averageness, and leveling down, as ways of being of the *they*, constitute what we know as 'publicness.'” It is publicness that "obsures everything, and then claims that what has been thus covered over is what is familiar and accessible to everybody." Accordingly, Heidegger finds a scaling down, caused by the modern public sphere. His account is also that of a technology pessimist. He blames technology for public transportation and mass media for boosting the process of making "every other […] like the next." The *authentic self* is lost to the *they* and all individual beings are dissolving "completely into a kind of being the Others." Like Kierkegaard, who claims: “even if every individual, each for himself in private, were to be in possession of the truth, yet in case they were all together in a crowd … untruth would at once be in evidence," we may object that being written and published, both proclamations need the public they are offending.

Much has been said about how seminaly important Heidegger was to Arendt’s work, but we should not forget that Heidegger’s importance is not confined to his students. Technology is often blamed for the fall of modernity and for an overwhelming presence that leaves no room for the past. In this sense, and returning to the fundamental connection of
individual mind and the city as a whole, the modern urban context turned out to be regarded as harmful. The metamorphosis from city to metropolis under the pressure of new technology and at the dawn of "the mass" and its media caused the city to turn against individuals and transform them. If we accept this claim, we are facing a version of the problem Plato pointed out, namely that no just individual can live in an unjust city and nothing of value can be produced in a poor environment. This problem turns out to touch the foundations of Heidegger’s philosophical project. Heidegger’s response will help us to better settle the position of architecture within the modern public which contemporary studies commonly advocate.

Like Husserl, Heidegger starts by asking the question how the “phenomena” or appearances of the world, could become accessible to the scrutinizing mind? For Husserl, to whom Heidegger dedicated his Being and Time, the phenomena are accessible as objects of the mind. He maintains that consciousness must always be the consciousness of something, and that it is inconceivable without the object to which it is directed. Instead, Heidegger argues that the Dasein is even more fundamental then our perception of the phenomena. Dasein is the concerned being-in-the-world. This embedded life co-constitutes the Dasein and the world, and only within its margins do we have access to the phenomena and how they appear to us. The things appear in a "world", and for Heidegger, that is also a shared, a public world. In Heidegger's own words: "[b]y reason of this with-like-Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world. Being is Being-with-Others." However, the “I” and the “you” remain opposite each other, although they share the world. 80

This is the point at which the arguments of Arendt and Heidegger part. Arendt felt that in his analysis of the world, Heidegger ignored his own best insights. Where Arendt starts to develop her political theory, Heidegger turns away from the public, arguing that it is only in an authentic form of Dasein where we can expect to find insights, in the form of the appearances that shine trough their everydayness. 81 For Heidegger, the authentic Dasein is one
detached from the interfering influences of the they. For Arendt, it is within the public, although only a public of certain qualities, that we can hope to understand the world. Because Arendt considers this certain public as lost, she, working at the time of deficiency, faces the same problem. And for scholars, and those how propose a theory of design practice, this is first and foremost a problem of method. The joint answer is not to increase distance.

In search for the *Urphänomene*, the original phenomena, Heidegger is obliged to distance himself from everything usual, eventually developing a kind of private language. For Arendt it is a temporal distance that will make it possible to dwell in the past to recover the original meaning of politics and its most important notions like, action, freedom, power, plurality etc. As a consequence and in order not to resort to the classical order, the project of critical regionalism leans toward Heidegger, rather than toward Arendt, alluding to a complete denial of any manifestation of the public; or at the most to a Rousseauian pre-cultural past.

The accounts of Arendt, Heidegger and Frampton confirm yet another principle. All share another dichotomy, with the members of the decayed public on the one side and the other who is ready to address the degeneration, by stepping outside the public, on the other side. Accompanied by resorting to a romantic aestheticizing of the creator and the work created, this is commonly found among modernist architects. Heidegger withdrew to a hut in Todtenauberg to write *Being and Time*. Le Corbusier found refuge in the *cabanon* at Cap-Martin. Authenticity in both cases works to establish authority. Authenticity does not come easily, but is achieved through utmost effort. Heidegger used the Greek concept *techne*, to describe this process, popularized in architecture via his text, “Building Dwelling Thinking.” Likewise, Le Corbusier notes in his diary that "painting is a bitter struggle, terrifying, pitiless, unseen; a duel between the artist and himself." Talking to students of architecture, Le Corbusier the architect takes a similar stance. "Devoting yourself to architecture is like entering a religious order. You must consecrate yourself, have faith and give. As a just
reward, architecture will bring special happiness to those who have given her their whole being." According to Le Corbusier, the reward of distancing oneself from others will be elevation above our "civilization", which, when experienced by a stranger or time traveller, "might well have the impression of something akin to a nightmare." He continues: "all the people have the same needs at the same hours, every day, all their live through. Our needs are ordinary, regular, always the same, yes, always the same." This sort of distanced authoritarianism pervades functionalist architectural theory. Mies reacted with confusion toward the public after the functionalist revolution. "I get up. I sit in my bed. I think: 'What the hell went wrong? We showed them what to do'." And Gropius assumes Nietzschean tones when he calls the architect the “Apollo of democracy.”

The dichotomy then is one of the Dionysian masses, ecstatic, spontaneous and habitual and the Apollionic architect as "societies seer and mentor." Although the dichotomy is that of The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, the creator in Nietzsche’s philosophy depends on the crowd and only within it can he hope to prosper. Contrary to Gropius's version, Nietzsche points at the constrained circumstances of the human mind, unavoidably in need of the public: “there is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival knowing” that, in all likelihood, will not be true knowledge. In a passage cited by Heidegger, Nietzsche concludes: "'objectivity' – the latter understood not as 'contemplation [Anschauung] without interest' … is, as such, a non-concept and an absurdity." For Nietzsche, the public is indeed the realm in which the individual will flourish, ultimately however doomed to fail – a tragic way of looking at the world. Hence, Nietzsche turns against this striving for autonomy and concludes: "the more affects we are able to put into words about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our 'concept' of the thing, our 'objectivity.'"

In this regard, Arendt leans toward Nietzsche rather than Heidegger, also pointing out that the "reality of the public realm relies on
the simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives," in fact this _plurality_ is the ground of the public realm shared, but at the same time comprising a multitude of distinct views.\(^91\) This is one of the important differences between Frampton’s reading of Arendt and the understanding of _The Human Condition_ promoted in architecture by George Baird. Those in search of authentic experience deliberately dispose themselves in opposition to the very idea that the collaborative community may yield something valuable, either in philosophy or in architecture.

### 4.2 Homework

For Heidegger, _Dasein_ is a field of disclosedness. Consequently, Heidegger is asking how we can shed some light and establish truths hidden in each situation.\(^92\) With the potential to reveal the covert truths, Heidegger is not in the collective, but in the authentic self of the inquirer. The early Heidegger of _Being and Time_ is in search of a fundamental ontology grounding the _Dasein_ as a fundamental and authentic being.\(^93\) He is looking for the pre-theoretical conditions of knowing, a knowing that is not distorted by any influence, by historical or contemporary others.

In search of the authentic phenomena, he turns his back against society. One could say that the performative part of this argument is writing _Being and Time_ in the Black Forest hut. The importance Heidegger attributed to the _being-in-the-world_, the phenomenological situation, together with his own aestheticizing, made the hut where he wrote, the bench in Messling where he read, and the country lane where he walked in thought, sights for philosophical tourists. We could start a list of essential architectural sites with Le Corbusier’s hut, Aalto’s boat and Philipp Johnson's guest house.

Heidegger calls the unconcealed truth _aletheia_. The inquiry toward _aletheia_ is driven by _techne_. He defines _techne_ as "producing, in terms of letting appear" and also as being "entirely at home [zu Hause] in something."\(^94\) This understanding can be connected to the etymology of consciousness deriving
from Latin *conscius* "knowing with others or in oneself", connected to *conscire* "be privy to".¹⁹⁵ In other words, the deeper we immerse ourselves in an occupation, the farther we get toward *aletheia*. Heidegger argues that the epistemological qualities of disinterested or authentic knowing are an ontological necessity for science, which is a form of *téchne*. "Science has its source in authentic existence," because "being-in-the-truth makes up a definite way in which *Dasein* exists."¹⁹⁶ Heidegger maintains that seclusion is a precondition for *techne*. This accounts for the remarkable course Frampton’s arguments take: starting from political theory and finding only at light, climate and topography as characteristics of *place*. But to see what the work of *homo faber* was like at the time of the *polis*, and how we could build on it according to the popular view, let us return to Arendt’s account.

5. THE ARCHITECT AS *HOMO FABER*

According to Arendt, there are three activities of the active life, two are part of the *oikos* and only one is found in the *polis*. Again, the close ties between Arendt and Aristotle are obvious. *Labor* is the reaction to the natural necessities of consumption. It is the occupation of the *Animal Laborans*. It is communal only, in that all creatures including humans need food and drink. *Homo Faber* is able to *work*, that is, he can produce deliberate objects, which are not consumed, but persist. Typically his products are even outlasting their maker. Laws, pieces of poetry, a chair or table and the products of architecture are fruits of *work*. They are, what constitute the *urbs*, that is, they make the world fit for human living. The permanence of the products of work links past and future generations by storing conventions, myths and achievements. Finally, *action* is both happening in the *polis* and creating the *polis*. Acting, as discussed above, is communicating with others on equal grounds. Like work, it requires freedom from necessities.
In this way we recognize the seminal importance of work in Arendt’s *polis* that is not as straightforwardly formulated in her writing. Its implications become apparent, especially when they are gone. Arendt explicates her claim of the "loss of the world" by attesting “victory of the *animal laborans*” over *homo faber*. Modern goods lost their permanence by being consumed just like the produce of labor. The consequences - something that is typically emphasized from the viewpoint of architectural theory - are extensive: the connection to past and future is lost; the public realm collapses, and we, living in modern society, lose our status of *homo faber*, that is, the status of being human. Although Arendt maintains that the *polis* is the people and not the material things, it becomes obvious that a good and working society is unthinkable without a common frame of reference. As we shall see, this is a common place that is often alluded to in architectural theory, at times exaggerated.

5.1 The monument makers

Talking about the products of *homo faber* that make up the *common world*, we turn to the material canvas that constitutes and frames the space of appearance. In other words, as a necessary precondition, any community must be able to address a shared world of things before the transcendental sphere of action is possible. The basal status of technology goes far beyond any talk about communication technologies, but encompasses all products of work. "The *vita activa*, human life in so far as it is actively engaged in doing something, is always rooted in a world of men and of manmade things which it never leaves or altogether transcends. Things and men form the environment for each of man’s activities, which would be pointless without such location." Arendt chooses the revealing example of a table. The piece of furniture, like the entirety of things, "gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak." During a formal dinner, the table will be as productive as all the company. It will provide precise instructions
for the guest: where and how to sit, how the body should be oriented toward it and what parts of the body are allowed to touch the table, and other parts, for example reserved for the chair. These conventions are not invented by the host, but conveyed by the table as cultural artifact relating to a shared past.\textsuperscript{101} Put this way, this would include \textit{all} technology, and the dismissal of modern technology we have witnessed would inevitably be contradictory. Arendt is quick to formulate some restrictions. In a long citation used often used by Kenneth Frampton and also George Baird she postulates:

"The man-made world of things, the human artifice erected by \textit{homo faber}, becomes a home for mortal men, whose stability will endure and outlast the ever-changing movement of their lives and actions, only insomuch as it transcends both the sheer functionalism of things produced for consumption and the sheer utility of objects produced for use. Life in its non-biological sense, the span of time each man has between birth and death, manifests itself in action and speech, both of which share with life its essential futility. The 'doing of great deeds and the speaking of great words' will leave no trace, no product that might endure after the moment of action and the spoken word has passed. If the \textit{animal laborans} needs the help of \textit{homo faber} to ease his labor and remove his pain, and if mortals need his help to erect a home on earth, acting and speaking men need the help of \textit{homo faber} in his highest capacity, that is, the help of the artist, of poets and historiographers, of monument-builders or writers, because without them the only product of their activity, the story they enact and tell, would not survive at all. In order to be what the world is always meant to be, a home for men during their life on earth, the human artifice must be a place fit for action and speech, for activities not only entirely useless for the necessities of life but of an entirely different nature from the manifold activities of fabrication by which the world itself and all things in it are produced."\textsuperscript{102}
For architects, this is obviously a rewarding passage. Mortals need *homo faber* to erect a home on earth. It will not only make a life possible that raises us from the animal kingdom, but the *monuments* will make selected actions last. But we are talking about things that have in common an "essential futility", that is they do not satisfy needs or function. We see that to construct these things, *homo faber* needs a different mindset than the *animal laborans*. Considering this special mindset, we can start to review *criticality*, as demanded and understood by Frampton, who takes it from Adorno and Horkheimer. But instead of looking at the concept of the Frankfurt School theorists of the autonomous artist, we once again return to the bodily metaphor of the city, moving upwards from the belly to the chest and the skull.

5.2 A critical class

Plato notes at the end of Book IX of the *Republic* that people tend to look down on ordinary labor because this work is devoted to serving worldly *needs* and not what is best in us - reason or the soul, respectively. But when we are to consider the city and start at "[t]he indispensable minimum", we find a cooperative group of workers. This is how Socrates and his ally start their imaginative city in the *Republic*. They begin at the minimal city and try to reconstruct its expansion. Hence, the first and smallest city satisfies the basic needs of food, shelter and clothing. The corresponding skills are those of the farmer, builder and weaver. A cobbler and a physician are added immediately. Socrates maintains that people are better at improving only one *techne* rather than many. "[W]e are not all born alike, but we have different natures that suit us for different functions" and the craftsmen will not produce their tools themselves. Therefore, Socrates and Adeimantos add carpenters, metal workers, shepherds and cowherds to their imaginative *polis*. 
They started off with a minimum of five men in the city and at this point are at nine.

Further professions are added, and now the city is capable of trade: merchants, sailors, retailers and wage-earning laborers. When the stage of fourteen professions is reached, it is the true, the “healthy” city, at least for Socrates. It is healthy, as Kenneth Dorter pointed out, because it is like a healthy body. Its concerns are only corporeal, that is the life of the people in the city is one of working, eating, sleeping and procreating. Importantly, there are first indications of music and religion. The healthy city organized only necessities, that is, those appetites "which someone could [not] eliminate if he practiced from youth." It is a peaceful coexistence without risk of war. But it is Glaucon, one of Socrates interlocutors, who jumps into the debate, not satisfied with such a world. He famously denounces this place as “the city of pigs.” Without any luxury, tables, couches, salt, olives, cheese, figs and deserts, it is not a desirable world for him. But as the price of comfort comes war. In Plato’s view, specialization is not only the founding principle of the city, but it is also the motor that constantly pushes the cooperative group toward more complex interactions. Specialization, the life in the city, benefits the human being but at the same time it breeds ever-new desires that demand yet more division of labor. At this time, the first non-necessities, products that are essentially futile, are introduced: painting, embroidery, gold and ivory. This process is potentially never-ending and via the luxury Glaucon demands, pushes the healthy city toward the “fevered city” and expansion. The demand for meat (the dwellers in the healthy city were vegetarians), the longing for perfume, furniture, cooks, servants, barbers and prostitutes pushes the community into war with its neighbors as ever more land is demanded to satisfy their appetite.

To stop the process of ever more specialization, a different mindset is needed. A city driven by appetite would never stand still. A new class - the guardians - introduce a new outlook upon the world: spiritedness. Like dogs, they combine the virtue of gentleness toward those they know and harshness
against those they don’t. This leads Socrates to the question whether both the dog and the guardian "will need, in addition to spiritedness, also to be a philosopher by nature?" The upper part is again split in two; the judiciary is separated from the legislature. The dog - then called a helper or auxiliary - loves someone it knows, but hates someone it doesn’t, "even though nothing bad comes to it from him." The dog loves learning, but not in the sense of the philosopher, who loves knowledge and learning, because he loves the good and the beautiful where he recognizes something familiar in nature. Plato speaks of the love of beauty and the good as "as a sort of recognition by the soul of what is akin to it in the world about it." What distinguishes the philosopher is the power to overcome appetite and in a second step passion, ascribing to love of the beautiful and the good.

Arendt’s homo faber and the critical regionalist architect hence resists the intemperance of the consumer society. In doing so, he enters a different cast, one that conveys the backbone of any public space. This is met by the notion of "the beautiful and the good" which is the literal translation of kalos kagathos used by the Greek elite to refer to themselves.

Kenneth Frampton draws on the Oxford English Dictionary to make the same point. There, we find architecture defined as "the art or science of constructing edifices for human use" and "the action and process of building." Frampton continues by looking at the etymology of “edifice.” The verb “to edify” not only means "to build", but also "to educate", "to strengthen" and "to instruct". The position of homo faber advocated by Frampton can be further elucidated with a passage from The Human Condition:

"Certainly every arrangement men make to provide shelter and put a roof over their heads – even tents of nomadic tribes – can serve as a home on earth for those who happen to be alive at the time; but this by no means implies that such arrangements beget a world, let alone a culture." As a preliminary remark, we can point to the authoritarian character of such an idea. Friedrich Nietzsche pointed out that not only were
the kaloi kagathoi beautiful and good, but they also claimed a special familiarity with truth. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, he remarked, that “it is a fundamental belief of all aristocrats that the common people are untruthful. The nobility in ancient Greece called themselves ‘We truthful ones’ [εσθλος]. It is obvious that everywhere the designations of moral value were at first applied to men and were only derivatively and at a later period applied to actions.”

5.3 Working toward truth

When Martin Heidegger was considering téchne, architectural theory paid close attention, as the subject is no less than the second part of the compound word archi-tékton. The root of the ancient Greek tékton was used to talk about practical knowledge that can be acquired by learning. It comprised many of the now distinct disciplines such as the visual arts, architecture, the art of playing an instrument, all crafts, and the skills required for science. In our case, the term is of importance both for Frampton’s theory and also, via the movement of tendenza or rationalist architecture, linked to the idea of autonomous architecture. In the case of Frampton, who rejects all the history of architecture, but at the same time needs to secure architectural expertise to avoid that decisions will look arbitrary, Heidegger’s claim that techne is essentially connected to truth comes handy. We can act meaningfully outside a culture that in any way would be inaccessible to us. On the contrary, rationalist architecture retraveled the roads of antiquity in order to arrive at "a general principle of architecture, of architecture as a science." For both, the prefix archi- will, as it did in ancient times, secure the outstanding position for the master-builder.

Heidegger promises that at the end of techne will be aletheia. He translates aletheia as "the unconcealed truth." Thus, he defines techne as “producing, in terms of letting appear’ and also as being “entirely at home [zu Hause] in something.” This understanding can be connected to the
etymology of consciousness deriving from the Latin conscius, "knowing with others or in oneself", connected with conscire "be privy to".\textsuperscript{121} Not only the logos of philosophy is capable of such an achievement, but also art and architecture, and craft. The deeper one immerses in an occupation, the further one will get toward aletheia and the essence from within and beyond things. The notion thus refers to an existing immanent potential within the objects, with the ability to illuminate even the world around them.

Heidegger’s archetype in his argument on techne and aletheia is "a Greek temple standing alone in a rock-cleft valley." This structure, a product of techne, will lead the passerby toward the truth about itself and the place it is embedded in. It is part of a meaningful totality Heidegger calls Geviert. The presence of the manmade structure will reveal the roughness of the ground, the rockiness of the valley, the violence of the storm and the space of air. The temple tells us about the sun, the darkness of the night, and it stands still against the rolling sea. All these things "come into relief as they are."\textsuperscript{122} This account evokes a similar atmosphere as Le Corbusier’s "liner" quietly resting or in a rough sea. The ship, too, is revealing, for all architects that cover a shoreline with holiday-homes, the truth about “maritime style.”\textsuperscript{123}

To Heidegger, a bridge is also an instance capable of making and revealing a place. As a building it is revealing and making a place at the same time. These places that allow human beings to dwell, that find their place within a world. The bridge does not only connect the banks of the river, but the "banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream." Wandering in the meadow along the river, one will pass a number of spots occupied with something, but only the bridge will establish a place, or locale, because it collects all the qualities available in a special way and lets them appear. Another important notion is that of the boundary. It is not understood as a mere border, but “is that from which something begins its essential unfolding.” Within a boundary, a locale or place can collect all the parts in a certain way, providing the essential being of the thing (the bridge, the temple) and the space around it.\textsuperscript{124} Frampton, following Heidegger,
maintains that space, the German Raum, carries the explicit connotations of a clearing "in which to be, a place in which to come into being."\textsuperscript{125}

How complex this process can be can be is shown in another example provided by Heidegger. It shows the important precondition of techne. In order to achieve a clearing, mortals need to dwell. A farmhouse in the Black Forest shows what this means to Heidegger:

"Here the self-sufficiency of the power to let earth and heaven, divinities and mortals enter in simple oneness into things, ordered the house. It placed the farm on the wind-sheltered mountain slope looking south, among the meadows close to the spring. It gave it the wide overhanging shingle roof whose proper slope bears up under the burden of snow, and which, reaching deep down, shields the chambers against the storms of the long winter nights. It did not forget the altar corner behind the community table; it made room in its chamber for the hallowed places of childbirth and the “tree of the dead” - for that is what they call a coffin there: the Totenbaum - and in this way it designed for the different generations under one roof the character of their journey through time. A craft which, itself sprung from dwelling, still uses its tools and frames as things, built the farmhouse. Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build."\textsuperscript{126}

Hence, dwelling is a special connection one needs to possess. In a final example, Heidegger is talking about a smaller thing, a painting, the \textit{Pair of Shoes} by Van Gogh. In this example we hear about the acquired craft of the master. Through his skill and only by drawing a worn pair of shoes, Van Gogh is able to reveal the toil and suffering of rural life led by a peasant woman, the presumed wearer of the pair. “Out of the dark opening of the worn-out insides of the shoe-tool stares the toil of laborious steps. In the
sturdy solid heaviness of the shoe-tool is stowed up the stubbornness of the slow trudge through the far-stretched and monotonous furrows of the field, over which a raw wind blows. On the leather lies the dampness and fullness of the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field path as evening falls.”

