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A. Haret, H. Khani, S. Moretti, M. Öztürk:
"Ceteris paribus majority for social ranking";
Vortrag: IJCAI - International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Stockholm; 13.07.2018 - 19.07.2018; in: "Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)", ijcai.org, (2018), S. 303 - 309.

We study the problem of finding a social ranking over individuals given a ranking over coalitions formed by them. We investigate the use of a ceteris paribus majority principle as a social ranking solution inspired from the classical axioms of social choice theory. Faced with a Condorcet-like paradox, we analyze the consequences of restricting the domain according to an adapted version of single-peakedness. We conclude with a discussion on different interpretations of incompleteness of the ranking over coalitions and its exploitation for defining new social rankings, providing a new rule as an example

We study the problem of finding a social ranking over individuals given a ranking over coalitions formed by them. We investigate the use of a ceteris paribus majority principle as a social ranking solution inspired from the classical axioms of social choice theory. Faced with a Condorcet-like paradox, we analyze the consequences of restricting the domain according to an adapted version of single-peakedness. We conclude with a discussion on different interpretations of incompleteness of the ranking over coalitions and its exploitation for defining new social rankings, providing a new rule as an example

Agent-based; Multi-agent Systems; Cooperative Games; Knowledge Representation; Reasoning; Knowledge Representation; Game Theory; Social Choice Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Voting

http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/42

https://publik.tuwien.ac.at/files/publik_272977.pdf

Projektleitung Johannes Peter Wallner:
EMBArg