Talks and Poster Presentations (with Proceedings-Entry):

R. Focardi, M. Squarcina, G. Steel, M. Palmarini, M. Tempesta:
"Mind Your Keys? A Security Evaluation of Java Keystores";
Talk: Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), San Diego; 2018-02-18 - 2018-02-21; in: "Proceedings of 2019 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium", (2018), 1-1891562-49-5; 1 - 15.

English abstract:
Cryptography is complex and variegate and re-quires to combine different algorithms and mechanisms in non-trivial ways. This complexity is often source of vulnerabilities.Secure key management is one of the most critical aspects,since leaking a cryptographic key vanishes any advantage ofusing cryptography. In this paper we analyze Java keystores,the standard way to manage and securely store keys in Javaapplications. We consider seven keystore implementations fromOracle JDK and Bouncy Castle, a widespread cryptographiclibrary. We describe, in detail, how the various keystores enforceconfidentiality and integrity of the stored keys through password-based cryptography and we show that many of the implementa-tions do not adhere to state-of-the-art cryptographic standards.We investigate the resistance to offline attacks and we show that,for non-compliant keystores, brute-forcing can be up to threeorders of magnitude faster with respect to the most compliantkeystore. Additionally, when an attacker can tamper with thekeystore file, some implementations are vulnerable to denial ofservice attacks or, in the worst case, arbitrary code execution.Finally we discuss the fixes implemented by Oracle and BouncyCastle developers following our responsible disclosure.

"Official" electronic version of the publication (accessed through its Digital Object Identifier - DOI)

Electronic version of the publication:

Created from the Publication Database of the Vienna University of Technology.