There are many architectural implications here. Alberto Pérez-Gómez is among the advocates of such an idea, however he is even more skeptical than Heidegger. Talking about techne, Pérez-Gómez is very close to Frampton in arguing that it is a skill referring to lost qualities of distant times. He admits that in the discipline of architecture there is a certain necessity to employ technology in order to construct a building. But it should only be used with "critical mediation" to arrive at the "mysterious' origins of technology in techne and its capacity to embody truth." To arrive at aletheia, architects should overcome technology, destabilize established views, to reveal that technology and the connected interest of control is not the absolute truth. This will lead to "a self-transformation" resulting in a different stance, or mindset, toward the world. In comparison and surprisingly, Heidegger is more humble at this point. He only insists that as times change, and when the days are gone on which the dwelling was found in the Black Forest farmhouse, we need to find new modes to establish a world. This, for Heidegger, is not owed to a singular event, but "mortals ever search anew for the essence of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell.”

Two other accounts can help to highlight architectural implications. Both sources are interested in philosophy and architecture, although with antagonistic weight: Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Both were obsessed with exactness in producing their designs. Although sometimes referred to as the architect of mass production, Mies famously required tolerances that were not available off the shelf. In fact, none of his designs could be successfully prefabricated. Wittgenstein, building the famous Palais in Vienna, was also dreaded by all involved in the building
process. Most feared was the high level of craftsmanship he required for all parts of the house. All cast-iron radiators and other metal parts needed to be produced with a tolerance of half a millimeter. This requirement could finally be met after a full year's search by a manufacturer in Scotland. Mies thought of his profession as essentially a "profession of truth" and is known to have liked the definition of Thomas Aquinas, "veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus" – truth is the equation of things and intellect.

As a result, imprecise things will to a lesser degree correspond to the idea of their essence. In the same manner, Wittgenstein states in the *Philosophical Investigations* that "inexact is really a reproach, and exact is praise. And that is to say that that what is inexact attains its goal less perfectly than what is more exact."

However, the connection both Ludwig Wittgenstein and Mies van der Rohe were making is in many regards Heidegger’s *aletheia* in reverse. The more effort is made to achieve the most exact representation of an idea, the more one will approach the truth about the thing. The maker of the thing is becoming the tool of the designer with the *techne* already done by the latter.

5.4 Dwelling in Heidegger

Heidegger’s thoughts on *techne* and *aletheia* provoked a momentous discussion among distinguished parties. For example, Joseph Rykwert began by pointing out that there was no Greek temple with the properties Heidegger described. None can be found in any rocky valley, including the Doric temple of Poseidon in Paestum that was later mentioned in Heidegger’s text. Calling our attention to a passage in a text by Gottfried Benn, published a year before Heidegger’s essay, Rykwert concludes that both texts have little to do with historical Greece, but have in common a mix of Nazi admiration for “naked violence, arbitrary power, racial pride, and homoerotic antifeminism.” Rykwert connects the mute temple to the absence of Mies’s
crystalline towers "appropriate [for] our alienated and technology-dominated time." 134

Meyer Schapiro argued that Heidegger’s account about A Pair of Shoes, similar to Rykwert’s criticism, was first of all utterly wrong because the depicted shoes were very likely those of the painter himself, and secondly the philosopher’s reading, if anything, provided a window to Heidegger’s "own social outlook with its heavy pathos of the primordial and earthy." 135

In the present text, we should try another approach, one that is not going back to the impossibly difficult task of dealing with Heidegger’s anti-Semitism and ad hominem accusations. Jacques Derrida’s contribution provides a point to start from. Derrida presented a text that twists and turns, exerting itself on possible readings. This makes the reader to look at the circularity that Heidegger engaged in: any search for aletheia, the unconcealed truth, brought forth by completely immersing in some thing, produced a perspective toward the world that - as historical rubble - will conceal and constitute the hidden truth. 136 “Van Gogh's shoes enabled the world of the woman to come to light; the Greek temple enabled the world of historical people come to light, but this "clearing" is disposition, perspective experience and interpretation. This becomes eminent because things only show up if they are important to us for some reason. Truth "does not exist in itself beforehand, somewhere among the stars, only later to descend elsewhere among beings." 137 A hammer is not by itself a tool to be used with nails. Only in a certain perspectival world will a piece of wood and some metal exist and function as a hammer.

5.5 Aletheia

Unnoticed by the discussion led in aesthetics, arts and architecture, on how we could access or create the meaning of a given thing, philologists have presented even earlier than the contributions already referred to, an important alternative to Heidegger’s techne/aletheia association.
We have seen that according to Heidegger, the possessor of practical knowledge will by *techne* and completely submerging in the work he is engaging in, achieve *aletheia*, the unconcealed truth within the thing he is treating. The value and meaning of a work of architecture or art is that it opens a "clearing" that sheds light on the true character of the thing itself or the context it is in. *Aletheia* then is the unconcealed truth of the object that is brought to light by the authentic labor invested. When we are considering *alēthia* we have to keep in mind that the Greek notion dating from the mid-fifth century BC is the most general and important word for “truth.” Thus it cannot be reduced to the specialized way Heidegger uses the term in his writing. Heidegger maintains that *to a-ลēthes* has originally and essentially meant *mē lanthanon*, the “unhidden” or “unforgotten” and a quality within the things of the world. Significantly the alternative accounts by Bruno Snell and Thomas Cole argue the opposite.

Bruno Snell argued that instead of designating properties of *objects,* *alēthia* was used to talk about attributes of *people.* He showed many instances were *alēthia* was used to talk about objects of consciousness that are retained in the memory without gaps. Hence, the first alternative makes the important point that in early texts, *alēthia* is almost exclusively used in terms of *subjects* speaking the truth.

Thomas Cole carried on Snell’s line of argument and maintained that the term had less to do with perception and appreciation (of a statement without *lēthē*), but instead was used to refer a process of communication. *Alēthia* s involved in, or results from, a transmission of information that excludes *lēthē*, whether in the form of forgetfulness, failure to notice something of significance or ignoring it. The characteristics of *alēthia* are care, precision, order and coherence. In the *Iliad*, Homer is describing a horse cart race. Achilles is installing one of his father’s followers as a judge at the turning point so “that he might mark the running and tell the truth [*alēthia*] thereof.” Cole argued that this means that the judge will report certain events just in case they happen. In this use, *alēthia* has no conceivable
antonym such as “falsehood.”  

Hence, the term can be understood as something like “discursive correctness.” This alternative makes alēthia neither a property within objects or subjects, but makes it a public good that exists between people. 

Cole continues that the early understanding of the notion and its subsequent development, becoming the predominant notion for truth, is not a particular characteristic of the Greek language, but is in “accord with a general principle of linguistic history.” The English sooth, like the ancient Greek etymos, was used exclusively for isolated individuals. But sooth gave way to “truth” and hence was replaced by a word which had originally referred, like alēthēs, to a specifically human quality, namely reliability and loyalty. A similar connection exists between the German treu (faithful) and Middle English troth. The latter is often related, but not confined to "discourse" and has only later come to designate the correctness of a statement (13th century) or reality of a thing (14th-15th centuries). There are significant changes caused by this alternative. Connecting alēthia with “discursive correctness” or “unforgettingness,” hence a quality of the public appearance of people, also points to its political significance. According to Cole, the meaning of this word was from the beginning “sober, methodological, rational truth – first in the possession of men alone, though later the Muses … oracles … and eventually even gods.” Hence, in the etymology of alēthia, we find modes of exclusions similar to those we found in the Attic polis. We can use these linguistic arguments to formulate an alternative to the still-prevailing understanding that architecture requires a certain mind-set of a selected view. These claims are often repeated and predominantly formulated as salvation for the crisis in architecture. We can contradict this idea by saying that architecture is exclusively reserved for those with a capacity to “accomplish this cultural task, … humble as an act, … an imagining self, ethical and responsible, rather than from the consensus of “communicative action.”
6. THE COMMON WORLD: MONUMENTS, PRODUCTS OF LABOR, FRAMING THE PUBLIC

The above makes clear that neither Arendt nor Frampton nor Pérez-Gómez are ready to concede that any architecture has the attribute of culture and the permanence of a monument.\textsuperscript{146} True monuments, edifices of the public realm, are the great works of homo faber. Arendt calls Homer "the educator of Hellas". The achievements of Pericles as saved by Thucydides, and other unspecified stories transmitted in "documents and monuments" are said to become “visible in use objects or art works.”\textsuperscript{147} Those things have the ability to constitute a public or polis and secure the communal meaning of a world. So, notwithstanding the difficult relation of architecture after functionalism and monuments, let us start with architectural buildings of monumental scale and in a second step expand the scope to a more general consideration of the world of things. In this discussion we will also establish the first connections to Enlightenment public sphere as discussed by Habermas.

6.1 Monuments

According to Alois Riegl, a “monument in its oldest and most original sense is a human creation, erected for the specific purpose of keeping single human deeds and events ... alive in the minds of future generations.”\textsuperscript{148} This definition by Riegl, who helped to reshape the theory of modern historic preservation may be supported by pointing to the etymology of the word “monument,” originally a Latin compound noun consisting of moneo (to warn, advise, remind,) and mens (mind, thought or alternatively referring to the Greek mnemósynon (reminder, mnemonic). \textsuperscript{149} In other words, monuments are anecdotal and mythical links to a communal past. Martin Heidegger proposes a similar argument. He remarks about an unknown temple that “[i]t is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which
birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for humans." This gives us a better understanding of what remembrance is directed to and what it could be that establishes a link between otherwise historically disconnected beings. For Heidegger, this is not limited to monuments on an architectural scale, but includes the entirety of "equipment" in the common world. We are, according to Heidegger, world disclosers - with reference to Entschlossenheit (determination) - by nature. That is, by means of things and coordinated practices we humans open coherent, distinct ontological worlds in which we perceive, feel, act, and think - akin to the process of acquiring techne – and become "entirely at home" with something. Only within the ontological and epistemological structure of these coherent worlds do we find a place for a hammer (a long piece of wood and a cuboid piece of metal) and one for a nail (a small thin metal stick) and fit them reasonably together. It is only with a specific world of things and beings providing the context that any encounter with people or using equipment is possible. All testing, doubting and concluding assumes a system in which all these statements are meaningful. If we trust the later Wittgenstein, then this holistic system will be more or less arbitrary and culturally relative. Heidegger argues historically that there has been a series of worlds, or understandings of being, in the West. This too, fits in very well with Alois Riegls definition, which was largely inspired by Johann Gottfried Herder’s Zeitgeist theory and is visible in his criteria for evaluating an architectural monument which by necessity are always relative.

At least seen from within the area of Alois Riegls writing, it is necessary to select the things we elevate to the status of a monument. Considering monuments, we return to the moment just prior to what some have called the fall of Modernity, and before Kant found the beginning of the principal movement of Enlightenment, the emancipation of the individual and the beginning of the modern public realm. Notwithstanding this importance, architects - and even if they started from political theory -
are consistently attracted by this time – a time said to have been before the crisis in architecture.

In an essay entitled “Posturbanism” (part of The Architectural Uncanny), Anthony Vidler alludes to the medieval city just as we have seen it through the above examples. He uses Riegl’s remark on monuments and focuses on their visual authority. He holds that in the "traditional city, antique, medieval or Renaissance, urban memory was easy enough to define; it was that image of the city that enabled the citizen to identify with its past and present as a political, cultural, and social entity" … "a complex mental map of significance by which the city might be recognized as ‘home.’"  

Two perspectives are profoundly at odds with each other. In terms of political theory, Arendt, Kant and Habermas respectively, it would be unconventional to characterize medieval Italy as a time of a mature public sphere. From the perspective of the monument builders, however, Vidler maintains that the dome of Santa Maria del Fiore would stand for the unity of the Florentine people. He is taking a remark by Leon Battista Alberti on Filippo Brunelleschi’s cupola to support this claim, insisting that the former thought it was "covering" the people and marking their "political and social unity". Although without providing the reference, Vidler seems to call our attention to a passage in the prologue of Della Pittura: "Who could ever be hard or envious enough to fail to praise Pippo the architect on seeing here such a large structure, rising above the skies, ample to cover with its shadow all the Tuscan people, and constructed without the aid of centering or great quantity of wood."  

Following Alberti, Vidler emphasizes the size of the dome. By the dome reaching for the sky, its shadow covers the Tuscan people. But doesn’t it at the same time make visible the power structures of 15th century Florence and its arti maggiori? More likely being a monument representing the feudal system, it addresses the public as the silent Publikum. We can also object to Vidler's choice of an example. Since he was writing about the role of architecture in the public and urban context, the Renaissance theorist
certainly was a curious choice. It was Alberti who advised architects to build walls and gates to incarcerate the troublesome working class into zones determined by occupation. He also held that piazzis should have secret passages, hiding holes, and listening tubes so that the household staff and their families could be spied upon. Not being a friend of cities at all, he concluded that while they might be necessary centers of government and commerce, it would be better to leave them behind and withdraw to a suburban villa.156

6.2 Meaningful worlds

The point Vidler and the others are trying to make is semantic. Accordingly, we find no distance between sign and reference prior to modern science. The communal context, or systematic relation of society, the urban memory put in the words of architectural theory, was directly accessible to all. This includes the appearance of the dome of Santa Maria del Fiore. Prior to the changes initiated by Galileo, Descartes and Copernicus, the proportional relation secured the individual's position within things big and small, including the totality of the cosmos and the polis. For architecture, this meant that "[a]rchitectural intentionality was transcendental, necessarily symbolic." Although Pérez-Gómez blames Alberti for replacing theory with a set of technical rules, he repeats the claim that prior to the modern age, “[r]eality was perceived as an organic totality directed by the regularity of the heavens, and knowledge was synonymous with the elucidation of the transcendental order of cosmos.”157 The extensive changes that marked the beginning of Modernity, overturning ontological and epitomical worlds, are well documented and beyond any doubt. And the existing totality of a transcendental order can be readily accepted for our present purposes. However, we cannot conclude from these statements that this resulted in an unquestioning and communal attitude about the world and the issues of the city. This leads to a problematic disparagement. The statement as cited
above implies that a theological perspective - asking "what" instead of "how" questions - would have been accepted without dissent. The statement neglects to allow for a free intellectual effort by all the people prior to the modern era.

Can we accept the generalization that the world was an unquestioned whole devoid of any dissent? Can we imagine a world full of objects, some of them man-made, that is directly accessible without any form of mediation? However powerful the proportional way of thinking may have been, it is unable to accomplish it all. In the summary provided by Peréz-Gómez, its limits become apparent. He diagnoses a profound crisis of meaning in 18th century architecture. Significantly using a phrase by Arendt, he said the crisis was caused by a "loss of the world", where world was certainly understood in the sense of Heidegger, hence the loss of a transcendental horizon. "Once a cosmography and mythology disappeared as socially accepted realities", architectural expression turned to be "based on human culture and institution, as a mimesis of history, rather than as a mimesis of nature." At that moment, buildings no longer conveyed knowledge, "as in the example of the cathedral to be understood as the medieval encyclopedia or biblia pauperum, allowing individuals to understand themselves in relation to an order represented by architecture." The important point here seems to be that nature and myth avoid the relativism that is attested to culture. With culture as a product of history, society was split into pieces and architecture left in shards.

But this view is at odds with the basic principle of the city. As we have seen above, any specialized community yields contradictory positions. In diverse, small or seemingly endless chains of a communal effort to create distinct human conditions, in the association of the city, rests the potential of disagreement, as all the links pursue different interests. Herder makes his relativist point by talking about the shepherd and the fisherman (an analogy found earlier in Plato’s hypothetical city). "The shepherd beholds nature with different eyes from those of the fisherman or hunter: and again, in every
region these occupations differ as much as the character of the people by whom they are exercised.”

Although the dome of Santa Maria del Fiore was without any doubt an important part of the "image" of Florentine culture, it is improbable that it spoke to all the way it spoke to Alberti. Alberti and Pippo are friends and experts interested in the same things. They value perspective drawing and elaborate scaffolding.

Instead, the Cupola del Brunelleschi falls into the above discussed category, "pieces of equipment" - the Greek Temple and Van Gough’s Shoes. It is part of a world accessible to the public, but at the same time allowing for subjectivity. It seems to cover not only one city, but also others that are unfolding for different groups of people. In constructing public space, providing the stage for action, architecture works as a technology of communication in contradictory ways. As stated above, when we quoted Heidegger to elaborate on Riegel’s definition of the monument, truth is both casting light and dropping shadow. "Truth, in essence, is un-truth." First, the common world establishes the present comfortably nested in past and future. In an second step and only after being objectively accessible, it provides the scope for distinct positions.
7. Culture

In order to conclude this first part, I want to turn to culture, accused by Pérez-Gómez to be the fission of modern society. As with Frampton, it should be apparent from the above discussion that he inherited all the problematic relationships from Arendt and to some degree from the Frankfurt School, and that he cultivated these in his own writings. Staying with the premise of the first part, let us look at Hannah Arendt's understanding of modern culture and at her reluctance, which is in no way inferior to that of the two architectural theorists.

Arendt, in an essay entitled "The Crisis in Culture: its social and its political significance", begins by stating “a still growing concern among intellectuals with the relatively new phenomenon of mass culture." This concern pertains to a crisis that came when "the mass of the population has become incorporated into society." Providing a brief history of that phenomenon, in order to see if the relationship mass to society and society to culture was triggered by similar causes, she says that at the very beginning were the gentile society of Britain and the French salons. At that time - we will see that it was the same time and location where Jürgen Habermas found his perfect public realm realized -, the educated "philistine" introduced a utilitarian interest to the cultural world. He "read the classics … by the ulterior motive of self-perfection, remaining quite unaware of the fact that Shakespeare or Plato might have to tell him more important things then how to educate himself." 

The material values that directed "the philistine's" entire outlook on the world could not be reconciled with “such useless objects and occupations as are implied in culture and art.” As a result, "the objective status of the cultural world," which "contains tangible things – books and paintings, statues, buildings and music" was reduced to a commodity and muffled in a cask of refined talk. This social [sic!] way of judging assaulted the "relative permanence and even eventual immortality" of theses things. Once they
became consumer goods, consumed in the sense of the produce of the *animal laborans*, the public lost its past, future and present.

Arendt is arguing that any judgment if it *interested*, that is, served any purpose, is corrupt. She argues that the first part of Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* "contains perhaps the greatest and most original aspect of Kant’s political philosophy." 165 Disinterestedness hence is not only the requirement to distinguish the beautiful, but it is inherently political. To judge disinterestedly is to overcome subjective and private conditions aiming toward agreement of the universal public. The bourgeois society lacked all of this. The *polis* sets the limits “to the love of wisdom and of beauty” and also is what "distinguished [us] from the barbarians." The difference then is "cultural", "a difference in [our] mode of intercourse with cultural things." 166 Finally, Arendt adds that this is indicted to “lack of virility, the vice of effeminacy … too great love for beauty.” 167

Eventually, the lack of culture, and all connected vice, incorporated the entire globalized world. The "avenues of escape are now closed because society has incorporated all strata of the population." 168 And due to their constrained circumstances of the *animal laborans*, the mass can never be free and all their acting will be one of necessity.

Either as an alarm call, or owed to a detached perspective, when Arendt and her followers are considering the free time of the mass, a disdain surfaces that is hard to accept. Even the pieces of time after work are not free in the sense Arendt is requiring. This time, the leisure time of evening, weekends and holidays, "is biological in nature, left over after labor and sleep have received their due. Vacant time which entertainment is supposed to fill is a hiatus in the biologically conditioned cycle of labor – in the 'metabolism of man with nature', as Marx used to say." 169 Richard Sennett joins in, attesting to the *tyranny of intimacy*: "a life limited by children, mortgages on the house, quarrels with one's spouse, trips to the vet, the dentist, the same hours for waking, catching the train to work, returning home, the careful drinking of two martinis and smoking of eight cigarettes
which is each day's ration."\textsuperscript{170}\ It is obvious that Frampton has the same things in mind when he is writing about the mall, suburbia and motopia. It is impossible to allow architectural theory, that started out by considering the public, such an understanding of large parts of society.

\textit{7.1 Rousseau's heirs}

Finally, we see the status of an architectural theory that started out by considering the public and ended up by directly opposing it. Admitting only a small elite and cutting off the rest, little of the initial project could be saved. Culture is something the individual must be worthy of, and not a field one participates in. That is why Frampton promotes architecture's interest in \textit{tektonik}. The logic of the construction is something \textit{natural} that has nothing to do with culture. Frampton releases and elevates this functionalist project at the same time. Heidegger, again, offers the most extreme remark in that context. He called culture, "\textit{den faulen}" (the lazy) aspect of a human, which is only considering the works of the mind."\textsuperscript{171}\ And even Habermas, whose theory will preoccupy us in the following pages, takes a similar position, stating that mass society replaced the public realm with a quasi-public sphere, the occupational sphere, and its in-authentic counterpart of "pseudo-private well-being."\textsuperscript{172}

This striking consensus comes together in the thoughts of Rousseau. In his \textit{Discours} we find a possible origin of the prevailing cultural critique, understood as the critique of the alienation of modern humans from primordial nature.\textsuperscript{173}\ Considering the social organization in large societies, Rousseau insists that mutual dependence makes humans weak and unfit for self-sufficient survival. "As [man] becomes sociable, [he] grows weak, timid and servile; his effeminate way of life totally enervates his strength and courage." Rousseau is baffled how human beings could ever leave the state of nature and organize in social structures. It "made man wicked while making him sociable. … the original man having vanished by degrees,
society offers to us only an assembly of artificial men and factitious passions, which are the work of all these new relations." 174 In a citation used by Frampton, Luis Barragán finds the city in the way of man’s innate relation with nature and as a result attests that "[n]ature becomes a scrap of nature and man a scrap of man". 175

The contempt directed against the entity of culture or later materializations has its origin in Rousseau’s account on the state of nature. "The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying This is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society." 176

7.2 Conclusion: An optimistic notion of culture

As we have seen, the discontent with our current cultural state was responsible for Hannah Arendt searching the past in order to establish her political theory. Once read by architects and architectural critics, her thoughts were a welcome inspiration at a time when the discipline faced the obvious end of the international plans of modern architecture and was unsatisfied with the alternatives at hand. Thus, in architecture, too, and most importantly based on Kenneth Frampton’s critical regionalism, but also in the texts of Alberto Pérez-Gómez and in some aspects Anthony Vidler, Arendt’s reluctance against modernity, which at the core is a contempt against modern culture, could prosper in our field. Because it is in many regards unthinkable for architects to follow Arendt to the polis, a maneuver that would essentially imply advocating the study of classical order, architects went even beyond Arendt. They let go all culture, seeking a hypothetical pre-cultural time or transcendental teleological state. Architects found the former in Rousseau and the latter in Heidegger. So, starting by reading political theory, the study of the public, architects arrived at the public’s harshest critic, Martin Heidegger, a philosopher always anxious to tend his distance to modern public and let the gap between him and Man.
appear as large as possible. The resulting architecture positions itself outside of culture and even at a distance to its own discipline. The remainder can only be a vague and esoteric notion of place, considering light, topology, climate, in a word nature, culture’s alleged counterpart. This is accompanied, also taking from Arendt, by finding criticality a gift of the favored few, with architects as homo faber amongst the favored, building the world for human beings, thus always capable of changing it at will.

