Talks and Poster Presentations (with Proceedings-Entry):
M. Lackner, P. Skowron:
"Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules and Strategic Voting";
Talk: IJCAI - International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
Stockholm;
2018-07-13
- 2018-07-19; in: "Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI} 2018",
ijcai.org,
(2018),
ISBN: 978-0-9992411-2-7;
340
- 346.
English abstract:
We investigate the possibility of strategic voting in approval-based multiwinner rules. In particular, we define three axiomatic properties that guarantee resilience to certain forms of strategic voting: independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), monotonicity, and SD-strategyproofness. In this paper, we systematically analyze multiwinner rules based on these axioms and provide a fine-grained picture of their resilience to strategic voting. Both our axiomatic and experimental analysis show that approval-based multiwinner rules are generally very susceptible to strategic voting---with one exception: multiwinner approval voting
Keywords:
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice; Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Voting
"Official" electronic version of the publication (accessed through its Digital Object Identifier - DOI)
http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/47
Electronic version of the publication:
https://publik.tuwien.ac.at/files/publik_273379.pdf
Related Projects:
Project Head Reinhard Pichler:
Effiziente, parametrisierte Algorithmen in Künstlicher Intelligenz und logischem Schließen
Project Head Stefan Woltran:
START
Created from the Publication Database of the Vienna University of Technology.