Vorträge und Posterpräsentationen (ohne Tagungsband-Eintrag):
G. Leigh:
"The simple truth";
Vortrag: Gothenburg Logic Seminar,
Gothenburg, Schweden (eingeladen);
15.09.2015
- 16.09.2015.
Kurzfassung englisch:
The 'truth bi-conditionals' are the statements of the form `A <-> T[A]´ where A is a sentence, T is a predicate symbol and [A] denotes a name for A (e.g. Gödel code of A). Theories defined in terms of truth bi-conditionals are known to be deductively and conceptually simple. As observed already by Tarski, compositional truth principles, such as `for all sentences A, B: T[A & B] <-> T[A] & T[B]´, are not derivable from the basic bi-conditionals except in trivial cases. Nevertheless, many philosophers (e.g. Quine, Horwich, Williams) have proposed that the truth bi-conditionals are all there is to truth. In this talk I present proof-theoretic support for this extreme view and show how remarkably strong systems (both truth- and proof-theoretically) are implicit in very weak truth-theoretic assumptions.
Erstellt aus der Publikationsdatenbank der Technischen Universität Wien.