The position I want to support in concluding Part I is to defend the basal status of technology and culture. This position I develop following Ernst Cassirer with whom Martin Heidegger famously disputed in the Swiss Alps. Cassirer held that it was impossible to conceive of human beings without the cultural achievements they bring forth. This is very much in accordance with Plato who maintained that we could understand the human being by looking at the city. Birgit Recki has provided an excellent overview of Cassirer’s notion of culture. Humans are part of a cooperative group, the public, which is defined as a free association of individuals to cope with the necessities of life. Thus, the public is concerned with the productive and communicative effort to create a particular condition. The notion culture encompasses all products, the objective (factual) communal achievements that appear as the result of making the world according to human needs. The term designates the realized works of this collective coping. Finally, we speak of technology as the single piece amongst the realized works. Houses, writing, books and telephones are pieces of culture. Building on Cassirer, it becomes apparent why it is impossible to speak of humans without their culture. And the boundary of yet another of Arendt’s constitutive dichotomies are blurred: the Aristotelian praxis, the acting in accordance with community, and poesis, the producing of its artifacts. Humans are distinguished by their consciousness: the producing and objectification of obtainable things. In other words, through the things in the world, knowledge becomes accessible; it becomes public. Thus, the man-made world of things with architecture being an important part of it, like Arendt
said, connects generations past and future. It is culture that makes available knowledge for public scrutiny. Only after the things are objectively available, can they be occupied and understood from certain perspectival understandings of the world. Such a perspective can be that of an expert culture, physics, medicine or architecture, or any sub-culture within society. For architecture this means that we have to include all, and only in a second step will our field's discursive sphere set is ontological characteristics, its nomoi, its rules of vision and division. Finally, a remark by Ernst Cassirer makes it explicit that the un-cultural life form we found in the discussion above is indeed no more than a philosophical construction.

"Rousseau said that the first human who fenced a piece of land should have been slain. After the lecture by Prof. v. Uexküll we know, that this wouldn't have been enough. The first dog should have been slain."179
8. APPENDIX I: CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS

In an anecdotal way, let us for the last time return to ancient Athens. At the beginning, we briefly looked at Plato’s advice that considering real cities would be more rewarding than proposing theories about them. This, he maintained, was due to the immanent complexity and contradictions found when humans gather in a dependent community. So, let us see what ancient Athens looks like in contemporary scholarship. The two accounts should work as an alternative to Arendt’s rendering of the polis and as a recapitulation of the most important assertions made above. First, providing a tentative history of the Attic agora, we see how these gathering places worked and how they failed to support a working public. Considering an early evolutionary leap in the history of literacy, we see to what degree technology is constitutive for public life and even for the individual’s outlook on the world. This should support the allegation that any theory that reduces culture to a few selected achievements, typically to high culture, must have overlooked how much humans are cultural creatures, whether we like it or not. Finally and considering the most private thing, the individual mind, we see why the homological relation of city and individual is not a mere metaphor. Hopefully, it will become apparent that even the most private things are considered in public, and we will find that exclusion is a dynamic process at the core of the polis going beyond the public/private reduction.

To do so, we need to specify what time span Arendt is talking about in the turbulent history of Athens and Attica. I take it to be an extended Classical Period; starting from Solon’s codex at the beginning of the sixth century to the middle of the fourth century B. C. During those two hundred and fifty years, many regimes succeeded or were toppled, and the face of Attica significantly changed. I will therefore start by providing a sketch of Athens and its political organization.
8.1 You say polis? What polis?

"I doubt if the world can produce a man, who were he has only himself to depend upon, is equal to so many emergencies, and graced by so happy versatility, as the Athenian."\textsuperscript{181}

"The Athenians are addicted to innovation, and their designs are characterized by swiftness alike in conception and execution … To describe their character in a word, one might truly say that they were born into the world to take no rest themselves and to give none to others."\textsuperscript{182}

There was fierce civil war before Solon managed to establish his laws in 594 BC. After doing so, he left on theoria. The codex Solon laid down strengthened the political power of the assembly, the ekklesia, and allowed the thētes, the lowest of Athenian classes, access to it. He canceled obligations and debts, pulling the horoi, mortgage stones, that had tied the many to the despotism of the few. He introduced the council of the four hundred and gave every citizen the opportunity to appeal to the hēliaia, the popular law-court. Furthermore, his codex divided land and people into four phylae based on their produce. However, only four years after the codex was established, civil war, stasis, returned. Ten archons were put in office until, after occupying the Acropolis, Peisistratos induced a tyrannis again. One of the unsolved problems was to bring together three geographically distinct and conflicting parties: the paralia from the coast, the mesogeion from the plains, and the asty - the city dwellers. The unwillingness of Athenian citizens to feel Athenian has earlier roots. In the geometrical period, and relatively detached from its Mycenaean past, loose settlements existed in the flat area around the Acropolis. Contrary to a long-held and unquestioning view, Attica does not seem to have been the way it was claimed by the most important sources.
Athens was very likely not *autochthonous*, a homogenous group of clans, always living on the same soil.

At the end of the 8th century BC, family clans in the strenuous region hardly suited for agriculture established some wealth. Still, their loyalty was primarily to their local villages or neighborhoods, the *deme*, rather than to the city. It has been suggested that small open spaces for meetings or assemblies were established at road crossings, before a unifying agora was built. The mythical king Theseus presumably joined several villages to form a city. But Thucydides reports: "Even after the centralization of Theseus, old habit still prevailed; and from the early times down to the present war most Athenians still lived in the country with their families and households [οικοί], and were consequently not at all inclined to move [into the *polis*]. . . . Deep was their trouble and discontent at abandoning their houses and hereditary temples … and to bid farewell to what each regarded as his native city." 

The early center of Athens was not northwest of the Acropolis where the later agora was, but southeast near the river Ilissos. That is where the old sanctuaries of Olympic Zeus, Pythian Apollo, of Gaia and of Dionysus in the Marshes were found next to the fountain house of Enneacrounos or Callirhoe. In the beginning, the refuge provided by the Acropolis seemed sufficient, but in the 7th and 6th centuries most Attic *poleis* constructed city walls as ramparts, a development that likely happened in Athens, too, although no archeological evidence has been found to date. It is likely that there was another older agora northeast of the Acropolis inside the city walls that served as a central place for rituals and assemblies up to the 5th century. The concentration of public buildings according to Pausanias was remarkable: the Ptolemaion, the sanctuary of the Dioscuri, the Anakeion and the Pyrtaneion, where Solon’s laws were kept. The modest beginnings of the new agora also suggest this, although again without archeological evidence. Hence we find the *polis* in constant change and a succession of *agorai* in the classical period Arendt is considering.
Before Solon, people remained in their rural homes. With his laws, a substantial migration set in. Skilled craftsmen, traders and farmers moved to the city, making it an increasingly specialized place of production. In other words, Athenian civic identity was “never an automatic inheritance from the past.” Rituals, myths and monuments were therefore actively used to emphasize uniformity and shared origins.

After Peisistratos’s death, his son Hippias took over. Due to a murder case that caused a public outcry, his tyrannis turned stricter. Cleisthenes won a political battle over Isagoras by promising to place politics back in the hands of the civitas. He rearranged the phylae to mix people from the three geographical regions, and he reintroduced the council, this time consisting of five hundred. Again, he was addressing the important problems of civic identity versus prevailing forms of regionalism.

A multitude of rituals played an important role in the establishment of Athenian citizenship. The Panathenaea was first held under Peisistratos in 566 BC. It consisted of games, and a procession was held in which a statue of Athena was dressed in a special robe, the peplos, and carried through the agora and the entire city. Contrary to the rituals of old Attica which were conducted by families, clans or demes, the Panathenaea was open to all free residents of Attica, women, resident foreigners and freed slaves. It also accepted a large number of theoroi, pilgrims from foreign regions. Another important festival, the Dionysia, was established most likely to celebrate liberation from tyranny. On the basis of the complex Attic calendar of feasts and festivals - some for all, some for a few - W. R. Connor has argued that we will better understand Attic history if we realize that Athenian citizenship depended indeed on membership in multiple groups. In the first instance, one was part of the oikos or family unit, then the deme, relating to the neighborhood or village, then the tribes or phylai, and finally there was membership in the city itself, also associated with the citizen army. Rituals, or religion, were not locked in a separate sphere, but were important to
construct civic identity. We will stop this short historical excursion before the Attic expansion, the wars and alliances begin.

8.2 Agorai

The term αγορά "agora" derives from αγείρειν, to gather together". Only gradually was the term used for and associated with a certain location. In Homer’s texts, the author uses it predominantly for non-specific gatherings: the Danaans gather on their ships to counsel, and so do the Trojans when they return from battle. A certain place is mentioned only when the Trojans should guard the "place of gathering" or when court is held. As a topographical location in the city, it is of great importance in describing the city of the Phaiakians. Homer also offers an account for a fragmented public space in early poleis. The Heroes have several agora associated with distinct oikoi. And when the Phaiakians met at the agora to counsel, only the politicians where accepted; when a game was set at the same place, all citizens were admitted.

Later, Herodotus, the famous traveller and historian, uses the term predominantly to refer to a special place: the Milesians feast on the agora, Cyrus declares that he is not afraid of people who have a central square in their city (this is because he thought Persians have none), Pisistratus shows his fake wound on the agora in Athens, and the Babylonians bring their sick to the agora so that everybody may contribute their advice. Finally, writing in the late fifth century, Thucydides uses the term exclusively to talk about a special open square in and sometimes outside the city. There is a sacred dimension to those places, but predominantly they are places of commerce.
8.3 Early Greek Literacy and the fundamental status of technology

One of the first artifacts indicating egalitarian beliefs is an inscription on a trachyte stele found in the agora of Chios, dating to the 6th century BC. According to Jan Bremmer, not only the subject of the text, but also the style it was written in points to the important role of literacy in establishing social structures. The stele is found in Emporion, a village of early rectangular houses scattered along a serpentine road. Only the Acropolis is surrounded by a wall. Inside the wall there are three structures with an agora marking the center. Apart from them, the plateau was left untouched. To the north is the largest building of the settlement, a Megaron Hall, likely used for public assemblies and administrative purposes. A temple and altar are further to the south, and this is where the stele was excavated. It preserved a fragment that begins by admitting the sameness of all people of Chios and continues by adding duties and possible sanctions.

Preceding the stele of Chios, the archeological record consists of lists and genealogies, establishing a relational or hierarchical order. Hesiod’s poetical account of the genesis of the cosmos, the *Theogony* is a good example. It starts with the appearance of the primordial gods Chaos, Gaia, Tartaros, Eros, Erebus and Nyx. The genealogical account ends with the Greek Gods residing on Olympus. This is one of the lists:

"And of Nereus and rich-haired Doris, daughter of Ocean the perfect river, were born children, passing lovely amongst goddesses, Ploto, Eucrante, Sao, and Amphitrite, and Eudora, and Thetis, Galene and Glauce, Cymothoe, Speo, Thoe and lovely Halie, and Pasisthea, and Erato, and rosy-armed Eunice, and gracious Melite, and Eulimene, and Agaue, Doto, Proto, Pherusa, and Dynamene, and Nisaea, and Actaea, and Protomedea, Doris, Panopea, and comely Galatea, and lovely Hippothoe, and rosy-armed Hipponoe, and Cymodoce who with Cymatolege and Amphitrite easily calms the waves upon the misty sea and the blasts of raging winds, and Cymo, and Eione, and rich-crowned Alimede, and Glaucnome,
fond of laughter, and Pontoporea, Leagore, Euagore, and Laomedea, and Polynoe, and Autonoe, and Lysianassa, and Euarne, lovely of shape and without blemish of form, and Psamathe of charming figure and divine Menippe, Neso, Eupompe, Themisto, Pronoe, and Nemertes who has the nature of her deathless father. These fifty daughters sprang from blameless Nereus, skilled in excellent crafts.”

Texts like the *Theogony* seem to affirm an aristocratic organization of society, the city and also a hierarchical cosmological order. Those who are in charge are qualified by virtue of their decent. The inscription at Chios expresses a different perception made possible through literacy and – if we accept Bremmer’s argument – marked the beginning of a critical outlook, or was at least aided by a change in people’s perception *via* the written documents. Bremmer cites Jack Goody who maintains: "Once an utterance is put down in writing it can be inspected in much greater detail, in its parts as well as in its whole, backwards as well as forwards, out of context as well as in its setting” … “it can be subjected to a quite different type of scrutiny and critique than is possible with purely verbal communication.” Furthermore, when a larger part of society read the texts, this may have had a democratizing effect on the community as a whole.

The Platonic dialogue *Protagoras* provides the mythical horizon for the change of view human beings seem to have experienced. In the dialogue, Socrates and Protagoras, the famous sophist, quarrel over the notion of virtue and whether it is a thing that can be learned. Is virtue alike *techne* and can it be acquired by students? Or is it rather something given by nature? Socrates starts by arguing against the idea put forth by Protagoras that virtue can be learned.202 He defends his claim by citing some examples where fathers could not impart virtue upon their sons and lost them as a consequence.203 Protagoras answers by reciting a fable on the origins of mortal creatures. “[T]he gods molded their [human] forms within the earth, of a mixture made of earth and fire and all substances that are compounded with fire and earth.” Then the gods committed it to Epimetheus and
Prometheus to spread light amongst the new and helpless creatures. Epimetheus forgot his mandate and did not do anything about it, so it was up to Prometheus to steal fire from the Hephaestus and practical wisdom from Athena. But civic wisdom belonged to Zeus, was kept in his citadel, shielded by his guards, so that Prometheus could never obtain it. The new creatures became the first to worship the gods, they built altars and made holy images. They started to speak, invented dwelling, cloths, sandals and beds. But they lived separately and, as a result, were vulnerable to the wild beasts because the beasts were in all ways stronger then the first humans.204

The species faced its early distinction, and Zeus sent Hermes to bring them respect and right and shame. Hermes, being a diligent envoy, asked Zeus if he should give the wisdom about justice and politics to the some of the creatures, like only to a few to acquire artistic excellence or familiarity with the art of medicine, or should he give it to all. Zeus advised him to give this knowledge to all, "for cities cannot be formed if only a few have a share of these, as of other arts."205 The art of politics, Protagoras continues, is different than the art of playing the flute. If someone professes to be a skilled player of this musical instrument and is publicly proven wrong – people would laugh at him. But if he were an unjust person and would publicly admit that he is – he would be considered a mad person "since it is held that all without exception must partake of it in some way or other, or else not be of human kind."206 Because the art of politics is delivered to human beings directly from Zeus via Hermes and given to all the people, it became an indispensible part of their existence.

The city soul analogy now has an historical horizon. Only when a unifying skill was given to the human species could humans recognize their sameness and live in cities. In other words, social life requires a shared outlook toward the world.
8.4 The law replaces the sovereign

Jesper Svenbro pointed to a connected development that is important to our understanding of the Attic polis. He argued, in accordance with Bremmer’s discussion on early literacy, that the practice of writing down the laws nomoi and making them publicly accessible like on the stele in Chios, led to a substitution of the sovereign basileus by the laws nomoi. Instead of an authority, readily available as the law and as its interpretation, the written documents require a public making-sense of them. This takes us to the beginning of the tentative historical account given above. The case of Solon’s laws makes the technological form of authority obvious.207

After becoming archon, the lawgiver of Athens, Solon was said to have left "for trading and also theoria." The theoria was planned to last for ten years, "as he did not think it fair for him to stay and explain his laws, but for everybody to carry out their provisions for himself."208 In his absence, the kurbeis and axons that held Solon’s codex were kept, according to Pausianus, at the Prytaneion at the old agora.209 The kurbeis were triangular freestanding objects made of bronze, and the axons were four-sided pieces of wood. Both could be rotated to display different parts of the laws.210 Furthermore, a statue of Solon was brought to Stoa Poikile, a colonnade at the agora, where people could look at the statue among other monuments.211 James Ker has argued that the function of Solon’s departure was to allow a different kind of perception, crucial for any public. The laws take the part of the archon and require community to clarify. Without the possibility to ask Solon anything about them, or to establish some context for better understanding, the laws significantly transform the social structure. One effect was that the lack of context transformed them into pure law, yielding a new field with new experts, the epimeleia, the "overseers", and exegetai, "the interpreters", specialists in sacred and secular things. From the very beginning, the public sphere employed autonomous institutions; this will be of importance for discussing how access to the polis was granted.
9. APPENDIX II: INSIDES

Let us now turn to a more detailed account of how an individual qualified to be part of the Attic polis. Who was accepted as a public speaker in Athens? As we have seen, Athens was probably not an autochthonous place for a homogenous society. Instead, it was an agglomeration of diverse people with different inherited and regional backgrounds and interests. In this short account, the subject will not be the whole polis but a small and well-researched part of public live. We will consider the "purity regulations" controlling who was to participate in thusia, a public sacrifice and feast. Hesiod described it as one of the few delights offered to people who - other than that - have to toil all year. Due to the difficult climate and the fact that most people made a living from agriculture, it seems a fitting characterization. Pericles also described it as part of the things that make Athens a great city.212

Greek religion had little dogmatism, no catechism, no sacrament, no confessional, no hierarchy, and no sacred court of law.213 The Greek Pantheon consisted of sets of practices that in analogy to political maxims are now referred to as leges sacrae. These rules yielded common beliefs in a dynamic system. The requirements for individuals to be part of a group, club, cult or the civic body were determined by those laws and regulations.

We find progressive abstraction in Greek purity regulations: from references to the body to the insides of people's minds. First, physical attributes are seen as the manifestation of inner qualities, with the same terms used for the morally good and the visually pleasing. Furthermore, a citizen was given a name to reflect inner qualities. Consequently, a man entering a new cult or religion had to pick an appropriate style of clothing, a suitable haircut, and a new name.214 We can use the notion kalos kagathos, which we have discussed above, as an example.
9.1 "No one impure is to enter"

Apollo, founder of the city of Delphi, patron of the muses, first of the *exegeti* and god of reason, was the authority who separated the pure from the polluted. To participate in rituals or enter a sacred place required the community to agree that an individual was "pure". Purity regulations applied not only to religious duties, but also reached into the realm of piety and all kinds of secular occupations. Therefore, the application of purity regulations meant that being accepted in the *polis* was an ongoing effort closely supervised the relevant peers. As mentioned above, purity was first connected to sensible things or external qualities. In the inscription on a stele at the cult of Men, the Phrygian god of the moon at Sounion, the requirements become explicit:

“No one impure (*akatharton*) is to enter, but let them be purified of garlic and swine and the touch of women. When members have washed from head to foot on the same day, they are to enter. And a woman, having washed for seven days after menstruation, and ten days after fatality and forty days after miscarriage.”

The early purity regulations directed the scrutiny toward sensible things. It is defilement of the body that may prevent someone from participating in rituals or visiting a temple. Similar requirements can be found in Athens:

“Those who enter the sacred place, are not allowed to carry weapons; their clothes shall be kept clean, no headband shall be worn, no shoes or only white shoes, but not made of goatskin, the belt shall not have knots; you may enter forty days after the death of a woman, a dog or a donkey, forty-one after intercourse with a virgin, forty
one after death in the family, three days after intercourse; a woman forty one days after giving birth … ”

The focus gradually shifted toward inner qualities, matters of the psyche, custom or habit. The active and contemplative parts are clearly treated together. As a result, the invisible insides of the psyche grew to be a communal concern. The inscription on a horoi, at the sanctuary of Zeus just outside the city of Euromos, is revealing:

“If you, stranger, are carrying a pure heart (phren), and you act justly in your soul (psyche), you may enter this sacred place. But if you have touched injustice and your mind (noos) is polluted, resort far from the immortal and the holy district. The holy house does not love bad people, but sanctions them, sincere ones god will offer his holy gifts”.

The requirements are about the individual's inner world: loyalty, honesty and obligation. People are refused not due to sensible things. Rather the acceptable is determined from the inside, or to be more precise, by an attested deviation from inner motivations and outer results.

“He who goes inside the sweet smelling temple must be pure (hagnos). Purity (hagneia) is to have an honest mind (ta hosia phronein).”

Demosthenes lays out the objective of this idea. The statesman insists: "the man who is to enter the sacred places, to lay hands on the vessels of lustration and the sacrificial baskets, and to take charge of divine worship ought not to be pure for a prescribed number of days only; his whole way of life should have been kept pure.” The reason why purity was of such vital importance was that pollution of the body or the consciousness was
considered to be contagious, potentially arousing communal misery. Collective guilt could be the result of violating purity regulations.

9.2 Miasma

For the good person, sacrifice, prayer and offerings are noble and conducive for the happy life, but they have just the opposite effect on wrongdoers.\textsuperscript{223} \textit{Miasma}, the Greek word for pollution, is etymologically linked to the “bad air” emanating from rotting organic matter. The word first referred to contact with a corpse or with blood, the meaning broadened and extended to the internal world of the mind. If a polluted person would participate in \textit{thusia}, the anticipated effects could be reversed and bring misery to the entire public. This made \textit{miasma} a powerful tool for managing exclusion. Being a citizen necessarily meant taking part in ritual democracy. Even at court, the \textit{helialia} - pollution and its possible communal consequences - were considered when a verdict was announced. Antiphon, in \textit{On the Choreutes}, argues in a case of homicide he considered unjust:

\begin{quote}
I did as they did: in their company I entered all our other sanctuaries: I offered sacrifices and prayers on behalf of this city: nay more, I acted as a Prytanis for the whole of the first Prytany save two days: I was to be seen sacrificing and making offerings on behalf of our sovereign people: I was to be seen putting motions to the vote: I was to be seen voicing my opinion on the most momentous, the most vital public questions.\textsuperscript{224}
\end{quote}

As the prosecution was in his company when he entered sacred places and pursued his civic duties as \textit{prytanis}, as an executive in the council of citizens, and during votes, they should have acted when they saw him. If the prosecution was right and he was indeed a murderer, it would have been their duty to disbar him from all that. Because they didn’t, it cannot be a fair
trial – otherwise it might have been the judges who caused misery for the entire *polis*.

