Talks and Poster Presentations (with Proceedings-Entry):

M. Lackner, P. Skowron:
"Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules and Strategic Voting";
Talk: IJCAI - International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Stockholm; 2018-07-13 - 2018-07-19; in: "Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI} 2018", ijcai.org, (2018), ISBN: 978-0-9992411-2-7; 340 - 346.

English abstract:
We investigate the possibility of strategic voting in approval-based multiwinner rules. In particular, we define three axiomatic properties that guarantee resilience to certain forms of strategic voting: independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), monotonicity, and SD-strategyproofness. In this paper, we systematically analyze multiwinner rules based on these axioms and provide a fine-grained picture of their resilience to strategic voting. Both our axiomatic and experimental analysis show that approval-based multiwinner rules are generally very susceptible to strategic voting---with one exception: multiwinner approval voting

Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice; Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Voting

"Official" electronic version of the publication (accessed through its Digital Object Identifier - DOI)

Electronic version of the publication:

Related Projects:
Project Head Reinhard Pichler:
Effiziente, parametrisierte Algorithmen in Künstlicher Intelligenz und logischem Schließen

Project Head Stefan Woltran:

Created from the Publication Database of the Vienna University of Technology.