Vorträge und Posterpräsentationen (mit Tagungsband-Eintrag):
M. Lackner, P. Skowron:
"Consistent Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules";
Vortrag: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation,
Ithaca, New York, USA;
18.06.2018
- 22.06.2018; in: "Proceedings of the 2018 {ACM} Conference on Economics and Computation",
(2018),
ISBN: 978-1-4503-5829-3;
S. 47
- 48.
Kurzfassung englisch:
This paper is an axiomatic study of consistent approval-based multi-winner rules, i.e., voting rules that select a fixed-size group of candidates based on approval ballots. We introduce the class of counting rules, provide an axiomatic characterization of this class and, in particular, show that counting rules are consistent. Building upon this result, we axiomatically characterize three important consistent multi-winner rules: Proportional Approval Voting, Multi-Winner Approval Voting and the Approval Chamberlin--Courant rule. Our results demonstrate the variety of multi-winner rules and illustrate three different, orthogonal principles that multi-winner voting rules may represent: individual excellence, diversity, and proportionality.
Schlagworte:
Consistent Approval-Based; Multi-Winner Rules
"Offizielle" elektronische Version der Publikation (entsprechend ihrem Digital Object Identifier - DOI)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3219166.3219170
Elektronische Version der Publikation:
https://publik.tuwien.ac.at/files/publik_273477.pdf
Zugeordnete Projekte:
Projektleitung Reinhard Pichler:
Effiziente, parametrisierte Algorithmen in Künstlicher Intelligenz und logischem Schließen
Projektleitung Stefan Woltran:
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Erstellt aus der Publikationsdatenbank der Technischen Universität Wien.