Thus, the Durkheimian argument so influential for Arendt’s rendering of the *polis* may be invalid, at least for ancient Athens. Durkheim maintained, that "[a]ll known religious beliefs present one common characteristic: they presuppose a classification of things - real and ideal notions of people - into classes or opposing groups, generally designed by two distinct terms which are translated well enough by the words profane and sacred (*profane, sacré*). This division of the world into two domains, the one containing all that is sacred, the other all that is profane, is the distinctive trait of religious thought.”

9.3 *hiera kai hosia*

This seems to be problematic, also in a more general sense. The collection of terms, *hiera kai hosia*, appears frequently in the classical period. Connor points to the terms *hiera kai hosia* to show that the scared and the profane were carefully linked. *Hosios* and its cognates were used especially in classical Athens to account for ritual correctness or purity. When *hoisos* is combined with *hiera*, it can be used to refer to two types of activities of importance to the profane human society and also of interest to the gods. The collection of terms was first used in public financing, but grew to denote the requirements for the members of the civic society. When Isocrates speaks of the *hiera* and *hosia* of the city, his is talking about the entirety of buildings, dedications and other amenities of the Periclean democracy "so embellished … with *hiera* and with *hosia* that even now those who come to visit consider Athens worthy of rule … over the Greeks." Xenophon goes even further to *hieron ἐ hosion* for all "worth seeing or hearing:" festivals, dramatic and musical contests, and the rites open to outsiders. Connor argues that at the classical period *hiera kai hosia* had "become a way to refer to participation in the society and hence to citizenship itself" to a degree that the young committed themselves to defend.
ta hiera and ta hosia by oath found on a stele in Archarnai. The central function of the polis and its leaders was to take care of both aspects of life.

The metaphysical importance of thusia made it an important site where the structure of the community was negotiated. Who was to enter was vigilantly checked. However, it was also important for those admitted that they would attend. If you failed to appear at the feast, you could lose your civic status. For example, not being seen alongside family members was used against the defendant in an inheritance dispute where his status as part of the family was questioned. The requirements to be considered by others part of the community reach far into the private and the inner world of the Athenian people. It made dancing, praying and feasting a public concern, influencing the status in the community - until finally the requirements reached the insides of the citizens requiring a pure psyche for all members of the civic body.

For women, the regulations were still more extreme. Although it is generally true that women were excluded from the polis, Nancy Evans shows that "some passed the fitness test". As another obstacle, their civic fate was tied to their male relatives. To give just one example, after the death of her father Agamemnon, Electra of Sophocles is subject to the authority of Aegisthus, who helped to murder her father. He deprived her of very basic human needs, such as shelter, proper clothing and nourishment. Without a male relative to look after her, she is no longer part of the community, but regarded a worthless foreigner. Thereby she is also excluded from all sacred and secular rituals such as thusia, feasts, dances and ritual sacrifice. Being accepted a speaker in polis was subject to a set of conventions constantly changing and under debate. It was to the public to decide and hence not bound by some sacrosanct dichotomy.
PART II AUTONOMY
10. AUTONOMY AND MODERNITY

Kant provides the perfect opposition to the reluctant modernism of Arendt and her followers. To Kant, modernity is not a crisis or catastrophe. Instead it is the emancipation of the individual, freeing itself from suppression of the past and making use of its reasoning mind. Perhaps only by sharing Kant’s thoughts on the authority of individuals and the public in the Age of Enlightenment, Arendt and others could form such a deep concern with the virtues of these precious spheres, that it could finally tip over and become an outright dismissal of the public’s current state. Or they just distrust the capabilities of the foundation of Kant’s critical ethics: the modern subject.

The merit of Arendt’s work is often understood as re-formulating the seminal importance of the public, the communal context for action. It would constitute a contrast to the Kantian autonomy and other ethical theories that started from the isolated individual. But as we will see, this is an inadequate rendering of Kant’s ethics owed to a reception that, up to the 1970s, existed more as a caricature than a serious interpretation.

The authors who see modernity as a descent are wondering whether its origin can be found in Descartes, Galileo or Copernicus. Ultimately, as we have seen, they attribute it more generally to modern science. It is easier with Kant. For Kant, it was the Copernican Revolution that caused a new way of thinking (Umkehr der Denkungsart). With Copernicus, the thinking individual for the first time succeeds in conceiving an epistemic setting that does not assume himself as the center of all things. For his practical philosophy, his ethics and thoughts on politics, Kant requires a similar revolution, a "revolution [that] results in the doctrine of moral autonomy – man gives law to himself."

Kant's critical ethics start from the praxis, from the conscious action of humans. In acting, they highlight their conceptual opposition to any fixed moral doctrine given from above, be it by a deity, an aristocratic system or a theoretical principle formulated by some philosopher. Not even by Kant
himself. The moral philosopher "has not in the least something new to teach." To only thing he can do is to call our attention to an immanent principle of virtue. That implies a single goal of moral virtue: "beauty and dignity of human nature." *The highest aim for human beings are human beings.* In doing so Kant’s moral thoughts turn away from any deductive order that controlled the European past and delegates all responsibility to humans endowed with reason. In this respect, Kant formulates the practical reason for a changing European society that requires an absolute consistency of theory and practice.

Kant demands all individuals to act *in the name of all and for the benefit of all.* How comprehensive this *all* is becomes clear when he describes the principle practical reason. "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law." With this formulation Kant places all responsibility in the hands of the individual, while at the same time he sets up a universal public as the measure for all actions. Also, he leaves behind the city as the horizon and extends it to the global community. To live up to this inconceivably difficult principle, the individual needs to be free. The possibility of freedom, the central interest of transcendental philosophy, is challenging for Kant. "There is no freedom, everything in the world happens solely according to the laws of nature." Against this determinism, he remarks: "still … his actions are to be called free." We can still decide whether we do the good or bad. This essential problem is the very possibility of the modern subject to act freely, and it led many of Kant’s successors to drop his critical ethics and its underlying assessment of human nature altogether. Autonomy is, or would be, the manifest expression of freedom. "Autonomy of the will is the property the will has of being a law unto itself (independently of every property belonging to the objects of volition)" Thus, the precondition for this famous formulation, also known as the *categorical imperative,* is freedom.

For Habermas, whom we will discuss at length below, the modern subject is not a conceptual thing, but a historic entity. It was born in the
Bourgeoisie, but it was not complete when it first saw the light. It is an “unfinished project” that still needs time - until we all can exploit our full emancipatory potential. This makes freedom and autonomy a founding principle of the modern bourgeois public sphere. And at the same time, it makes obvious why the project of architectural autonomy initially is affirmative to Modernity.
11. The Autonomy of Claude-Nicolas Ledoux

The project of architectural autonomy was first not actively engaged in, but postulated in retrospect by Viennese art historian Emil Kaufmann. Formalists like Heinrich Wölfflin and Alois Riegl or Adolf Loos and Karl Krauss formulated comparable ideas. However, for the present study that is interested in sediments of political theory in architectural theory, Kaufmann is the ideal point to start from. In his 1933 book, *Von Ledoux bis Le Corbusier*, Kaufmann subsumes the entire project of modernity starting with Ledoux and culminating in the work of Le Corbusier with one bold stroke under the ideas of Kant. As might be expected, some critics refuted this attempt as "simplistic" or even "pathological."244 We can be skeptical about Kaufmann ascribing Kantian ideas to Ledoux, who, as we know, never read Kant. And even if we agree with Habermas that the modern subject did was not *postulated* but instead *evolved*, we may find it impossible to include the entire project of architectural functionalism under that idea. However, we should take serious his link of *autonomy* and *freedom* to the project of functionalist architecture. These two attributes have rightly been marked as founding principles of the bourgeois public sphere and thus Kaufmann’s contribution does raise important questions about the nature of functionalism and the place of the architecture within society.245

For Emil Kaufmann, architectural modernity began with the work of Claude-Nicolas Ledoux. It was the French architect who first translated modern ideas into the language of architecture. For Kaufmann the "building history" [*Baugeschichte*] of the 19th century "is the fight of the ascending autonomous principle against the perishing heteronomous [principle]."246 The changes in society were so extensive that, even if it were not Ledoux, architectural modernity would have been implemented "even if he had never existed."247

Kaufmann’s is promoting modern architecture and the faithful of the society that made it possible. He cites a remark by Ledoux, who found
that history “has broken the chains that shackle architecture.” Thus Kaufmann insists Ledoux accomplished “what numerous centuries had been unable to realize.” Where others have found the above crisis of meaning in architecture, Kaufmann recognizes a wholly new treatment of material. He argues that the stone of Neoclassicism was pervaded by the genius of the architect and was thus dead material. “Form has no other function than to be the bearer of ideas, the mediator of moods … which are distinct from the sensuous material and which the material itself does not contain.”

Kaufmann quotes an aphorism of Friedrich Nietzsche, human all too human, to make his point. Revolutionary architecture promoted by the three architects, Boullée, Ledoux, and Lequeu recognizes the “autonomy of matter” and “the baroque reinterpretation of dead matter to organic creations stops [and] the baroque effort to inspirit everything ends. … Stone is Stone again.”

Kaufmann leaves no room for doubt that Enlightenment was an achievement that made humans better instead of corrupting them. “The pre-revolution period understood a column better, if it appeared as Atlas, Caryatid or Herm, a leg of a table better if it was formed like the claw of an animal” The ancient time “was more primitive than humankind after Enlightenment … which is more distant and sober.”

The ancients needed all kinds of anthropomorphisms to acknowledge affinities. For the modern mind, this effort would seem tautological as “the autonomous consciousness … wants the sachliche Form.” Just how much Kaufmann himself is in agreement with Kant becomes apparent from these statements. The autonomous individual, who has to conceive a universal public in acting, will not be free in excess, but rather in moderation, distant, sober and sachlich. At the same time this formulation suggests a perspective system of values. As we shall see below, it reflects how much the Bourgeoisie was influential in determining what attributes are demanded from the modern individual. Kaufmann is very aware of this.
11.1 City of Chaux

“If one wishes to characterize the architectural systems by formulae as reduced as possible one could define Baroque association in these terms: one part dominates all the others and nevertheless all the parts form a whole; the deep sense of the pavilion system can be translated thus: the part is independent within the frame of totality. Between the systems lies a Revolution.”

The most famous among Ledoux’s works is the utopian design for the Salines de Chaux. Inspired by the contemporary political spirit and the philosophy of Rousseau, it is his proposal for a city fit for modern individuals. At the same time it becomes obvious how pervasive the changes were that justified the attribute “revolutionary” for the architecture of the time. In analogy to the Kantian practical philosophy or the work of Rousseau, Kaufmann attests a renunciation from a unified system toward isolated parts. It is a move from the “Baroque unity” [dem barocken Verband] to a pavilion-system that distinguishes the 19th century. The individual consciousness [Individuellbewusstsein] substitutes the inclusive order. The braking of the Baroque unity requires more of the individual parts. The “members of the Baroque organism” make no sense once isolated. In contrast, the parts of the pavilion system can stand on their own, as they acquire they meaning not in relation to something, but from within. The further the unity is split into distant parts, the more they will take shape, that is, it will become certain how to formally articulate them. The way Kaufmann uses the term “distance” is essentially different from the usage we have discussed above. “We consciously use the term, to directly point at the ever more general [use] in the new society, [and] not in the from of Renaissance and Baroque limited to higher circles.” Distance denotes the space that the autonomous parts require in order to treat them in isolation. The size of the doors to the of Chaux is dimensioned for the single individual and not with baroque grandeur. The two lavish stairs each sit in one arm of
an equilateral cross. The two other arms are occupied by the elevated aisles. The altar in the center is kept in complete isolation, an impression that is intensified by waste-high walls and the view of the community, looking down on it from the gallery. Ledoux's frequent recourse to the work of Rousseau works on a conceptual level, not demanding a break with all culture. The strong conceptual ties between Ledoux and Rousseau are visible in Ledoux's writings: “return to the principle, consult nature: everywhere man is isolated” and his design of the colony “Cénobie” distanced from the rest of the city and living as a single family.

Finally, we learn about Kaufmann’s assessment of the relatively new phenomenon of the mass. For him it is an advancement of a large number of people toward a higher way of life, that “until the revolution was reserved for a small circle.” The distinction between high and low culture was removed. These were the requirements it took to enlarge the scope of the discipline. “The early eclecticism, that almost exclusively treated church, palace and villa and at best included fortifications, is replaced by the new architectural universalism.”

11.2 From Ledoux to Le Corbusier

All this set the frame for modern architecture. Kaufmann, pointing out that he is an historian, touches only briefly upon contemporary architecture of his time. Making all buildings an autonomous problem that could be solved from within, architecture could work on universal solutions for international problems. Still, he argues that architecture in most cases has stuck to old aesthetic ideals. Although the transition toward an autonomous architecture is already carried out with regard to city planning and the functionality of buildings, his contemporaries are content with merely decorating buildings. The façades are now masks, because their design worked in the old, lost logic. Only few instances show the full potential of the autonomous solution. In the case of Schinkel, it could move to and fro from straightforward
classicism to a “fatal subsiding of the new ideas.” Sometimes it lead to a radical abstraction and getting lost in some arbitrary detail that would delimit the entire design. Even worse are the buildings of the newly built Ringstrasse. They sit there as autonomous solids, but are decorated in “history's worn dresses.” Loos, Berlage and finally Le Corbusier are among the few who live up to the original ideas of the autonomous project Kaufmann found in Ledoux.
12. THE AUTONOMY OF ALDO ROSSI

Aldo Rossi wants a lot. Writing *The Architecture of the City*, Rossi tries to establish a new foundation for the practice of architecture. 265 This foundation should be the city – as a whole. Not a specific one, but the city as a phenomenon of human culture. Thus he can consider various places and still speak of the city in the singular. For Rossi, autonomy is the proposal of an autonomous architectural discipline, or even science, concerned only with the city. No need for interdisciplinary inspirations, as the city has all that architects need to consider.

Although Rossi starts from the city, he does not have any obvious ties to political theory. We do know that he had great interest in Marxism. However, as stated above, this is the way the notion is used in the present study. But his interest in the city as foundation for the practice of architecture, and the influence the contribution had in the field, makes it impossible to ignore his work. Also, I will use some important parts of his argument below. One important claim by Rossi is that it is inevitable to look at the big picture, arguing that the city cannot be meaningfully split and examined in pieces. His theory is an act of liberation against the expiring but omnipresent functionalist theories and the Italian's neo-rationalism. “I may be wrong, but it appears to me, that, since architects aspire modest aims, the results are modest too.”266 The reductionism inherent in functionalism of the 1960s misinterprets buildings as hermetic entities of definable function. “It becomes increasingly clear that we should not design a neighborhood, thinking of it as a closed entity … Instead we should grant a certain independence (it would be better to talk of autonomy) that is necessary for certain functions, but the crucial point is to establish the correct mutual relationship with other neighborhoods.”267 In this sense, it is a direct answer to Emil Kaufmann’s argument on the emergence of modern functionalism. Baukuh has pointed out that the most brilliant part of Rossi’s point against functionalism is that he avoids the reductionism evident in functionalist
theory from the beginning. When Marc-Antoine Laugier presents his trope on the primitive hut, it is a lonesome story of an isolated individual. Searching for rain he finds a cave, but it proves unhealthy and dark. He is forced to leave it, willing to construct something better to fit his needs, creating architecture. Taking from Loos and Levi-Strauss, Rossi is able make a more cooperative origin the basis of his architecture. “The first humans (and not the first human being) built the city (and not a house).” He asks us to take the pace of the city seriously. Even tough the city is changing, it does so very slowly and without spontaneously creating something new. It is not necessary, again directed at functionalism and its obsession with the new, to invent anything, to add anything to the complexity of the city. Everything is already there, nothing needs to be added, instead its complexity should be tamed.

12.1 The city – of facts

Looking at the city, Rossi paraphrases Ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous beginning of the Tractatus: “The world is the totality of facts, not of things.” Thus, Rossi makes the subject of architecture, the urban facts, a detail that was lost in the English as well as in the German translation. Following Wittgenstein, the city is not a list of things, but appears in their connection and specific relation. “What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts” and “An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things).” All things can be connected in an unlimited way, creating new facts. They are the “elements that cannot be further reduced” On the basis of these facts we can “understand the city as a great representation of the human condition.”

Commenting on Rossi’s architecture of the city, Raphael Moneo pointed out that “there are, in the city, urban facts which are permanent, that withstand the passage of time; these urban facts are the monuments that, in one way or another, constitute or make up and configure the city.
The monument therefore has more than an intelligible and atmospheric value, it is not only architecture as anecdote, as the picturesque, but it gives meaning to the life in the city which, through these monuments, both remembers the past, and uses ‘its memory.’” The subject of Rossi is not so much that of monumental architecture, but the links and connections of the unspecified urban facts as monuments.” In contrast to the view of Anthony Vidler that urban memory is something of the past, for Rossi the city as an instance of collective memory is still accessible. The key has not been thrown away.

12.2 The city – of science

But Rossi wants too much. Returning to the then old-fashioned concept of typology, Rossi creates a radical simplification that is just like the “naïve-functionalism” he liked to ridicule. Rossi takes the notion of "type" from Quatremère de Quincy: “the word 'type' does not represent so much the image of something that must be copied or imitated perfectly, as the idea of an element that must itself serve as a rule for the model. ... The model understood from the point of view of the practical execution of art, is an object that must be repeated such as it is; the type, on the contrary, is an object on the basis of which everyone can perceive of works that may not resemble each other at all.” For Rossi, "type" is a structure that can be revealed by virtue of the mind. On that basis, Rossi is seeking “the beginning of an architecture which will overcome individuality by establishing a rigid architectural world with few objects” However he fails to recognize that type is always relative to the culture of the builder and discarding this nested semantic that he acknowledges, using Wittgenstein, Rossi brings to read buildings as meaningful individual parts. That Rossi at times falls back to an extreme functionalist view, becomes apparent even in some of his comments on the city: “We want to determine which laws determine the city as human creation; we consider the spatial proportions, with form, with its growth, as if
the city was a big work of engineering built to last, which it is according to our opinion.”

It is exactly this blend of Renaissance scholarship and functionalist ideas that is also responsible for Le Corbusier’s modular experiments. Furthermore it is connected to the notion of god and man as horological, the former a little more so. Thus we can understand the complex work and read its parts like the letters and words in a book. In the words of Galileo Galilei, “... great book which ever lies before our eyes - I mean the universe - but we cannot understand it if we do not first learn the language and grasp the symbols in which it is written” … “This book is written in the mathematical language [type], and the symbols are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, [walls, columns, voids] without whose help it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it; without which one wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth.” Establishing their science of building based on human proportion related to city and house, both Rossi and Le Corbusier ignore that the proportional relation that lasted until the Renaissance was metaphysical and dissolved because of science. This is, of course not to discredit the important study of typology. But the radical version of Aldo Rossi is full of contradictions. If we think of Plato’s relation of polis and individual, a relation that outlasted the changes of modernity, just imagine a science of human beings based on a reduction as rigorous as that of Aldo Rossi.
13. THE IDEAL OF THE BOURGEOIS PUBLIC SPHERE

Comparing the fading etymologies of the ancient Greek *etymos* and the English “sooth,” the former replaced by *aletheia* and the latter by “truth” from Middle English “*troth*” (cf. German *trew*), Thomas Cole adds joyfully: “[t]hat Englishmen should look for truth to someone who is loyal and Greeks to someone who keeps his mind on what he is about should cause no surprise.” Up to the 13th century, “truth” was usually confined to discourse and the correctness of a statement. From the 14th to the 15th centuries, the word designated the reality of a thing before finally, from the 16th century on, it took on the meaning we are now familiar with.

The notion of the public sphere together with its adjunct of “bourgeoisie” is inseparably linked to Jürgen Habermas. He also starts his inquiry with an historical account on particular social spaces. As a reader of Marx and Kant, he is also convinced that we can look at the material world to better understand who we are. And, we could add, *notwithstanding* his ties to the Frankfurt School, Habermas is considerably more positive, although not lacking in criticism, about our current state than Arendt was. Another substantial difference is that Habermas considered a segregated society from the beginning, but thought that it cannot possibly be used to claim a special place within the public. The connection of Habermas and the autonomous architecture movement is looser than the connection that ties critical regionalism to Arendt. This has to do with the heterogeneity of the project and the consequent multiple sources it was informed with. Still, Habermas's account of the British coffeehouse, where he finds the perfect public sphere realized, provides an opportunity to comprehend much of the complexity of architectural autonomies.

In the British coffeehouse of Restoration Britain, between about 1660 and perhaps fifty to seventy years later, Habermas found the “ideal speech situation” - in the *bourgeois public sphere*. In these chatty places, Habermas maintained, *voluntas* was transformed into *ratio*. Of course
“truth” and “truthfulness” played a significant role in this process. By looking at Habermas’s theory and reconstructing his historical account of the coffeehouse, we can rebuild his *lifeworld account on freedom and autonomy*. This will be informative especially in contrast with the Kantian version and Kaufmann’s application of it.

It is remarkable that such a mundane place should, according to Habermas, bring about truth. Not only do humans realize their most precious capacity of *action*, but in discourse they will also acquire the highest epistemological power and partake in the “unfinished project of modernity.” Such a view certainly is not self-evident.

Alfred Polgar, in his 1927 “Theory of the Café Central”, argued that the essential quality of the splendid Viennese *Kaffeehaus* is lived by those “who [want] nothing there but to be there.” He continues, “[t]he Café Central lies on the Viennese latitude and on the meridian of loneliness. Its inhabitants are, for the most part, people whose hatred of their fellow humans is as fierce as their longing for people who want to be alone but need companionship for it.” At the beginning of the 16th century, when coffee was first consumed in Istanbul, a similar remark was heard. The clientele of the *Kahveh* or *Kaneh* was described by the Turkish historian Ibrahim-I Pechevi as a mix of students, professors and out of work judges, playing chess and Trictrac, sharing little but their liability to leisure and indolence. And even contemporaries of the British coffeehouse disagreed with Habermas and found the talkative atmosphere not as attractive as it became for future scholars. Indeed, one author warned that the coffeehouse debates “if suffered too long,” would prove “pernicious and destructive.”

