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D.A. Behrens, G. Feichtinger, G. Tragler, J. P. Caulkins:
"For Saud or Sand? Modeling the Implications of (Mis)Understanding Objectives in the War on Terror";
Vortrag: The Mathematics of Public Security (MAPUSE), Wien (eingeladen); 07.04.2006.

International terrorism is by any measure a principal concern of policy makers and a complex issue. This talk develops a set of inter-related optimal dynamic control/dynamic game models in an effort to shed light on certain strategic issues concerning how best to prosecute the "war on terror". The issue of primary interest concerns the proper way to conceptualize the objectives of the competing parties and the implications of misspecification at that level for success or failure. To focus on these issues other aspects of the problem are greatly simplified. Notably, the state of the terror system is reduced to a single variable denoting the current strength of the terrorists.

terrorism, policy, optimal control, dynamic game