Talks and Poster Presentations (with Proceedings-Entry):

A. Dabrowski, G. Petzl, E. Weippl:
"The Messenger Shoots Back: Network Operator Based IMSI Catcher Detection";
Talk: 19th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID 2016), Paris, France; 2016-09-19 - 2016-09-21; in: "RAID 2016: Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 9854 (2016), 279 - 302.

English abstract:
An IMSI Catcher, also known as Stingray or rogue cell, is a device that can be used to not only locate cellular phones, but also to intercept communication content like phone calls, SMS or data transmission unbeknown to the user. They are readily available as commercial products as well as do-it-yourself projects running open-source software, and are obtained and used by law enforcement agencies and criminals alike. Multiple countermeasures have been proposed recently to detect such devices from the userīs point of view, but they are limited to the nearby vicinity of the user.

In this paper we are the first to present and discuss multiple detection capabilities from the network operatorīs point of view, and evaluate them on a real-world cellular network in cooperation with an European mobile network operator with over four million subscribers. Moreover, we draw a comprehensive picture on current threats against mobile phone devices and networks, including 2G, 3G and 4G IMSI Catchers and present detection and mitigation strategies under the unique large-scale circumstances of a real European carrier. One of the major challenges from the operatorīs point of view is that cellular networks were specifically designed to reduce global signaling traffic and to manage as many transactions regionally as possible. Hence, contrary to popular belief, network operators by default do not have a global view or their network. Our proposed solution can be readily added to existing network monitoring infrastructures and includes among other things plausibility checks of location update trails, monitoring of device-specific round trip times and an offline detection scheme to detect cipher downgrade attacks, as commonly used by commercial IMSI Catchers.

Created from the Publication Database of the Vienna University of Technology.