13.1 Egalitarian narratives

There is of course another way to view the coffeehouse culture, and it has its own history. Thomas Babington Macaulay argued in his *History of England from the accession of James the Second* that the “most important political
institution” and “the chief organ through which public opinion of the metropolis vented itself” was indeed the coffeehouse, a place best characterizing the uniqueness and distinction of London.286 His nephew, George Macaulay Trevelyan, took the view, quoting John Mackey in 1714, that the coffeehouse was “the ‘center of social life’”, its quintessence being the “universal liberty of speech of the English nation uttered amid clouds of tobacco smoke, with equal vehemence whether against the Government and the Church, or against their enemies.”287

After the Second World War, Hans Speier popularized the idea outside Britain, arguing that the coffeehouse was the realm of political debate and literary criticism, or the place where “the English middle classes began to accomplish their own education.”288 It is this line of argument on which sociologists and political thinkers who propagated the concept of the bourgeois public sphere relied. But this line of argument was also described as “Whig history” and subject of much criticism in recent literature. This politically biased way of writing history produced both, the “mythology of the Queen Anne period” and “of the rational and egalitarian coffee-house.” It is this basis Habermas relied on, when he identified the social life of the coffeehouse in the early 18th century as a hallmark of public opinion in Western civil society.289 That is also why, according to Brian Cowan, “few historians have taken Habermas’s rosy view of the … coffeehouse at face value”.290

There are also pragmatic reasons why the British coffeehouse found scholarly recognition and why its mythology loomed large. When the copyright of both The Spectator and The Tatler, hallmarks of the free press and products of the coffeehouse culture, expired, they appeared in large editions as anthologies and selections almost every year, especially in the final decades of the 19th century. They were prepared for schools, missionaries and for teachers of writing and journalism.291

But this is not to say that everything concerning coffeehouse culture is a biased construction. The coffeehouses were of central importance, for
the young free press and for early science. A myriad of political pamphlets circulated in and around them. People talking over coffee were often involved at the forefront of the new empirical sciences, which – other than their deductive ancestors – had to rely on the witnesses of phenomena and experiments. This made the search for a reliable member of the public – the good, free, truthful testimony – an important issue from this time on.
“First, they preserved a kind of social intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether. … Secondly, discussion within such a public presupposed the problematization of areas that until then had not been questioned. … Thirdly, the same process that converted culture into a commodity (and in this fashion constituted it as a culture that could become an object of discussion to begin with) established the public as in principle inclusive.”

This is, in a nutshell, is Habermas’s view on the early Enlightenment public realm based on his historical inquiry. Later, he famously described it as the ideal speech situation. However, we obviously need to add more detail. Where the first three points are indicating an omission in this citation, Habermas makes clear: “[n]ot that this idea of the public was actually realized in earnest in the coffee houses, the salons, and the societies; but as an idea it had become institutionalized and thereby stated as an objective claim.” Although such clarity is not upheld throughout the text, we need to recognize that Habermas is not, unless otherwise stated, sketching the history of Enlightenment’s public sphere, but the history of its idea. At least Habermas seems to prefer such a reading thirty years after the first edition. This was overlooked by a considerable number of Habermas's later critics. That is also the point which the present argument wants to make: the idea of the Enlightenment's public sphere is visible in the discussion and postulations of an autonomous discipline of architecture. And this autonomy differs significantly from what Kant demanded.

The failure to notice this important difference is that of all those critics of Habermas who took his account as the reconstruction of the coffeehouse public sphere and not of the idea associated with it. It is also showing in the structure of Habermas’s text. Aspects of the “public opinion” are discussed in the chapter, “Idea and Ideology", together with the theories
of Kant, Marx, Hegel, Mill and Tocqueville. Thus Habermas is placing the public's contribution on the same level as that by the authorities of the past.

14.1 From representative publicness to the public sphere

For Habermas, the modern public sphere is an historical achievement. Its importance even surpasses that of its antique precursor, because in contrast to the public sphere of the polis, the public of the Enlightenment is perusing its own emancipation. Throughout the Middle Ages and up until the Baroque period, the public was unified, according to Habermas, only by its mute watching of the show of court and church. It was the time of a representative publicness that employed all kinds of signs to enact their pretensions to power. This staging of the imperial show was dependent on attributes tied to its actors: insignia, dress, demeanor and rhetoric “in a word, … a strict code of ’noble' conduct.” While the Baroque spectators are an indispensible part in this set up, they remain “private.” They are part of the grandeur, but always excluded; “there is no representation that would be a private matter”. The public that secured court-knightly authority or disconnectedness is, according to Habermas, qualitatively different from the culture of politeness the new bourgeoisie esteemed. The representative publicness reduces all others to their stage, whereas the autonomy of bourgeois public sphere is relative and part of social plurality. For Habermas, confounding these distinct conditions is the crucial flaw committed by Richard Sennett. In the preface to the second edition of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas makes clear that recognizing the contrast of representative publicness and the distinct means of representation of the bourgeoisie public, would have saved Sennett from basing his diagnosis of the fall of public man on a erroneous model. The cortegiano, the honnête homme and the gentleman are of the new humanistic educated ilk, replacing and not extending upon the Christian knight.
From the mid 17th century on and all over Europe, those of the new paradigm populated the salon, the coffeehouse and the *Tischgesellschaften*, the places where the public found its space again. It follows from this that we can, in Habermasian terms, speak of the public only when it has a spatial presence. The initial step for Habermas was an advance toward a “literary public sphere,” discussing literature, music and all other arts. These talkative circles brought forth the concept of public opinion that was spread by the press. It is through the mandate of public opinion that *the many* could claim their share in affairs of the *res publica*. In Habermas's historical account, the next things to join the public canon of discussion were science, philosophy and politics; the last subjects until the elite circles fell apart.

Habermas lists the topics touched upon by Joseph Addison in the *The Spectator*: “charities and schools for the poor, the improvement of education, pleas for civilized forms of conduct, polemics against the vices of gambling, fanaticism, and pedantry and against the tastelessness of the aesthetes and the eccentricities of the learned.” Generalizing from what we find in *The Tatler* and *The Spectator*, Habermas concluded that “[t]he public that read and debated … read and debated about itself.” It is in this early discursive sphere and through its participant that the bourgeois bias, still visible today, was established. The topics brought into the public sphere obviously were those of the individuals that were able to partake. The obscure remark that it was “the same process” that transformed culture in a commodity *and* constructed the public sphere as “in principle inclusive” is pointing at what we have discussed looking at the Aristotelian understanding of the *polis*. The commodification of the culture extended the demand of independence from biological needs; a certain amount of money. Only those who have the monetary possibilities can participate in the discursive circles, because they have the time to do so. Furthermore, modern subjects have the capital to surround themselves with all kinds of things. Because Arendt thinks of this as ties to the necessities of life, she rejects the modern public
altogether. Habermas instead is willing to accept the changes of modern times, as an interim stage.

Those who flocked to the coffeehouses and similar social spaces all came from bourgeois families, the topics of this clique constituted - and still constitutes - the discursive horizon. This perspective of a particular lifeworld is what added the *bourgeois* to the public sphere.*300* Hence, when Habermas considers the Enlightenment equivalent of the *oikos*, he is considering bourgeois households and their quarters. As we shall see, he ascribes special importance to the built environment. At the same time, it becomes apparent that the discourse in the coffeehouses in London or in Britain on the whole was from the beginning *technological*. *The Tatler* and *The Spectator* and countless weeklies were a necessary means to build and uphold a discursive sphere inside coffeehouses and scattered all over city and country.*301* In contrast to the model *polis* that tended toward unification, fragmentation is part of the modern public sphere. The coffeehouses construct discursive fragments connected through the technology of the press.

### 14.2 An unfinished project

For Habermas the built environment occupies a special place in the manmade world of things. There are two important ways in which Habermas uses changes in architecture to illustrate his thoughts on the Enlightenment public sphere. When Habermas reconstructs the development of the modern concept of privacy, he is pointing at the changing layout of upper-class housing. Moreover, new urban facilities like theaters, museums and concert-halls and finally department stores, freeways and airports are visible achievements of an ever-aspiring public.*302* The latter are arenas of visibility where the growing public looks at itself. At the same time the list, according to Habermas, shows the first hints of “system relationships that cannot be given form.”*303* Thus, in Habermas's opinion, we witness today a public sphere structured as a post-architectural world.
Those things may be negative developments for Habermas, but they are part of the process, although the path this process is taking under the force of capitalism is problematic.

In a famous talk he gave as he received the Adorno Prize, an event he used to mock the first Architectural Biennale in Venice, Habermas argued that the celebration of contemporariness, inherent in the modern movement, has led to a glorification of the dynamics of time, speed, flux and change in general.\textsuperscript{304} But this process, inherent in Modernity, went out of control. He quoted Adorno who found “[t]he zeal directed against the tradition becomes a devouring maelstrom.”\textsuperscript{305} The avant-garde used to be at the forefront celebrating the energetic presence. But the harbinger backed down, once they - oddly - fulfilled their promise of their art and lifestyle: happiness for all. Those who cherished every moment, foraging all encounters for the singular and special, passed what was sought after and described it as gift or genius to all. Sounding like Bourdieu, Habermas argues that as a consequence of achieving their goals, artists shied away from the public that now looked awkwardly like them.\textsuperscript{306} In contrast to Arendt, Habermas does not seek the past in search for an answer to the phenomenon of "the mass", but finds a \textit{structural problem} that can be solved. We can, Habermas insists, shape and build an alternative, most importantly by working against the fragments in society.

Returning to Habermas's initial model, the \textit{ideal speech situation}, we find why Habermas is so relentless. In his model, the ideal discourse needs to recognize \textit{all possible views} on a specific topic.\textsuperscript{307} Although this certainly is connected to the Kantian \textit{all}, the \textit{practical} difficulties of such an idea are not comparable with the criticism raised against the categorical imperative. Habermas later acknowledged the criticism and as a consequence referred to “pragmatic presuppositions” which participants must make in order to progress.\textsuperscript{308} Nonetheless, such an understanding must unavoidably seek to overcome all sorts of exclusions and will always be an unfinished project, occupied with overcoming “the other.”
Habermas's ideal speech situation is close to what Aldo Rossi stipulated as a premise for his inquiry. For the architect, the city was indifferent and all parts of it all together. But Habermas seems to be even closer to Pier Vittorio Aureli and his understanding of architectural autonomy. Aureli describes his effort as to “reconsider architectural form in the light of a unitary interpretation of architecture and the city”, finding the projects of Ludwig Hilbersheimer a direct precursor for Archizoom’s No-Stop City. But Aureli is arguing for the exact opposite of what Habermas had in mind, revealing the far ends which the notion has acquired in architectural discourse, both ultimately promoting the obliteration of the city, the cooperative community.

14.3 Architecture as a wall

The problems of Aureli’s account become manifest at the very basis, in fact already when he defines architecture. For him, obviously leaning towards Koolhaas’s “Exodus or the Voluntary Prisoners of Architecture,” “[t]he very condition of architectural form is to separate and to be separated.” However, what he calls “absolute architecture” is something that exists completely devoid of any connection to an experiencing mind and outside culture. Aureli is relying on the authority of both Arendt and Habermas, however in a remarkable way. Considering the Aristotelian dichotomy of polis and oikos, Aureli argues that the polis as the “space of the many” is fundamentally dependent on a “space in between.” Quite literally, for Aureli, this in-between is the wall - architecture that is “not a natural phenomenon.” Under these premises he concludes that Aristotle’s dictum that humans are political animals must be wrong, because such a species could evolve only after the space in-between, the walls of houses and cities were created. The underlying conviction undoubtedly is that of a container space that has long haunted architecture, but is nevertheless outdated. Such a view is ignoring not only the perceived qualities of any spatial arrangement,
but – of more importance to the present study - it is ignorant of the capability of all material things (not only architecture) to store and transmit conventions and all kinds of information. It is delightful to read Arendt’s remark on the table that “gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other”, which we already discussed above, taking it in a literal way, without the “so to speak.”  

Aureli also follows Arendt in arguing that “the victory of economic optimization over political judgment,” the crisis of modernity, was owed to expanding the logic of the oikos on a global scale. Starting from the assumption of the container space, he argues that this principle was that of urbanization, the “logic of total integration.” The city per se stands in opposition to it as it formulates “stoppages, walls, boundaries and partitions.” This allows us to read architecture, any building, due to its “finite, thus separated form(s) … as critical.”

This reductionism goes well beyond the problems Aldo Rossi encountered. Such a view could be connected to the habitat theory of Jay Appleton and its architectural application of Grant Hildebrand. But the underlying understanding is that of Carl Schmitt. Aureli's notion of autonomy is derived from the legal scholar’s outrageous theory. To Schmitt, autonomy is the conscious decision of whom to fight against. “Thereby the inherently objective nature and autonomy of the political becomes evident by virtue of its being able to treat, distinguish, and comprehend the friend-enemy antithesis independently of other antitheses.” On the basis of this - and this should be remembered -the invalidity of the public in the Weimar Republic was declared and the demand for a Führerprinzip was raised. Seen in this light, Aureli’s play on reactionary ideology is most disturbing.

The contrast to the above mentioned argument by Habermas could not be bigger. Where Habermas seeks the obliteration of the other, Aureli argues that it is by creating the other that architecture can be productive in a critical way.
In Habermas’s account, the typological changes of modern houses reflect changes in society. The plans portray the development from the social order centered on households to the modern public of isolated individual actors, a process Emil Kaufmann has described as “the “bourgeoisation” of the residential building against the “cold splendor” of the salon.”

We know that the Greek oikos (now referring to the building) separated women from men by providing gynaikonitis and andronitis. The typical floor plan also included the symposium for all kinds of social gatherings. Vitruvius is very clear about the ritual origin of these terms, stating that the men’s room was so called, “because the men employ themselves therein without interruption from the women.” Hence, it is the practice Vitruvius is pointing out. On this practical level, Habermas argues that the modern concept of the autonomous individual is accompanied by a new understanding of privacy. The new social conventions are made tangible in customs of building and use. Habermas argues that the evolving bourgeois home shows the development of privacy as the sphere of the individual. A lifestyle which involved the whole house, with all rooms shared by the residents, was replaced by a more complex layout. Habermas quotes Trevelyan who talks of “[c]ertain changes were taking place in the structure of the houses newly built. The lofty, raftered hall ... went out of fashion. 'dining rooms' and 'drawing rooms' were now built as high as a whole story, as the various purposes of the former 'hall' were divided among different rooms of ordinary size. The courtyard ... where so much of the life of the old establishment used to go on, also shrank ... the yard was placed no longer in the middle of the house but behind it.” The hall, where the household presented itself to the public, was substituted by the bourgeois living room. It became the “conjugal family’s living room into which the spouses with their smaller children retired from the personnel.” Later, according to Habermas, the house was further divided into private spaces for each
individual, a concurrent development of a functional diversification. The association of privacy and intimacy occurred at the same time when additional and autonomous functions entered domestic spaces.

Paraphrasing Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl’s remark that this development “made the house more of a home for each individual, but left less room for the family as a whole,” we may read it in Heideggerian terms. We are reminded of Heidegger’s uncanny as the feeling of “not-being-at-home.” At the center of the public sphere of the autonomous individual are the networks of communication, the media and the objects of culture among free subjects: the hall, the living room, The Spectator, the Internet. The systems of state and economy soon began a “colonization of the life-world.” The external interests of the market force the subjects to assimilate. The results of the structural transformation are a “quasi-public realm” and “pseudo-private well-being” with the system extending deep into the objectivized lifeworlds of the individuals.

14.5 Control, understanding, emancipation

Habermas’s interest in the public is directed toward the epistemological virtue of the many, and architecture takes an important role in his argument. Habermas’s epistemology is divided in three parts, and architecture establishes and discloses all of three forms of knowledge, giving shape to a bourgeois bias of the public sphere.

Initially Habermas insists that when all voices are heard and a powerless consensus is obtained in the ideal speech situation, the result of the discourse will not be a mere belief, but knowledge, something that is true. According to Habermas’s “consensus theory of truth”, the “truth condition of propositions is the potential assent of all others.” This knowledge is an all-discursive thing with no necessary connection to the material world. Due to the inherent problems that emerge from consensus theory, Habermas proposed “pragmatic epistemological realism” instead. Here, the truth
bearer is not the Kantian *all* but the objective world of things. A proposition, result of discourse, is true and stands up to all objections, because it is pointing at existing objects in the world.\textsuperscript{329} The objections raised against the situation of ideal speech show that it is not only almost infinitely demanding, but even theoretically impossible. This, however, has not hindered Patrick Schumacher recently to postulate his principle of “openness through closure”, understood as a scientific discourse of “architects – and only architects – who determine through their collective architectural discourse what is good, appropriate contemporary architecture”: the truth.\textsuperscript{330}

There are three distinct instances when propositions can be true, constituting three kinds of knowledge. Each is associated with an *interest* and a corresponding *science* that institutionalized the pursuits. First, there is instrumental knowledge brought about by the *technical interest* of human beings to *control* nature. It is the domain of the natural and empirical sciences. Second, the *practical interest* of *understanding* is, on the level of the subjective lifeworld, responsible for producing meaningful actions, artifacts and events. Its interest is communication, which always means going beyond the individual. Its method are the hermeneutics, employed by historical or interpretive sciences. Finally there is the *emancipatory interest* and knowledge aspiring *freedom from domination*. It is carried out by philosophy, art and the critical sciences.\textsuperscript{331} So there are three kinds of distinct knowledge, all of them product of discourse – whether connected to the objective world or not. By virtue of knowledge, we liberate ourselves from the necessities of nature, establish an inter-subjective lifeworld and finally identify and overcome power-relations.

Since control, understanding and emancipation are immanent in the architectural presence, Habermas defends the modern project against post-modern impulses which he deems conservative. Against the leveling of fragments in society, Habermas often emphasizes the importance of an autonomous artist. This brings us to a final use of the term in architecture as it is considered in the present study.
14.6 Autonomous criticism

“The project of modernity as it was formulated by the philosophers of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century consists in the relentless development of the objectivating sciences, of the universalistic foundations of morality and law, and of autonomous art, all in accord with their own internal logic.” This is the understanding of modernity Habermas promotes and wants to pursue. The only realm to which he grants autonomy is that of the arts, although not without seeing the problems such an idea involves. All other separated realms of expert cultures need to overcome the “false sublation of culture” and seek the dialogue with the public. But in the realm of aesthetics and criticism, Kant’s disinterested pleasure removes all bonds of necessity. In Habermas's opinion, Kant’s disinterest will ensure that “the quality of a work [will be] determined quite independently of any connections it might have with our practical relations to life.”

Criticism and the arts set free the emancipatory potential in Habermas’ epistemology. In other words, they are directed toward culture, society [personality] and material production, which they examine and question. Let us look at the definitions Habermas provides.

“I use the term culture for the stock of knowledge from which participants in communication supply themselves with interpretations as they come to an understanding about something in the world. I use the term society for the legitimate orders through which participants regulate their memberships in social groups and thereby secure solidarity … Material reproduction takes place through the medium of the purposive activity with which sociated individuals intervene in the world to realize their aims.”
This is close to how K. Michael Hayes uses the term showing equal ties to the definition of Ernst Cassirer above.

“By culture, as I shall use the term here, I understand a conceptual unity comprising, on the one hand, the theoretical and practical systems which authorize, promote, or constrain the production and use of ideas and objects and by which a society or place differentiates itself and maintains its hegemony; and on the other hand the artifact and environments which endure as resourceful physical precedents or exemplars if systems of production and become transmitters of culture.”

The critical realm of architecture opens when the autonomous discipline detaches itself from culture. It is in the gap “between culture and form” The critical architecture Hays is aspiring is “resistant to the self-confirming, conciliatory operations of a dominant culture and yet irreducible to a pure formal structure disengaged from the contingencies of place and time.” This is in total contrast to the proposal by Frampton (mentioned above), which ignores place but acknowledges culture, placing itself in opposition or resistance to it. Mies van der Rohe’s architecture is the manifestation of such an idea.

Citing Simmel’s famous account on swirling Berlin of the nineteen twenties, Hays points at the “silence” of Mies's later works. This feature of Mies's huge masses is for Hays the radical detachment architecture needed to create an opposition and, taking the notion from Heidegger, “open up a clearing … in the chaos of the nervous metropolis.” Having the accounts of Habermas and Heidegger at hand, it becomes obvious again that architecture is claiming to know the truth, this time a critical truth of emancipation.
14.7 Brutal objecthood

The modernist endeavor of raising awareness is clearly connected to this idea. In a famous instance of raising awareness that forcefully collided with the public was Richard Serra’s *Tilted Arc*. The large site-specific sculpture at the Foley Federal Plaza, 120 feet long and 12 feet high, is now known “for notoriously having absolutely no public backing.”\(^{342}\)

The Cor-ten steel arc expanded, before it was removed after 1300 people signed a petition to remove it, and spanned across the empty public space. In Richard Serra’s words, through the presence of the arc “[t]he viewer becomes aware of himself and of his movement through the plaza. As he moves, the sculpture changes. Contraction and expansion of the sculpture result from the viewer’s movement. Step by step the perception not only of the sculpture but of the entire environment changes.”\(^{343}\) Having to walk long distances to get around the sculpture, people undoubtedly became aware of the new environment and the sculpture. This applied to people working in the neighborhood who had to walk around it on a daily basis.

After the petition succeeded, a trail was created. While many artists, Richard Serra of course being the loudest, already started to protest, Calvin Tomkins, art critic of the *The New Yorker*, was quoted as saying, “I think it is perfectly legitimate to question whether public spaces and public funds are the right context for work that appeals to so few people – no matter how far it advances the concept of sculpture.”\(^{344}\) On the trail, numerous artists, museum curators and ordinary people who had signed the petition were asked to give their opinion. William Rubin, curator at the MoMa at the time, said: “Richard Serra's Tilted Arc is a powerful work of great artistic merit … Truly challenging works of art require a period of time before their artistic language can be understood by a prouder public”\(^{345}\) This *test of time* argument is giving credit to the idea that through their autonomy, artists are above and beyond the public, responsible for begging the public for recognition. Shirley Paris, a worker at the federal building across the plaza,
responded, obviously acknowledging the test-of-time argument: “This gigantic strip of rust is, in my opinion, an arrogant, nose thumbing gesture … It is bad enough for government and civil servants to be perennial target of the public and the press alike, but for us to be degraded by an artist as well is, to say the least, compounding the insult.”346

The public discussion on the Tilted Arc shows problems raised by an artistic project that seeks to educate the public through its works, one truth at the time. Placing this truism in a public for an extended time, the banality of Richard Serra’s work of art and any other undertaking that tries to objectify a one-line statement becomes part of the material world of things. It is a curious approach, like a surgeon cutting off a leg to demonstrate what we always took for granted. Raising awareness is not just annoying to the workers at the Federal Place. Promoting their position in educating the public, architects and artists are soaring to the heights of a quasi-religion, subjecting the public in a pre-Enlightenment manner and reducing people to a silently sustaining Publikum. That is why Kant insisted that emancipation is an individual thing.

