Talks and Poster Presentations (with Proceedings-Entry):

M. Lackner, P. Skowron:
"Consistent Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules";
Talk: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Ithaca, New York, USA; 2018-06-18 - 2018-06-22; in: "Proceedings of the 2018 {ACM} Conference on Economics and Computation", (2018), ISBN: 978-1-4503-5829-3; 47 - 48.

English abstract:
This paper is an axiomatic study of consistent approval-based multi-winner rules, i.e., voting rules that select a fixed-size group of candidates based on approval ballots. We introduce the class of counting rules, provide an axiomatic characterization of this class and, in particular, show that counting rules are consistent. Building upon this result, we axiomatically characterize three important consistent multi-winner rules: Proportional Approval Voting, Multi-Winner Approval Voting and the Approval Chamberlin--Courant rule. Our results demonstrate the variety of multi-winner rules and illustrate three different, orthogonal principles that multi-winner voting rules may represent: individual excellence, diversity, and proportionality.

Consistent Approval-Based; Multi-Winner Rules

"Official" electronic version of the publication (accessed through its Digital Object Identifier - DOI)

Electronic version of the publication:

Related Projects:
Project Head Reinhard Pichler:
Effiziente, parametrisierte Algorithmen in Künstlicher Intelligenz und logischem Schließen

Project Head Stefan Woltran:

Created from the Publication Database of the Vienna University of Technology.