14.8 Conclusion: between autonomy and truth

In the pages above, we tried to gain access the complicated, at times contradictory debate on the autonomy of architecture, as seen by Kant and Habermas. Emil Kaufmann’s subject was a formal autonomy, a result of breaking Baroque unity. According to Kaufmann, the disintegration is not understood as a form of decay, but on the contrary as an important and necessary prerequisite of modern subject. Based on this formal autonomy, architects were able, according to Kaufmann, to articulate the appearance of buildings or their parts by their function. Ultimately resulting in a universal architectural language, this is how Kaufmann finds modern autonomy realized in architecture.
Aldo Rossi takes the next influential step in turning from the autonomous architectural object to proposing an autonomous discipline. The subject of the discipline should be the totality of the city. In doing so he places his theory in opposition to Kaufmann and to all functionalist theories. At the same time, Rossi campaigns for an understanding of architecture quite isolated from interdisciplinary influences. Aldo Rossi hastily goes to work proposing a science of urban facts, but a science whose reductionism makes it almost obsolete as it emerges. Still, he made the important contribution of renewing our understanding that the essence of architecture is nothing architectural, nothing on the inside.347 And also by proposing the city as a subject of architecture, Rossi provides a focus, although still enormous, on what could be at the center of the reflective praxis of what architects consider as culture. Moreover, Rossi rightly observes that an autonomous discipline can, by virtue of its freedom, gain the potential of criticism. Considering the criticism raised against the ideal speech situation, that it was even theoretically impossible, we still find it a precondition for architectural truth in Patrick Schumacher’s theory.

Finally, Habermas's extreme account on the virtues of the modern public sphere offered a possibility to establish a connection to its conceptual origins in Kant. At the same time, the influential understanding of the notion of autonomy as formulated by the Frankfurt School has surfaced. For K. Michael Hayes, the later works of Mies van der Rohe were the products of an autonomous artist, who takes his responsibility of emancipation within society seriously. Again, architects were comfortable with their edifying position outside culture, but in a way felt misunderstood by the public. Claiming responsibility for the public’s emancipation, architects and artists return to the dark pre-Enlightened days of normative ethics that Kant wanted to overcome.

Taking the point of departure, Kant’s political theory, seriously, it is impossible to justify a position "above society". Still, we have to recognize that as a specialized discourse, architecture and any other artistic endeavor,
is characterized by relative autonomy against a public that it nonetheless presupposes. Calling the public sphere “bourgeois” points to the fact that any independent view of the world and of the public has its own distinctive features. Appendix III will be occupied with reconstructing some of the contingencies Habermas’s idealized account has obscured and will point at some instances where they are visible in architectural theory. In my final remarks, I will argue, again based on Kant and some of his readers, that architectural criticism should be most of all directed at itself, not on a theoretical but a practical level.
15. APPENDIX III: THE BOURGEOIS COFFEEHOUSE

As mentioned above, when considering the *polis*, let us return to the British coffeehouses in an attempt to compare Habermas’s “rosy” account of these places with comments in recent literature. Looking at the places of ideal speech, the British coffeehouse, we find them important centers of debate, but livelier than those depicted by Habermas. Most importantly, the vague term of *bourgeoisie* needs to be replaced by a detailed description of what coffeehouse crowds were like. Hidden behind the always-unpleasant notion of the *bourgeoisie* are people of unbelievable curiosity. Still, if we consider who was admitted to the coffeehouses, we will find some of the demands made on individuals within this public sphere that were later formalized into general principles of modernity. In accordance with Nietzsche's above cited aphorism on truthfulness and social status, notions such as *Sachlichkeit* are found as desired attributes *first* for individuals and *later* formalized in institutions to structure them in open discourse. On that basis, I want to formulate my understanding of criticism in the last chapter.

In the early days of the coffeehouse, Britain faced a severe crisis. After the troubled period of civil wars and unrest, the remark of Charles I, “you cannot be without me: you will fall to ruin if I do not sustain you” was put to the test when he was executed in 1649.348 His death left the English nation in turmoil, and its deep fractions seemed impossible to overcome. On May 19, 1649, England was declared a “Commonwealth and Free State … without any King or House of Lords.”349 Still, political settlement remained impossible. After Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell died in 1658, power had passed to his son Richard. But the members of the purged Long Parliament did not find much public approval either. The “Rump” Parliament was put down. It came back, but remained unpopular. It was indeed a good time for heated political discussion. Countless pamphlets circulated in the coffeehouses proposing ways in and out of monarchy and the Commonwealth. The drive for political action caused widespread contempt
for those in power and led to new economical possibilities. Samuel Pepys, the future President of the Royal Society, who published Newton’s *Principia Mathematica*, noted in his famous diary: “Boys do now cry ‘Kiss my Parliament’ instead of ‘Kiss my arese’, so great and general a contempt is the Rump come to among all men, good and bad.”

Politics and changing governments were so confusing that contemporaries found events hard to follow. Each turn was accompanied by a new wave of political pamphlets emanating from the coffeehouses in which all sides advocated their views on recovery of the Commonwealth. “For each serious proposal for constitutional reform there was an even greater number of attires, squibs and lampoons, variously scabrous and pornographic, scurrilous and vulgar.” But let us turn to one of the places of discussion, since “there ware also att this time a Turkish drink to bee sould, almost in evry street called coffee.”

15.1 *Coffee and its house*

Coming via Aleppo, coffee conquered Istanbul instantly, where British traders and travelers encountered it and brought it to Britain. When in 1554, the Turkish historian Ibrahim-I Pechevi expressed his concerns about the culture of idleness that came with the coffee, he was talking about only one coffeehouse which was run by two Syrians. Notwithstanding the scholarly concern, ever more people were drawn to these places, so that in 1610 the traveller and poet George Sandys would find the coffee house a well-integrated part of daily life in Istanbul.

Coffee came to Britain in the middle of the 17th century and was the perfect substance to whet the appetite of the yearning bourgeois who was always itching for the next craze. It had been consumed in old Europe before – in Venice respectively, at a time that was in many regards more cosmopolitan than the present. Coming from Turkey, then a country not on anyone's Grand Tour, the dark liquid came endowed with a mythical aura.
Coffee, “black as soote, and tasting not much unlike it” had the charm of the exotic and the appeal of a drug – minus undesired effects of other drugs such as promiscuity or memory lapses. It was part of a flood of new goods, herbs and drugs and was consumed by the upper class alongside tea, betel nuts and marijuana. Consequently, coffee was first sold and consumed as a medicine and stimulant in a society “always open to adding still more to their pharmacological repertoire.” In the same manner, the mythical discovery of coffee is linked to its drug-like characteristics, and presumably from the 14th century on, the Sufi of Yemen found its stimulating nature helpful and also used coffee for religious performances. There is some disagreement as to where and when the first coffeehouse opened in Britain. Brian Cowan insists that the place was Oxford and the date 1650. The house was run by a Jewish entrepreneur named Jacob and was frequented “by some who delighted in noveltie” and by scholars from the nearby university. It is certain that this place existed, but uncertain when it opened. Markman Ellis argues that coffee was brought to Britain and commercially distributed by a Greek called Pasqua Rosee, supported financially by Daniel Edwards. In the beginning, the black broth was consumed in the house of Edwards, but soon, Daniel Edwards felt that the “novelty” was “drawing too much company to him.” Pasqua Rosee was appointed to run the place for Edwards at some time between 1652 and 1654 at St Michael’s Alley in London. Whichever was the first to open, both accounts tell us about the first coffee drinkers in Britain. It was the particular mixture of philosophers, scientists, merchants and upper class, all of them longing to be among the favored few to encounter all kinds novelty.

Coffee was a tremendous success. The Levant Company, in charge of regulating the trade with Turkey and the Near East, knew how to satisfy the demand. The number of coffeehouses multiplied and so did the displeasure of those in power. A system of licensing coffeehouses was established similar to the system for public houses, taverns and alehouses. But the coffeehouse, selling exotic hot drinks, did attract a different clientele
than the infamous tippling places. Still, the authorities saw the customers of the coffeehouse as a threat. National and local governments kept them on a short leash. In 1675, Charles II attempted but failed to suppress the coffeehouses in England - only some twenty years after coffee was first consumed in public in England. Later historians admired, but King Charles II feared the talkative atmosphere in which people sustained their sense and did not drown in booze. The coffeehouses were at the center of news and political debate. Republican circles were known to meet in these places, but their undertakings there remained obscure. Yet in those memorable years, the coffeehouse was not only home to sober discourse, but also to dubious creatures. Titus Oates, who was the perjurer behind the rumors of the Popish Plot, was a regular in the Amsterdam coffeehouse. From there he spread the false allegations of a catholic conspiracy to kill the King. The turmoil his rumors caused led to the execution of at least twenty-two men before Oates was arrested and convicted for sedition. Not only Oates was arrested, but also Peter Kidd, the keeper of the Amsterdam coffeehouse. He was tried several times for his nonconformist views.

In 1662, the London Gazette was the organ to spread conformist official news. But out of the coffeehouses numerous newspapers argued against the monopoly held by state and crown, some printing news and letters, some stories and pamphlets. Charles II insisted to control what was going on in those places. “[A]ll of his loving subjects of what[ever] state or condition …that they [shall not] utter or publish any false news or reports or … intermeddle with the affairs of the government.” Charles II was not an exception. It was generally agreed among the nobility that the number of coffeehouses should be kept small. Edmund Verney proposed a method that today still is state of the art, and not only in Britain: ‘If coffy houses must enter into recognizances to betray their guests, it is a better way to put them down then by a proclamation.’ Like other traders, coffeehouse owners had to possess “freedom of the City,” which allowed them to practice their trade, parade in the streets and drive sheep off the London Bridge. To maintain
their license, coffeehouse keepers had to publicly demonstrate their loyalty to the crown. Regular attendance to the parish church as well as proper voting was demanded of the license owners.

15.2 "Universitie of Eden"

The atmosphere of the coffeehouse was divergently perceived by to those who witnessed it at the time. For some the sober discourse felt like “the flourishing Universitie of Eden,” places “Consecrated for sober Discipline.” As an alternative to the sometimes riotous drunkenness of the ale and public houses, the coffeehouse offered an opportunity where individuals who had been “brutified” at the pubs were able to “restore their senses”. And “whither shall a person wearied with hard study or the laborious tumouils of a tedious day repair to refresh himself, or where can young Gentlemen or Shop-keepers more Innocently and advantageously spend an hour or two in the evening, than at a Coffee-house.” Besides the refreshing drink one could find the opportunity to encounter people “all expressing themselves on diverse subjects according to their respective Abilities.” Indeed some philosopher pointed to Aristotle’s Politics and argued that the “sociability in mankind, or inclination to live in company, is by nature” and this founding principle of the “city and commonwealth” can be found in the public space of the coffeehouse. These places show the “inclination to live together in company, Man with man.”

We know from the diary of Samuel Pepys that he routinely visited coffeehouses two or three times a week. For example, he sat in the coffeehouse at noon on Saturday, December 26, 1663, engaging in “good discourse with some gentlemen concerning the Roman Empire”. He returned on the following Wednesday, this time meeting with two Royal Society fellows, Captain John Graunt and Sir William Petty, “with whom I talked and so did many, almost the whole house there” about Petty’s new invention of a “double-hulled sailing vessel.” The day after he returned, his

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head aching after work, “and sat an hour or two at the Coffee, hearing some simple discourse about Quakers being charmed by a string about their wrists.” The young Samuel Pepys found these places attractive not only because of their “sociability” and discourse, but also because they provided a great chance for “networking” as we would call it today. Significantly, after his career advanced, he avoided the coffeehouses and preferred direct and private encounters.

By contrast, satirists mocked and ridiculed the coffeehouse and its crowd. The connection between the coffeehouse and the printed press was one reason for complaint. At “this time of general scribbling, and daily impregnating the Press with no less seditious then ridiculous Pamphlets.” Another critic referred to the dawn of the modern press as “this Scribling age” giving voice to “every wild and brain-sick fancy of our Republican candidates.”

John Starkey’s *A Character of the Coffee and Coffee-Houses* found the public debate a “confused way of gabbling” caused by widespread intellectual confusion. “A Coffee-house, like Logick the Lawyer, […] will maintain any Cause … Infinite are the Contests, irreconcileable the Differences.” Another label the coffeehouses earned was “Penny Universities” because of the didactic character and the cheapness of the drink. But the *Character* maintained, “[a]s a ‘School it is without a Master. Education is here taught without Discipline. Learning […] is here insinuated without Method.” Not only that it was a bad school, but the most profound truths were also questioned there. ‘[T]he Noblest Speculations, the Divinest Truths, becomes as Common […] as Stones.” Its visitors are enjoying a “facetious or merry Story” more than philosophy proper. Another peculiarity of the coffeehouse caused annoyance. Entering the coffeehouse, one had to take the nearest available seat and could not reserve the table for future company. What people like Samuel Pepys found a wonderful opportunity, the *Character* thought of as the loss of all civility.
“Now being enter'd, there's no needing
Of complements or gentile breeding,
For you may seat you any where,
There's no respect of persons there;
Then comes the Coffee-man to greet you,
With welcome Sir, let me entreat you.”

The seating order of the coffeehouse may have a precursor and also ancestors. In the House of Commons too, members were supposed to take that nearest available seat; “no difference being there held of any degree.” And later, the meetings of the Royal Society would have a very similar character. Furthermore it has been suggested that the formal – or informal character of the Royal Society is connected with the proceedings of the Rota, since eleven of the twenty-seven known members of the Rota became Fellows.

15.3 The Rota

The Rota was an institution that came close to the Habermasian ideal and was referred to in his Structural Transformation. It was a club of political discussion, open to all who were interested. It was established by the lawyer and utopian James Harrington in the Turk’s Head Coffee-House to discuss the details of Harrington's book, The Commonwealth of Oceana (1659). It was one of those pamphlets, a work of political fiction, starring and dedicated to Oliver Cromwell as Olphaus Megaletor. Together with a group of philosophers, the Megaletor would compose a new constitution and after the laws were installed, would withdraw from political engagement, like Solon, to private life. A small political elite determined by property would then rule Oceana. The spirit of faction would be avoided by ‘rotation’ as one third of the government would be replaced each year. This was why “the greatest
part of the Parliament-men, perfectly hated this design of Rotation, by balloting, for they were cursed tyrants” just like their office dominated their nation.377

The Turk’s Head was the ideal place for a club like the Rota. It was situated in “New Pallace-yard, where the next house to the stairs.” It was close to Westminster Hall, then home of the Rump. The building faced the New Place Yard, a large open space close to the river that had been used for centuries for executions, state occasions and public festivals. According to John Aubery, the owner of the place called Miles provided the Rota with a special table “made purposely”. It was a large oval so that many could sit and talk to each other, “with a passage in the middle for Miles to deliver his Coffee … About it sate his Disciples and the Virtuosi.” He reported that “[t]he discourses in this kind were the most ingenious, and smart, that ever I heard, or expect to heard … the arguments in the Parl[ament] House were flat to it.”378 Every evening some clause of Harrington’s proposal would be debated. At the end of each discussion the topic of the next day would be agreed upon.

This scenario is the first that would qualify for the coffeehouse discourse for future scholars. Among the regulars at the Rota were theorists and radicals, merchants, officers and soldiers. The discussion at the Rota was formal with emphasis on rationality and seriousness. But the closeness to Westminster Hall was not only an advantage. Mr. Aubrey remembered “One time,” a member of the parliament, “and his gang, came in drunk from the tavern, and affronted the Junto.” The mob tore the documents and minutes of the club and “the soldiers offered to kick them downe stayres, but Mr. Harrington's moderation and persuasion hindered it.”379

Notwithstanding the rational and formal debate, there was no revising of Harrington’s model. In this situation, a speech only exceptionally found consensus. Instead, as a satirist mocked: “the usual custom of the club” was to “dispute everything … knocking Argument against Argument … until out of breath, and then refer it to our wooden Oracle, the Box
The debates at the *Rota* lasted exactly as long as the day General Monck restored the Long Parliament and was appointed commander-in-chief of all forces. Charles II was formally invited by Parliament to be Britain’s monarch, a King, and he was particularly hostile toward the coffeehouse culture.
16. APPENDIX IV: CLIENTELE

It seems to have been a characteristic of the coffeehouse crowd that they excluded few topics in their discussions. None was considered too high or too low. Instead, exclusion worked *ad hominem*, complaining about the habits and crowds in the coffeehouses, thus limiting who was allowed to have an opinion and who should remain silent. From our present perspective, the virtues of *soberness, seriousness, rationality*, now associated with the sciences and sought for by architects from Loos to Rossi, prevailed. The term *effeminate* was used by Arendt and Rousseau, describing all individuals who allegedly displayed that characteristic, not only females. In fact, many of the instances they discussed were promoted as general principles of Modernity, but as we saw in Appendix II, they were not unlike those which structured the *polis*. Looking at the characters of the coffeehouse, we find a more dynamic process than just the ambiguous notion of the *Bourgeoisie*.

16.1 The virtuosi

One habit the satirists attacked was that of the *virtuoso*. The term *virtuoso* first appeared in Henry Peacham’s *The Compleat Gentleman*. It referred to those within the social elite who associated themselves with curiosity, who were culturally engaged nationally and internationally and whose interests ranged from classical Antiquity to all kinds of wonders. The new empirical sciences still had to negotiate their boundaries. As a consequence and in their *Advancement of Learning*, the virtuosi longed equally for the significant and for the strange. Their untamed epistemophilia was incomprehensible even to future scholars. It has been argued that people like John Evelyn, Fellow of the Royal Society, “could not offer a language of distinction which would allow a collector to distinguish between the interest provoked by a painting, an antique coin, or even that of natural wonders or mechanical inventions.” The *virtuosi* merely had an “insatiable appetite for the strange and ingenious”
but could not tell good from bad or original from copy. This state of general curiosity and what in retrospect was deemed as an inability to judge is typically associated with the baroque scholar in contrast with the Enlightenment scientist. Francis Bacon, the father of modern empiricism and an important example of the virtuosi, died of pneumonia while trying out a hypothesis whether freezing could be a method to preserve chicken. When a frightened assistant informed Robert Boyle about a piece of "glowing" meat found in the larder, the philosopher ordered him to hang the veal shank in a dark corner close to his bed. For the moment he was unable to devote himself to that phenomenon, because he was eager to try out a new telescope. However, he hoped to examine the meat later, from his bed." An important reference was the fictional institution called Solomon's House, which Francis Bacon proposed in his utopian work, The New Atlantis. The house contained trees made “by art greater much than their nature,” mathematical instruments, “diverse curious clocks,” silks and "dainty works of feathers” of a fineness hitherto unachieved in Europe. Furthermore, it contained a collection of “loadstones of prodigious virtue; and other rare stones, both natural and artificial.” Francis Bacon, and many others of the Royal Society entertained in Wunderkammern for inspiration and display.

Some contemporaries made fun of the curiosities and the utterly strange and useless scientific experiments. Members of the early Royal Society, the “newe speculators” were attacked for their unworliday interests and naivety. As Pepys reported about Charles I: “Gresham Collage he mightily laughted at, for spending time only in weighting ayre, and doing nothing else since they sat.” Royal ignorance went so far that Charles I called the virtuosi and Fellows of the Royal Society his “fools”, speaking to Lorenzo Magdalotti, the surprised Italian visitor. But significantly, the Character found it necessary to add an apology at the end of his text. “The Describer knows, there are several Virtuosi and Ingenuosi, resort to the Coffee-house, whom, he hath the honour to be acquainted with, others are his Friends. Yet all the Elements here being confusedly mixt, this House
appears to him as a meer Chaos, so the (in contemplating it) he cannot prefer even Light before Darkness, not being here separated or distinguishable one from another, amidst confusion.”

So there were others the author wanted to single out as being the responsible for “meer Chaos.”

Indeed, there were many stereotypes and forms of social exclusion. Women were generally not even allowed to enter the bourgeois public sphere of the coffeehouse. Although some women might have been admitted to the coffeehouse, there are no reliable sources to substantiate this claim. The exception was a small number of female coffeehouse keepers, mostly widows, and prostitutes. Addison and Steel made use of their papers to populate their fight against the presences of females. “It is very natural for man who is not turned for mirthful meetings of men, or assemblies of the fair sex, to delight in that sort of conversation which we find in coffee-houses.”

The Spectator devoted several issues on the problems of women appearing in the coffeehouses. A published letter to the editor expressed unease about “these idols sit and received all day long the adoration of the youth ... by reason of one beauty who detains the young merchants too long near Change, and another fair one, who keeps students at her house when they should be at study.”

16.2 Fob, beau, town gallant

Other people were excluded under the label of effeminate. The “fob,” the “beau” and the “town gallant” were not welcome. Tellingly, recent literature describes them as early members of a consumer society. “Sir John Foppington”, appearing in Abel Boyer’s English Theophrastus, enters the White’s Chocolate House “where after a quarter of an hour’s compliment to himself in the great glass, he faces about and salutes the company.” The topics of his company's discourse are described as fashion, diet “this lord or that ladies habit” and affairs with French ladies. He is also seen at Tom’s or Will’s “to learn some piece of news, … to hear the Sentiments of the Criticks
about the last new Play”. But this is “to gather some fragments of wit,” not for his edification, but only to decorate the subsequent gossip. “His mind [is] used to whistle up and down in the levities of fancy, and effeminated by the childish toyings of a rampant imagination finds it self indisposed for all solid employment, especially the serious exercises of piety and virtue.”

Perhaps even the founder of the first coffeehouse, Daniel Edwards, would have regarded future customers as such characters. We know about his flamboyant lifestyle and his lushly decorated house. The hall of his family's house was paneled with “intricately carved wainscoting, hung with gilt-embossed leather wall coverings and decorated with the exclusive treasures of Levantine trade: tables displaying intricate “turkey-work” carpets of lustrous hue and geometric patterns in silk and wool, delicate Chinese porcelain and Ottoman dishes, polished marquetry … [and] delicate sarsnet silk curtains to screen the sun.” Habermas is right that economic freedom provided access “in principle” to the public space of the coffeehouse, but it does not follow a assured inclusion to the talkative crowd.

16.3 Institutions of knowledge

Exclusion was not only at issue in the coffeehouse culture, but also in the early institutionalized forms of discourse by the actors participating in the new sciences. Gresham College was founded in 1598 by Sir Thomas Gresham. John Wilkins, who was a founding member of the Royal Society, introduced public lectures “in the vulgar tongue, for the capacity of every unlettered ingenious artificer.” The practical focus of the College was unprecedented in Britain. It implied that when astronomy was considered, it was applied to naval use so it would be seen to be of public benefit. Before that, astronomy concealed itself by using special characters, “invented by the ancient astrologers for the secrecy of them, the better to conceal their sacred and mysterious profession from vulgar capacity.” The approach of Gresham College was in many regards almost the opposite to that of the
universities; it was an institution serving the public at large and as such in many regards connected to the utopia of Solomon’s House. Significantly, developments at the college in London resulted in a program to “Greshamize” the universities. A group of Oxford scholars, the chemical club, meeting at an apothecary shop that was famous for its coffee, reformed the focus of the university. In London, too, ever more people became interested in this knowledge, and the Royal Society was founded in 1662.397

Other than their derived ancestors, the new experimental sciences fundamentally depend on experiments and hence on the reliability of witnesses who were there. The historian of the Royal Society, Thomas Sprat, outlines the far-reaching interests of the Royal Society: “we find many Noble Rarities to be every day given in,” not just from “learned and profess’d Philosophers,” but from “the Shops of Mechanicks; from the Voyages of Merchants; from the Ploughs of Husbandmen.”398 According to Sprat, the revolution of the new sciences “shew’n to the World this great secret, That Philosophy ought not only to be attended by a select company of refin’d Spirits. As they desire the productions should be vulgar, so they also declare, that they may be promoted by vulgar hands.”399 The Royal Society comprised an uncommonly broad spectrum of society. Michel Hunter has shown that tradesmen were indeed more active than their aristocratic fellows.400 Any experiment, like other accounts received, needs someone who encounters it. As such, some “matter of fact” depends on the reliability of the person’s testimony.

But this relative openness was constantly challenged, and social rank was the quickest route to membership. The result was that a small group of active workers had to carry the weight of a large number of “well-off dabbler”.401 Still, Thomas Sprat maintained that it was due to this conjunction of diverse individuals that “inventions of chance will be spread into all their various uses.” The “weak minds of the Artists themselves will be strengthen’d, their low conceptions advanc’d, and the obscurity of their shops inlighten'd. By this their thoughts will be directed to better Instruments
and Materials … the flegmatick imaginations of men of Trade, which use to grovel too much on the ground, will be exalted” and the “conceptions of men of Knowledge, which are wont to soar to high, will be made to descend into the material World.” Thus he concluded: “It was said of Civil Government by Plato, that then the World will be best rul'd when either Philosophers shall be chosen Kings, or Kings shall have Philosophical minds. And I will affirm the like of Philosophy.” 402

Like the coffeehouses, these new institutions were in conflict between an unprecedented openness and an internal order that excluded some people, assigning them to the background of the discourse. This was done by determining features of the men. Those who may have been present but did not qualify for "reliable testimony" were “the poor and the mean in general,” tradesman, Catholics, continental gentry, Italians and politicians. With all of these groups, their “unreliable truthfulness … was pervasively blamed on their constrained circumstances.” 403 Instead, a gentleman was considered to have no such constraints, and he would have neither financial dependencies nor political interests. “Gentlemen were truth-tellers because nothing could work upon them that would induce them to be otherwise.” 404 And it is no coincidence that the Greek kalos kagathos is frequently translated into English as “gentlemen”.

As we have seen above, it is a commonplace in architectural theory to accuse early modern architects of a very similar turn toward the public and thus away from the world of the spirits in an attempt to join the undoubted successes of the natural sciences. The attempts of the revolutionary architects seeking Rousseau and his political theory, their attempts in anthropology and what could be called revisionist histography have in common that they are essentially read with the public in mind. Less common than criticism against the early moderns is the analysis of the social contingencies at work in our discipline. The history and sociology of science has devoted much of recent efforts to exactly those contingencies and to how
they have shaped, speaking with Bourdieu, the *nomoi*, sets of vision and division, of the various fields.

In conclusion, I want to argue that a refined understanding of the contingencies is not only a matter of theory, but also a very practical necessity, as Kant already formulated. Finally, I want to promote Kant’s notion of *critique* that is directed toward the inside, as an attempt to consider and reformulate the basic frame of the discipline in question.
17. CONCLUSION: AIMING CRITICISM

Writing a short commentary on Kant’s “Zur Beantwortung der Frage was ist Aufklärung,” Michel Foucault maintained that modernity was not something that can be found in a calendar, but instead it was a certain attitude, a particular stance toward the world. Thus, modernity is a way of relating to today and putting emphasis on how today differs from yesterday. Being modern is to have a “deliberate, difficult attitude [that] consists in recapturing something eternal that is not beyond the present instant, nor behind it, but within it.” It is the attitude that makes possible to grasp the “‘heroic’” aspect of the present moment.” This attitude is also responsible for modernity’s essential potential and need for critique.405 Foucault maintained that Kant’s answer to the call of the Berlinische Monatsschrift published in November 1784, was the first time that this modern attitude was used as a method. The significance of “Zur Beantwortung der Frage was ist Aufklärung” was that it was a criticism or reflection upon the present, considering its historical importance and then, in a next step, making it a philosophical problem. In other words, for the first time the contingent state of knowledge and the horizon established by the things we know had become part of knowledge itself and part of philosophy. This is, according to Foucault, what makes Enlightenment the age of critique. In contrast to the Habermasian ideal of emancipation that is read by a critical class, Foucault’s comment on Kant is upholding the individual’s autonomy and at the same time determining demands for it. The attitude of architects whom we encountered throughout this study, feeling above the public and/or as forerunners of the public, would be impossible to plead for on the basis of Foucault and what I consider as more living up to Kant’s initial project.406 As we have seen considering the Tilted Arc, such an attitude is often and understandably felt as irritating. If architects choose to make the city the subject of their discipline and if they take the city seriously, it is absurd to plead for a stratification within the public, elevating oneself above the others.
From the things said above, we can idealize four basic ways of criticism or reflection, all of them apparent in architecture, all of them, a process inherent in criticism, tending toward idealization. There are four ways in which an ordinary instant can be turned into a problem of criticism.

First, there is the criticism of the individual. This sort of criticism, which turns against the thinking mind itself, made the artist the ideal modern character for Foucault, Hegel, Baudelaire and, as we have seen, for Habermas.\textsuperscript{407} In Habermas’s view the impact of the artistic lifestyle was so extensive that it became the mold for modern consumerism. Foucault points at the important mix that constitutes the mindset of the artist who is “in appearance a spectator, a collector of curiosities.” But through an ethos of work, his will and patience, the artist is able to capture what everyone takes for granted and to expose his essential truth. “[W]hen the whole world is falling asleep, he begins to work, and he transfigures the world. His transfiguration does not entail an annulling of reality, but a difficult interplay between truth of what is real and the exercise of freedom; 'natural' things become 'more than natural,' 'beautiful' things become 'more then beautiful,' and individual objects appear 'endowed with an impulsive life like the soul of [their] creator'.”\textsuperscript{408} This does not seem to be restricted to the realm of the arts. As the example of Robert Boyle working from his bed, scrutinizing "glowing" meat, has shown, the same idealization can be found at the dawn of modern science. Also, the dislike of idleness and exaggeration of one’s own industry structured the principally open public of the coffeehouse and, finally, was formalized by Heidegger and his understanding of techne and aletheia, and was cordially welcomed in the field of architecture.

Second, there is the formal criticism of thought. Techne is also essential in this form of critique, proving the provisional nature of this list. As an example of this formal criticism we can take the aesthetics of Sir Joshua Reynolds. In his Discourses, he maintained: “disposition to abstractions, to generalizing and classification is the great glory of the human mind.” The artist ought to reduce the idea of beauty to a general principle. Against
“temporary ornaments … the Professor of painting proceeded in the same method, when he shewed you that the artifice of contrast was founded but on one principle.” Reynolds is “convinced that this is the only means of advancing science, of clearing the mind from confused heap of contradictory observations, … bringing them under one general head, can alone give rest and satisfaction to an inquisitive mind.” The tendency of model-building and reduction in science is very similar. This has also been called the process of desubstantialization in Ernst Cassier’s analysis in Substance and Function; relations are replaced by Aristotelian substances. In architecture, it can be seen, for example, as the process Emil Kaufmann described: starting from the autonomous building, leading toward an independent architectural language. The remarks of Le Corbusier that the whitewash will purify and reveal the truth and Loos’s ornament as a sign of degeneration are expressive examples found in our field.

Third, there is criticism of the public. We have discussed this extensively with regard to Arendt, Heidegger, Frampton, Hayes, Adorno and Serra. As a means of constructing social difference and to elevate oneself above others, it is a claim for authority. This is not particular to our field, but it can be found in all autonomous fields where people are defending their integrity, creating “the idea of identity” in the community and finally claiming a singular position typically in association with a special relation with truth.

Fourth and finally, there is systematic criticism, or reflexivity directed against one’s own perspective toward the world. All the others forms mentioned above make it necessary and, as we shall see below, it was also a necessity to act politically – a practice called theoria. For Kant, this last form of criticism is essential for all systematic fields of knowledge and philosophy. It is the preoccupation of his third criticism, the Critique of Judgment, and the subject of the last chapter.
17.1 System and Critique

The etymology of the word system provides a relevant connection to the changes of modernity which, as we have seen, are a disaster for some and the source of freedom for others. In antiquity, systēma was used to denote a “whole compounded of several parts or members”, used for political and religious councils, for technical instruments, keys and the entirety of the cosmos. Later, medieval scholarship used systema in the same way it used the term corpus, denoting the whole of religious articles. In its first modern use, scholars spoke of the systema mundi in direct relation with antique scholarship. Thus, Galileo Galilei, in 1632, considered the entire cosmos in his Dialogo sopra I due massimi sistemi del mondo. The systema mundi is the proportional relation of all celestial and earthly bodies.

Soon after the Copernican Revolution, the meaning of the term was reduced and now used to speak of more moderate undertakings. System and hypothesis now belong together forming an alliance that is no more exclusive but relative. Astronomers, just like architects, lost their ability to consider the cosmos and at the same time the entirety of things, but they were now working with hypothesis. That means that a variety of systems are always possible and there is no need or basis to favor one over the other. In fact, Andreas Osiander, writing the preface for the Copernican De revolutionibus orbium mundi, the book so crucial for Kant, already reminded his readers:

“it is the duty of an astronomer to compose the history of the celestial motions through careful and expert study. Then he must conceive and devise the causes of these motions or hypotheses about them.

…

[However] Let no one expect anything certain from astronomy, which cannot furnish it, lest he accept as the truth ideas conceived for
another purpose, and depart this study a greater fool than when he entered.”

The Copernican hypothesis is no more the truth then the Ptolemaic, or even any astrological hypothesis, it is “just” a different one. This is the dawn of modernity. In the classical ideal, in philosophy, science, art and architecture, the only possibility for justification that extended beyond the horizon of belief is the *mos geometricus* of mathematics and geometry. Only in the pure clarity and from the proportional relation of the *mos geometricus* could philosophers expect something to be true. But as the coherence of the cosmos and its parts had fallen, the geometrical justification became obsolete. And it was Kant who was the first to formulate another general possibility.

To Kant, a system is “the unity of the manifold of cognitions under one idea.” We must therefore “[u]nder the government of reason” unify all cognitions under a “system, in which alone can support and advance its essential ends.” In a complex public that allows autonomy for its various systems, fields and disciplines, it cannot possibly be held together by one general mode of justification. But Kant wants to use autonomy and not shy away from its freedom, the freedom seen by some as methodological *horror vacui*. Kant calls free acting a *game* (*Spiel, Spiel der freien Kräfte*) that will be sincere if and only if all participating assets are brought in harmonic relation without force. Then we can call acting in a *system* free.

For Kant there is no contradiction in having autonomous views unified in a common public. Instead, living in a system, we can establish criticism only by exposing ourselves to the common context of the public. Kant holds that all knowledge will be private if the acting person is “a cog in a machine” – when the person acts in a familiar environment (of the discipline). Only in a public and free use of reason can we hope to seek criticism. By necessity, any system has constraints, contingencies, modes of production that influence the results. These contingencies cannot easily be
overcome without the risk of leaving the system. Thus, the critique of the system is only possible in an attempt to search outside of it – in the public. We cannot expect to find truth that way, but this endeavor will be systematic, that is, serving to create puzzlement about all that seems familiar.420

Aldo Rossi took his notion of urban facts from Wittgenstein. However, the later Wittgenstein maintains that “all that is the case” is so within “a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support.”421 Aldo Rossi’s facts are factual within the system in which he thinks and operates, and that is architecture. Because he does not recognize this, but instead peruses the project of an objective science on that basis, he fails so soon. Recognizing that all knowledge is part of a given system that has, according to Pierre Bourdieu, its specific sets of “vision and division” its nomoi, is recognizing that its views are autonomous, but always will have a relation to the public as a whole. First, the things as objects are available and part of culture. In a second step, they can be occupied and understood from certain autonomous perspectives, having their own nomoi. Michael Hayes uses a very similar definition of culture that was already mentioned above. However, he argues that it was necessary for architecture to turn against culture - instead of questioning what exactly it would be the perspective of architecture could offer.

In one of his last texts, Pierre Bourdieu approached science, looking at its modes of production and its contingences. He describes his interest as investigating the “paradoxical properties of … autonomous fields, such as science or poetry. …[T]hey tend to have no other link with the social world than the social conditions that ensure their autonomy with respect to the world, that is to say, … the historical conditions that had to be combined to produce a social condition such that the people who benefit from them can do things of this kind.”422 The book is not only a study on how science is possible, how we perhaps can speak of scientific progress, but most
importantly it is a passionate plea for scientific autonomy for “the ‘freedom’ it needs to develop its own necessity, its own logic, its own nomos.”

Science should be free with “scientists, freely making their own choice of problems and pursuing them in the light of their own personal judgment. They are in fact co-operating as members of a closely knit organization.”

Without any doubt, architecture - as part of the built environment - never worked that way. This does not mean that we should abandon the project of architectural autonomy. Instead, we should work on it, by being critical towards our own field. I maintain that this critical project in architecture (Bourdieu used the term reflexivity) is essential, especially if we agree to the connection of polis and individual which we discussed above.

17.2 Theoria

The critical practice I want to propose is derived from Kant’s understanding of critique and Bourdieu’s later application which he called reflexivity. This is not a project of theory but must be a part of the praxis. The proposal is a one of practice that is conscious about the constituting principle of the facts we take for granted, and seeks to critically employ them. Thus, the subject is the city, the history of our discourse and the links which dependencies the field have to the social world at large that limits its autonomy. If we want to pursue reflexivity or a critical project, it implies stepping outside of the “private” circumstance of the system seeking the public at large. Trying to overcome our bias is to be curious about the world and about the things we take for granted.

To make his point, Kant turns our intuitive understanding of “private” and “public” upside down. Acting in the private conditions of a system, we typically work like “a cog in a machine”, constantly accepting the standard and rules of the system in question. This, Kant maintains, is necessary most of the time in order to uphold the cohesion of the system.
However, it is in the public, where we are free, where we should seek the limits of the views we take for granted.

The ancient practice of *theoria* was employed for very similar reasons. In the classical period, *theoria* meant to make a journey for the sake of learning. Among the most popular reasons for going on a *theoria* was to visit oracles or festivals.427 The precondition for *theoria* was to leave one’s familiar environment, to establish a geographical distance from it. As a result, individuals on *theoria* witnessed a “high degree of freedom during the journey,” resembling what Simmel later said about the stranger.428 The freedom during *theoria*, was “a dangerous move”, because in leaving the accustomed community one also lost the security and status conferred by group membership. Hannah Arendt maintained that to act is to disclose one’s identity, to answer the question “Who are you?”429 In acting, one cannot hide the “who” and “what” one is – “his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, … [are] implicit in everything somebody does.”430 For her, the “Who” is something hidden by the person himself, a socially constructed collage of past events and situations, either experienced personally by the other or told in stories. This social self is “like the daimôn in Greek religion which accompanies each man throughout his life, always looking over his shoulder from behind and thus visible only to those he encounters.”431 Exposing ourselves to something unknown and away from our convenient surroundings, we leave behind this daimôn; and this is the way we can expect to learn something new.

At the beginning of Plato’s *Republic* we find Socrates on *theoria* together with friends. He chooses to stay overnight to see the festival and procession. For him the festival is both distraction and inspiration. Aristotle, too, is arguing that it is an essential occupation for the philosopher to see naked men doing all kinds of athletic exercises.

“As we go to the Olympian festival for the sake of the spectacle, even if nothing more should come of it – for the *theoria* itself is more
precious than money; and just as we go to theorize at the festival of
Dionysus not so that we will gain anything from the actors (indeed we
pay to see them) … so too the theoria of the universe must be
honoured above all things that are considered to be useful. For surely
we would not go to such trouble to see men imitating women and
slaves, or athletes fighting and running, and not consider it right to
theorize without payment the nature and truth of reality.” 432

He is not afraid of the Society of the Spectacle, the mass, but instead
appreciates the opportunity of theoria and is also willing to pay for it. Wonder
is important on theoria. According to Aristotle, all philosophy begins with
wonder and ends in theoria. “It is through wonder that men originally began,
and still begin, to philosophize, wondering at first about obvious
perplexities.” As one begins to wonder he will be “experiencing perplexity
about greater matters.” Because the person puzzled about the world will
think he is ignorant, he will be trying to “escape ignorance” and that is why
humans “practiced philosophy.” “[I]t is clear that they pursued knowledge
for the sake of knowing, and not for the sake of anything useful.” 433

Going on theoria meant to compare the nomoi, the laws, of the
town, with the laws of other cities. This is what Aristotle and Plato are
doing in their political texts. Plato is very explicit about this in his Laws.
Without those sent on theoria, the polis “will never in its isolation attain an
adequate level of civilization and maturity, nor will it succeed in preserving
its own nomoi permanently, so long as its grasp of them depends on mere
habituation without comprehension.” 434 Significantly, Pierre Bourdieu uses
nomoi to talk distinctly: “principle of vision and division, a principle of
construction of objective reality irreducible to that of another discipline.” 435
Michel Foucault maintains that like wonder, “care” is important for curiosity
and this is also one of the components of aletheia. For him it is “a readiness to
find what surrounds us strange and odd; a certain determination to throw off
familiar ways of thought and to look at the same things in a different way …
a lack of respect for traditional hierarchies of what is important and fundamental.”436 There is no room for elitism there.
NOTES

2 Aristotle, Politics 2.1263a
5 Pol. 1263a15–16.
8 Pol. 1280b
9 ibid.
10 Hesiod, Works and Days. 90-91
11 Pol. 1253b
12 Pol. 1255b
13 Höffe, Otfried, (ed.) Aristoteles: Politik p. 22; Since slaves are first acquired through war, slaves enter the city after hunters and soldiers, that is, at the level of the “Fevered City” (see below); Rep. 373d-376c. At 395e, slaves become a fact of life. See Dorter, Kenneth, The Transformation of Plato’s Republic, p. 66n16; Bosanquet, Bernard, A Companion to Plato’s Republic. Rivingtons (London) 1906, p. 84.
14 “One fine day it occurred to the Members of the Body that they were doing all the work and the Belly was having all the food. So they held a meeting, and after a long discussion, decided to strike work till the Belly consented to take its proper share of the work. So for a day or two, the Hands refused to take the food, the Mouth refused to receive it, and the Teeth had no work to do. But after a day or two the Members began to find that they themselves were not in a very active condition: the Hands could hardly move, and the Mouth was all parched and dry, while the Legs were unable to support the rest. Therefore they found that even the Belly in its dull quiet way was doing necessary work for the Body, and that all must work together or the Body will go to pieces.”

15 Plato, *Tim.* 69c; 70a-c; 44d, 69d-470a; Dorter, *The Transformation of Plato’s Republic.* pp. 353-357


18 Socrates, who was among those who propagated this view, in a dreadful sense proved his conviction, when he was sentenced to death by a corrupt oligarchy that ruled Athens after the defeat in the Peloponnesian War. A just individual cannot live in an unjust city.

19 Rep. 2.368d “So, since we are not clever persons, I think we should employ the method of search that we should use if we, with not very keen vision, were bidden to read small letters from a distance, and then someone had observed that these same letters exist elsewhere larger and on a larger surface. We should have accounted it a godsend, I fancy, to be allowed to read those letters first, and examine the smaller, if they are the same.”

20 It needs to be added that Plato in the *Theaetetus* seems to accept a lower standard for knowledge. *Crat.* 187b4-8


22 Recki, Birgit, *Kultur als Praxis. Eine Einführung in Ernst Cassirers Philosophie der symbolischen Formen.* Akademie Verlag (Berlin) 2004 p. 34.

23 ibid.


28 Frampton, “The Status of Man,” p. 27.
34 Arendt, *The Human Condition.* p. 198
36 “…Make account of this, that wheresoever you please to sit down, there presently of yourselves you are a city”, Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War.* Thomas Hobbes, ed. J. M. Dent (London) 1910, 7.77; Arendt, *The Human Condition.* p. 198
37 José Ortega y Gasset, quoted in Sert, José Luis “Centers of Community Life,” in J. Tyrwhitt, Sert, J. L. and Rogers, E. N. (eds.) *The Heart of the City.* Lund Humphries (London) 1952 p. 3 the preceding sentence suggests the context of such ideas “For in truth the most accurate definition of the urbs and the polis is very like the comic definition of a cannon. You take a hole, wrap steel wire tightly around it, and that's your cannon.” Baird, *The Space of Appearance.*
38 Arendt, Hannah, *The Human Condition.* p. 27.
39 ibid.
41 Arendt, Hannah, *The Human Condition.* pp. 7-8; a pun on Heidegger’s "Man".
44 Arendt, Hannah, *Crises of the Republic,* p. 140.
47 Like in Aristotle, the members of a family are “non-political, even antipolitical” – being in a family is not “living together”. Arendt, *The Human Condition.* p. 54.
50 Arendt, Hannah, *On Revolution.* 38

149
Arendt, Hannah, *The Human Condition*. p. 51


Salkever, Stephen, “Reading Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics,” p. 216

Cicero, Tuscolanae Disputationes 5.5.


*PbL.* 4.11

Rep. 546d2; finding the correct moment has to do with a kind of measure, important for *techne*. It "comprises whatever measures things in relation to the mean, the fitting, the *kairos*, the needful, and anything else that dwells in the middle away from the extremes." Rep. 284e.


Frampton, “Toward,” p. 82

ibid.

Frampton, “Toward,” p. 81


see also Frampton “architecture seeks to preempt all culture it consciously divorces itself form both building and the realm of historical reality. Frampton, Kenneth, “On Reading Heidegger,” *Oppositions* 4 Witteborn Art Books (New York) 1975 pp. 1-4; p. 4

Frampton, “Toward,” p. 82

Frampton, “Toward,” p. 87; “Critical Regionalism,” p. 327

ibid.

Frampton, “Critical Regionalism,” p. 327

Later, in the introduction to *Labour, work and architecture* Frampton recommends “double glazing, … recycling of warm air in winter, low-speed fans, servo-mechanisms for the control of louvers and vents; the use of solar walls and photovoltaic cells” for reasons of sustainability. “Introduction” p. 14

Frampton, “Toward,” p. 86


Frampton, “Toward,” p. 88


Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time.* (translated by Joan Stambaugh) State University of New York Press (New York) 1996 p. 127 “Abständigkeit, Durchschnittlichkeit, Einebnung konstituieren als Seinsweisen des Man das, was wir

150

76 ibid. Heidegger later used the terms “planetary journalism” and “planetary technology”.


82 This is not to claim distance ist he only reason for Heidegger’s diction.


86 see: Jormakka Kari, *Eyes that do not see.


88 Gropius, Walter, *Apollo in der Demokratie*.


96 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 363, 415-
100 Arendt, The Human Condition. p. 52.
105 Rep. 369d.
106 Rep. 370a-b.
107 Rep. 370e-372c, 370c.
109 Rep. 372d
110 Dorter, The Transformation of Plato’s Republic. p. 66
111 Rep. 373a
112 It may be added that those who were not granted full civic status in the Attic polis lead the pre-luxurious life. Nancy Evans pointed out the women for example only scarcely consumed meat. Evans, Nancy, “Feasts, Citizens and Cultic Democracy in Classical Athens” Ancient Society 34 (2004) pp. 1-25.
113 Rep. 375c.
116 Arendt, Hannah, Between Past and Future pp. 209-10 [my italics].
In addition to the above references, see also Colquhoun, Alan, “Typology and Design Method,” in Essays in Architectural Criticism. The MIT Press (Cambridge, MA) 1984 p. 45.


"Standing there, the building holds its stand against the storm raging away above it, and so first shows the storm itself in its violence. The radiance and glow of the stone, themselves shining only by grace of the sun, first bring the light of day, the expanse of the sky, and the darkness of night, to appear in relief. The secure towering-up of the temple makes visible the invisible space of air. The unshaken work stands against the rolling sea, and in resting lets appear the surge of the tide. Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter into their contrasting Gestalt and so come into relief as what they are.” Heidegger, Martin. “The Origin of the Work of Art” in Basic Writings, 1st Harper Perennial Modern Thought Edition., David Farrell (ed.) Krell HarperCollins (New York) 1993 p. 139-212; pp. 167-8.


Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking", p. 362 "a building as dwelling must be construed through technology, using this critical meditation to disclose the 'mysterious' origins of technology in techne and its capacity to embody truth, in the mode of 'aletheia'. What is at stake is never an overcoming of technology that might 'leave it behind,' (Überwindung) but rather a twisting and healing (Verwindung), a destabilizing that may show that technology is not absolute truth, that there are other ways available to humanity for relating to the world, means that need also result in a self-transformation that is perhaps related to Heideggerian Gelassenheit, strategies other than power and domination."

Heidegger, Martin. “The Origin of the Work of Art” p. 159


157 Pérez-Gómez, “Dwelling on Heidegger: Architecture as Mimetic techno-poiesis”.
161 Arendt, Between Past and Future. p. 203.
162 Arendt, Between Past and Future. p. 201.
164 Arendt, Between Past and Future. p. 219.
165 I’m consciously replacing “the Greeks” and “them with “us” and “our” as I think this is what Arendt is trying to say. This said, I need to add that “us” and “our” is referring to concerned “intellectuals”. Arendt, Hannah, Between Past and Future p. 214, 197
166 Arendt, Between Past and Future. p. 215.
168 Arendt, Between Past and Future. p. 205.
169 Sennett, The Fall of Public Man. p. 337.
175 Rousseau, “A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality” p. 57; Adolf Max Vogt connected Le Corbusier’s obsession with the pilotis with the earliest dwelling above water, thus Desor’s and Rousseau’s teachings. Vogt, Adolf Max, Le Corbusier, the Noble Savage. Toward an Archaeology of Modernism. The MIT Press (Cambridge, MA) 1998.

Recki, Kultur als Praxis. p. 23.


Arendt is frequently talking about Classical Antiquity, and Arendt is referring to Fustel de Coulanges's, Machiavelli's and Weber's treaties on that time; she refers to Solon’s laws as a decisive moment (The Human Condition p. 29-31, 81) and the End of Aristotle’s life seems to be an appropriate limit on the other end. Also see: de Coulanges, Fustel, The Ancient City. Batoche Books (Ontario) 2001 [1864] p. 162-65.

Thuc. 1.70; a Corinthian speaker addressing the Spartans.

Thuc. 2.16.

Thuc. 2.15.


Il. 18. 274; 18. 497; ibid.

Od. 6. 266-9; ibid.

Od. 1.5; ibid.

O.d 8. 110; ibid.

Herodot 1, 21, 2; 1, 53, 1; 1, 197


Hesiod, Theogony ll. 240-264.


Prot. 319a.

Prot. 319c.

Prot. 320b-22a.

Prot. 322d.

Prot. 323b-c.


Ath. Pol. 11.1.

Paus. 1.18; while the location of the kurbeis seems to be decided, that of the axons is not certain. They might as well have been at the Bouleuterion or the Stoa Basileios at the Agora. See. Connor, W. R., “Sacred' and 'Secular’ I ε ρ ας και μετά το α and the Classical Athenian Concept of the State” Ancient Society 18 1987 p. 161-88 n75p.187.


Hesiod, Works and Days 90-91; Theogony 532-535; Plutarch, Moralia XIV 1102b.

Chiniotis, Angelo, “Reinheit des Körpers – Reinheit des Sinnes in den
griechischen Kulturgesetzen,” in Assmann, Sundermeier (eds.), Schuld, Gewissen
und Person (Studien zum Verstehen fremder Religionen, 9), Gütersloh 1997, 142-
179, p. 143.

Rep. 4. 427b, Laws 6. 759 c.; Garland, R. S. J. “Religious Authority in Archaic and
Classical Athens,” p. 80.

Lane, Eugene, Corpus Monumentorum Religionis Dei Menis: (CMRDN). Leiden (1971)
p. 10.

Parker, Robert, Miasma: pollution and purification in early Greek religion. London
Reinheit des Sinnes in den griechischen Kulturgesetzen”. This is not to say that
the requirements for men and women were the same, hence making them equals in the
polis. The extreme regulations for women are discussed below.

Körpers” p. 146 [my translation] “Wenn man das Heiligtum betritt, darf man keine
Waffen tragen; man soll reine Kleider haben, keine Kopfbinde tragen, keine Schuhe
bzw. nur weiße Schuhe, die aber nicht aus Ziegenfell gemacht wurden, der Gürtel
darf keine Knoten haben; betreten darf man es vierzig Tage nach dem Tod einer
Frau, eines Hundes oder eines Esels, einundvierzig nach dem Beischlaf mit einer
Jungfrau, einundvierzig nach einem Todesfall in der Familie, drei Tage nach dem
Geschlechtsverkehr, eine Wöchnerin einundzwanzig Tage nach der Geburt”.

Errington, M. “Inscriften von Euromos“, in Epigraphica Anatolica, 21, 15-32 as citied in
Chaniotis, “Reinheit des Körpers,” p. 156. [my translation].


Temple of Asclepius at Epidaurus forth century B. C. Parker, Miasma. p. 322.

Translated by J. H. Vince, modified. Cf. W. Burkert p. 77, Conner, "Sacred' and
'Secular" p. 179.

Laws 4.716 d, as cited in Conner, W. R. "'Sacred' and 'Secular'" p. 179.

Antiphon, On the Choreutes. 6.45. Antiphon is talking about both secular and sacred
obligations.


Connor, "'Sacred' and 'Secular'” p. 163.

Connor, "'Sacred' and ‘Secular’” p. 167.

Connor, “‘Sacred’ and ‘Secular’”, p. 169

Isaeus, Astyphilus, 9.21 as cited in Evans, “Feasts, Citizens and Cultic Democracy
in Classical Athens” p. 13.


Sophocles, Electra. 252-265, 187-192.

Sophocles, Electra. 189f, “I can’t carry this pain any more. Most of my life has
already gone without the slightest hope. I waste away without any children or
without a man to stand beside me, to stand up for me and, like a disdained stranger
in my own city, I go about doing the domestic work of my own father’s rooms. Look
at my dress! Such a shabby cloth and with this dress, I wait for the people to finish eating before I can sit down for my own meal but by then, all the food is gone. All the tables are empty.”


234 Gerhardt, Volker; Kaulbach, Friedrich, *Kant. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft* (Darmstadt) 1979 p.75

235 Gerhardt, *Kant*. pp.74-5


237 Gerhardt, *Kant*. p.75

238 Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, hrsg. Von der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1902, IV 404

239 Kant, II 217; Gerhardt, *Kant*. p.68


241 Kant, 1787/1983, B 473 (zweite Auflage der KrV) as sited in Gerhardt, *Kant*. p. 78

242 Kant V, 99

243 Kant, I. 1785; *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*. p. 108


246 Kaufmann, Emil, *Von Ledoux bis Le Corbusier*. Verlag Dr. R. Plasser (Wien) 1933 p. 59;


250 “The stone is more stone than before. In general we no longer understand architecture, at least by far not in the way we understand music. We have outgrown the symbolism of lines and figures, as we have grown unaccustomed to the tonal effects of rhetoric, no longer having sucked in this kind of cultural mother’s milk from the first moment of life. Originally everything about a Greek or Christian building
meant something, and in reference to a higher order of things. This atmosphere of inexhaustible meaningfulness hung about the building like a magic veil. Beauty entered the system only secondarily, impairing the basic feeling of uncanny sublimity, of sanctification by magic or the gods' nearness. At the most, beauty tempered the dread—but this dread was the prerequisite everywhere.

What does the beauty of a building mean to us now? The same as the beautiful face of a mindless woman: something masklike.” Nietzsche, Friedrich, Human All too Human. Stanford University Press (Stanford, CA) 1997 [1878] #218.

251 “Da die Eigengesetzlichkeit des Stofflichen anerkannt wird, hören die Umdeutungen der toten Materie in organische Gebilde auf, endet die barocke Allbeseelung. Für die nachrevolutionäre Baukunst ist Stein wieder Stein.” Kaufmann, Von Ledoux bis Le Corbusier. p. 45 [German italics in original; English: my translation and italics].

252 “Die vorrevolutionäre Epoche verstand eine Stütze besser, wenn sie als Atlante, als Karyatide oder als Herme auftrat, einen Tischfuß, wenn er als Tierpranke oder Huf, einen Wasserlauf, wenn er als Fischmaul geformt war. Sie war primitiver als die Menschheit nach der Aufklärungsperiode, die, um vieles kühler und nüchterner, die Säule—woferne eine solche Verwendung findet—as Säule haben will, und nicht in anthropomorpher Umwandlung, die auch jeder Personifizierung abstrakter Begriffe durchaus abhold ist.” Kaufmann, Von Ledoux bis Le Corbusier. pp. 45-46.

253 “Nicht der Stoff entscheidet, sondern das autonome Empfinden will das Material zeigen, wie es ist, will die 'sachliche' Form.” Kaufmann, Von Ledoux bis Le Corbusier. p. 46.

254 “Wir gebrauchen das Wort bewußt, um unmittelbar auf das in der neuen Gesellschaft immer allgemeiner werdende, nicht wie in Renaissance and Barock auf die höheren Kreise beschränkte 'Distanzhalten' hinzuweisen.” Kaufmann, Von Ledoux bis Le Corbusier. p. 33.


256 Kant’s practical philosophy was developed “in dialogue with his reading of Rousseau.” This also applies to Wolff and Hutcheson. Still, Kaufmann’s conclusion remains grave. Gerhardt, Kant. pp. 62-67.


263 “die Frage des Aufstieges der großen Menge zu höheren Lebensformen, zu einer besseren Lebensführung, die bis zur Revolution nur einem kleinen Kreise vorbehalten war.” Diese Gleichstellung und das Aufheben der Trennung einer hohen und einer niedrigen Kunst bewirkt, dass “alle Bauaufgaben gleichwertig und der


267 “Es wird immer deutlicher, dass man ein soziales Wohnviertel nicht so projektieren sollte, dass man es als abgeschlossene Einheit betrachtet … Stattdessen sollte man zwar eine gewisse Unabhängigkeit (besser wäre es von Autonomie zu sprechen) gewähren, die für einige Funktionen unerlässlich ist, aber der Knackpunkt liegt darin, die richtige wechselseitige Beziehung mit den anderen Stadtteilen herzustellen.” Rossi, Also, “La città e la periferia, Scritti scelti sull’architettura e la città. 1956-1972, Clup (Milano) 1975 p. 163; as cited in baukuh, “Die Architektur der Stadt; Das nicht gehaltene Versprechen,” p. 16


269 baukuh, “Die Architektur der Stadt; Das nicht gehaltene Versprechen,” p. 21


271 Rossi calls those facts fattì urbani. In English they are called “urban artifacts; in the German this phrase was translated into “städtbautliche Sachverhalte” both times obscuring the link to Wittgenstein. This point was made by baukuh “Die Architektur der Stadt; Das nicht gehaltene Versprechen,” p. 20n54, p. 27

272 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 2; 2.01

273 Rossi, The Architecture of the City. p. 41

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277 Rossi, Aldo, “Introduzione”, Architettura Razionale, 21 F. Angeli (Milano) 1973

278 “Wir wollen feststellen, welche Gesetz die Stadt als Manufakt bestimmen; wir beschäftigen uns mit dem räumlichen Verhältnissen, mit ihrer Form, ihrem Wachstum, als ob die Stadt ein großes, auf Dauer angelegtes Werk der Ingenieurstuck ware, was sei unserer Ansicht nach auch ist.” (my translation) Rossi, Aldo, “I problemi metodologici della ricerca urbana,” in AA. VV. La formazione del concetto di tipologia edilizia, Venice 1965; as cited in baukuh “Die Architektur der Stadt; Das nicht gehaltene Versprechen,” p. 20

279 the insertions are mine. Galileo Galilei, Discoveries and opinions of Galileo, including The starry messenger (1610), Letters on sunspots (1613), Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina (1615), and excerpts from the assayer (1623). Doubleday (Garden City, NY) 1957 p. 178, as quoted in Jormakka Kari, Disguise and Delimit p. 26

280 Cole, “Archaic Truth,” p. 27

281 ibid.

282 Habermas, The Structural Transformation. p. 83

283 Polgar, Alfred “Theory of the Café Central” in Segel, Harold B. The Vienna Coffeehouse Wits, 1890-1938. Purdue University Press (West Lafayette, IN) 1993, pp. 267-70


286 Macaulay, Thomas Babington, The History of England form the Accession of James the Second, I, 1848 pp. 366-70 “Every man of the upper or middle class went daily to his coffee-house to learn the news and to discuss it. Every coffee-house had one or more orators to whose eloquence the crowd listened with admiration, and who soon became what the journalists of our time have been called, a Fourth Estate of the realm. … Foreigners remarked that the coffeehouse was that which especially distinguished London from all other cities; that the coffee-house was the Londoner's home, and that those who wished to find a gentleman commonly asked, not whether he lived in Fleet Street or Chancery Lane, but whether he frequented the Grecian or the Rainbow. Nobody was excluded from these places who laid down his penny at the bar. Yet every rank and profession, and every shade of religious and political opinion, had its own headquarters.”


292 Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*. p. 36-7

293 Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*. p. 36


296 Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*. p. 8


298 Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*. p. 17

299 Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*. p. 43

300 Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*. p. 43-7

301 Habermas, *The Structural Transformation*. p. 41-2


303 Habermas, “Modern and Postmodern Architecture” p. 424


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Aureli, The possibility. p. IX, p. 2; Koolhaas, Rem, “Berlin,” Zone 1-2 (1986); the connection of Koolhaas and Hilbersheimer was made for example by Neumeyer, Fritz, Rogier Francesca, “OMA’s Berlin: The Polemic Island in the City,” Assemblage, No. 11 (Apr., 1990), pp. 36-53.


Aureli, The possibility. p. 4-2, p. 3.

See the summary of the debate and the problems in Jormakka, Kari, Genius Locomotionis. edition selene (Wien) 2005.


Aureli, The possibility. p. X.

ibid.


Aureli, The possibility. p. 27-30; for a critical review of Carl Schmitt’s theory, see Gerhardt, Öffentlichkeit. pp. 207-211.


“Pier Vittorio Aureli “The Possibility of an Absolute Architecture”” YouTube video, 2’10” last consulted on July 9th 2014.


Trevelyan, English Social History p. 246.

Habermas, The Structural Change p. 43.
The term “home” may very well be read in a Heideggerian way as “being-at-home.” Similar arguments have been read in Heidegger’s terms suggesting a connection to the “uncanny” as the feeling of “not-being-at-home.” Heidegger, Martin, “What is Metaphysics” § 23

Habermas, The Structural Transformation. p. 83

Habermas, Jürgen, “Reflections on the linguistic foundations of sociology” p. 89


Habermas, “Modernity: An Unfinished Project,” p. 45

Habermas, “Modernity: An Unfinished Project,” p. 48

Habermas, “Modernity: An Unfinished Project,” p. 47


Habermas, “Modernity: An Unfinished Project” p. 45

Hayes, “Critical Architecture: Between Culture and From,” p. 29

Hayes, “Critical Architecture: Between Culture and From,” p. 17

see also: Wallenstein, Sven-Olov, The Silences of Mies. AXL Books (Stockholm) 2008

Hayes, “Critical Architecture: Between Culture and From,” p. 22


Finkelpearl, Dialogues in public art. p. 64

349 Spurr, The Post-Reformation. p. 117
351 Ellis, The Coffee House p. 42
352 Ellis, The Coffee House p. 42
358 Cowan, The Social Life of Coffee. p. 33
368 Coffee-houses Vindicated in Answer to the late Published Character of a Coffee-House Asserting from Reason, Experience, and Goof Authors the Excellent Use, and Physical Vertues of that Liquor. With the Grand Conveniency of such Civil Places of Resort and Ingenious Conversation. London, 1672, p. 2, 4; Evelyn, Sylva. p.229 as cited in Picciotto, Labors of Innocence. p. 298
369 Parsons, Robert, Allen, William. Englefield, Francis Sir, A conference about the next succession to the crown of England: divided into two parts. 1681 p. 3-4
370 Pepys, Diary. December 26th, 30th, 31st 1663, as cited in Ellis, The Coffee House. p. 56
371 Ellis, The Coffee House p. 58
373 M. P., A Character of Coffee and Coffee-Houses. 1661; Character of a Coffee-House. 1665
377 Letters Written by Eminent Persons in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries to Which are Added, Hearne's Journeys to Reading, and to Whaddon Hall, The Seat of Browne Willie, ESQ and Lives of Eminent Men, By John Aubrey, ESQ. Part II 1813 p. 372 as cited in Ellis, The Coffe House. p. 299
378 Ellis, The Coffee House. p. 371
379 Ellis, The Coffee House. p. 372
380 The Censure of the Rota Upon Mr Miltons Book (London: Paul Giddy, Printer tot he Rota, at the Sign oft he Windmill in Turne-Againe Lane, 1660 p. 3 as cited in Ellis, The Coffee House. p. 47
388 Picciotto, Labors of Innocence. p. 149
389 M. P. A Character of Coffee and Coffee-Houses §10
Ellis, *The Coffee House. A Cultural History*. p. 66; Cowan, “What was masculine about the Public Sphere?” pp. 127-157


Wilkins, John, *The Mathematical and Philosophical Works of the Right Rev. John Wilkins, Late Lord Bishop of Chester*: III. An abstract of his essay towards a real character, and a philosophical language. 1802 p. 90

Wilkins, John, *Mathematical Magick, or, The wonders that may by performed by mechanichal geometry: in two books, concerning mechanical powers [and] motions. Being one of the most easie, pleasant, useful (and yet most neglected) part of Mathematicks. Not before treated of in this language*. 1648, II p. 90, 50


Picciotto, *Labors of Innocence*. p. 396-7


Shapin, Steven, *A Social History of Truth*. p. 94


see. Gerhardt, *Kant*. pp. 57-97

**Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.** Polity Press (Cambridge, MA) 1987 p.16-20;
Foucault, “What is Enlightenment,” pp. 32-50 p. 35
416 Luban, *Legal Modernism*., p. 34
418 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. 122
419 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment” p. 36
420 paraphrasing Kampartel, “‘System’ und ‘Begründung’” p. 29
421 Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*. § 142
423 Bourdieu, *The Sciece of Science*. p. 47
This is not to say that I accept Bruno Latour’s point that is in talking about politics and science (architecture) next to each other, that I argue that the same methods of active deception and professional influence are at work. See Latour, Bruno, *Science in Action: How to follow Scientists and Engineers through Society*. Open University Press (Milton Keynes) 1987

Gerhardt, *Kant*. p. 109

Nightingale, *Spectacles of Truth*. p. 40


Arendt, *The Human Condition* p. 179

Arendt, *The Human Condition* p. 179-80


Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 1.2.6

*Laws* 951b


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